cargo-vet
cargo-supply-chain
cargo-vet | cargo-supply-chain | |
---|---|---|
12 | 20 | |
598 | 311 | |
5.7% | 1.3% | |
7.6 | 4.9 | |
about 1 month ago | about 2 months ago | |
Rust | Rust | |
Apache License 2.0 | Apache License 2.0 |
Stars - the number of stars that a project has on GitHub. Growth - month over month growth in stars.
Activity is a relative number indicating how actively a project is being developed. Recent commits have higher weight than older ones.
For example, an activity of 9.0 indicates that a project is amongst the top 10% of the most actively developed projects that we are tracking.
cargo-vet
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Ferrocene – Rust for Critical Systems
For supply chain security, you might be interested in cargo-vet[0], a tool for coordinating and requiring manual reviews of open source dependencies. Both Mozilla and Google[1] have started publishing their audits.toml files, which are a machine-readable file describing what source code reviews they have performed.
[0] https://github.com/mozilla/cargo-vet
[1] https://opensource.googleblog.com/2023/05/open-sourcing-our-...
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Rust security scanning options
there is also cargo-vet for manual auditing of the source code of the crates, which is not something that can be done automatically. Quite a few companies and orgs use it now like Mozilla, Google, Bytecode Alliance, us (Embark Studios), ISRG, zcash etc. And believe its usage will expand significantly going forward with corporate users and security sensitive projects/orgs.
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NPM repository flooded with 15,000 phishing packages
If you don't know the author, signatures do nothing. Anybody can sign their package with some key. Even if you could check the author's identity, that still does very little for you, unless you know them personally.
It makes a lot more sense to use cryptography to verify that releases are not malicious directly. Tools like crev [1], vouch [2], and cargo-vet [3] allow you to trust your colleagues or specific people to review packages before you install them. That way you don't have to trust their authors or package repositories at all.
That seems like a much more viable path forward than expecting package repositories to audit packages or trying to assign trust onto random developers.
[1]: https://github.com/crev-dev/crev [2]: https://github.com/vouch-dev/vouch [3]: https://github.com/mozilla/cargo-vet
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How do regulates companies handle software of unknown Provence (SOUP) when using needed open source crates?
The other approach is https://github.com/mozilla/cargo-vet
- greater supply chain attack risk due to large dependency trees?
- Dozens of malicious PyPI packages discovered targeting developers
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Best way to protect a project from supply chain attacks?
cargo crev and cargo vet for reviewing dependencies and using reviewed versions
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Vetting the Cargo
Since the audits are designed to be used at a per project level and contributed directly into the VCS repo (allowing you to using git signing for example) I don't quite understand what additional off-line cryptographic signatures are required here (considering that Cargo's lockfiles already contain a hash of the crate which would prevent the project from getting an altered version of a crate accidentally and that SHA validation is being considered as part of vet as well https://github.com/mozilla/cargo-vet/issues/116).
- Mozilla/cargo-vet – supply-chain security for Rust
- Gitsign
cargo-supply-chain
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Release of Structsy 0.5
Great news! Sounds like a good way to add caching to cargo supply-chain. There's a lot of small chunks of data we want to persist.
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greater supply chain attack risk due to large dependency trees?
Shameless plug: https://github.com/rust-secure-code/cargo-supply-chain shows the supply chain attack surface for your Rust project.
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Announcement: xflags 3.0.0
bpaf: https://github.com/rust-secure-code/cargo-supply-chain/blob/29bfcb256001cdef46830544b554d33c56602030/src/cli.rs
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Yet another command line argument parser: bpaf 0.5.2
I'm very happy with it for cargo supply-chain. I appreciate that it has no unsafe code, no sprawling dependency tree, and supports OsStr in addition to just &str.
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Best way to protect a project from supply chain attacks?
cargo supply-chain to see your attack surface for supply chain attacks
- Cargo-supply-chain: Rust author, contributor and publisher data for dep. crates
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Comparing Rust supply chain safety tools
See also: cargo supply-chain
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Yet another command line argument parser: bpaf 0.4.0
I've used bpaf for cargo supply-chain and I'm very happy with it.
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Fundamental - finding out who you can fund in dependency tree
https://github.com/rust-secure-code/cargo-supply-chain can also help here.
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Announcing `cargo supply-chain` v0.3: revamped CLI, separate JSON schema
cargo supply-chain list the publishers of all crates in your dependency graph. With it you can:
What are some alternatives?
cargo-crev - A cryptographically verifiable code review system for the cargo (Rust) package manager.
cap-std - Capability-oriented version of the Rust standard library
W4SP-Stealer - w4sp Stealer official source code, one of the best python stealer on the web [GET https://api.github.com/repos/loTus04/W4SP-Stealer: 403 - Repository access blocked]
paru - Feature packed AUR helper
git-ts - Git TimeStamp Utility
gitsign - Keyless Git signing using Sigstore
cargo-auditable - Make production Rust binaries auditable
secimport - eBPF Python runtime sandbox with seccomp (Blocks RCE).
eve-rs - A simple, intuitive, express-like HTTP library
security-wg - Node.js Ecosystem Security Working Group
cargo-msrv - 🦀 Find the minimum supported Rust version (MSRV) for your project