The APIs are flexible and easy-to-use, supporting authentication, user identity, and complex enterprise features like SSO and SCIM provisioning. Learn more →
Cargo-vet Alternatives
Similar projects and alternatives to cargo-vet
-
community
Public feedback discussions for: GitHub Mobile, GitHub Discussions, GitHub Codespaces, GitHub Sponsors, GitHub Issues and more! (by community)
-
InfluxDB
Power Real-Time Data Analytics at Scale. Get real-time insights from all types of time series data with InfluxDB. Ingest, query, and analyze billions of data points in real-time with unbounded cardinality.
-
packj
Packj stops :zap: Solarwinds-, ESLint-, and PyTorch-like attacks by flagging malicious/vulnerable open-source dependencies ("weak links") in your software supply-chain
-
lunasec
LunaSec - Dependency Security Scanner that automatically notifies you about vulnerabilities like Log4Shell or node-ipc in your Pull Requests and Builds. Protect yourself in 30 seconds with the LunaTrace GitHub App: https://github.com/marketplace/lunatrace-by-lunasec/
-
WorkOS
The modern identity platform for B2B SaaS. The APIs are flexible and easy-to-use, supporting authentication, user identity, and complex enterprise features like SSO and SCIM provisioning.
-
cargo-supply-chain
Gather author, contributor and publisher data on crates in your dependency graph.
-
crev
Socially scalable Code REView and recommendation system that we desperately need. See http://github.com/crev-dev/cargo-crev for real implemenation.
-
W4SP-Stealer
Discontinued w4sp Stealer official source code, one of the best python stealer on the web [GET https://api.github.com/repos/loTus04/W4SP-Stealer: 403 - Repository access blocked]
-
SaaSHub
SaaSHub - Software Alternatives and Reviews. SaaSHub helps you find the best software and product alternatives
cargo-vet reviews and mentions
-
Ferrocene – Rust for Critical Systems
For supply chain security, you might be interested in cargo-vet[0], a tool for coordinating and requiring manual reviews of open source dependencies. Both Mozilla and Google[1] have started publishing their audits.toml files, which are a machine-readable file describing what source code reviews they have performed.
[0] https://github.com/mozilla/cargo-vet
[1] https://opensource.googleblog.com/2023/05/open-sourcing-our-...
-
Rust security scanning options
there is also cargo-vet for manual auditing of the source code of the crates, which is not something that can be done automatically. Quite a few companies and orgs use it now like Mozilla, Google, Bytecode Alliance, us (Embark Studios), ISRG, zcash etc. And believe its usage will expand significantly going forward with corporate users and security sensitive projects/orgs.
-
NPM repository flooded with 15,000 phishing packages
If you don't know the author, signatures do nothing. Anybody can sign their package with some key. Even if you could check the author's identity, that still does very little for you, unless you know them personally.
It makes a lot more sense to use cryptography to verify that releases are not malicious directly. Tools like crev [1], vouch [2], and cargo-vet [3] allow you to trust your colleagues or specific people to review packages before you install them. That way you don't have to trust their authors or package repositories at all.
That seems like a much more viable path forward than expecting package repositories to audit packages or trying to assign trust onto random developers.
[1]: https://github.com/crev-dev/crev [2]: https://github.com/vouch-dev/vouch [3]: https://github.com/mozilla/cargo-vet
-
How do regulates companies handle software of unknown Provence (SOUP) when using needed open source crates?
The other approach is https://github.com/mozilla/cargo-vet
- greater supply chain attack risk due to large dependency trees?
- Dozens of malicious PyPI packages discovered targeting developers
-
Best way to protect a project from supply chain attacks?
cargo crev and cargo vet for reviewing dependencies and using reviewed versions
-
Vetting the Cargo
Since the audits are designed to be used at a per project level and contributed directly into the VCS repo (allowing you to using git signing for example) I don't quite understand what additional off-line cryptographic signatures are required here (considering that Cargo's lockfiles already contain a hash of the crate which would prevent the project from getting an altered version of a crate accidentally and that SHA validation is being considered as part of vet as well https://github.com/mozilla/cargo-vet/issues/116).
- Mozilla/cargo-vet – supply-chain security for Rust
- Gitsign
-
A note from our sponsor - WorkOS
workos.com | 26 Apr 2024
Stats
mozilla/cargo-vet is an open source project licensed under Apache License 2.0 which is an OSI approved license.
The primary programming language of cargo-vet is Rust.
Sponsored