cargo-vet VS packj

For supply chain security, you might be interested in cargo-vet[0], a tool for coordinating and requiring manual reviews of open source dependencies. Both Mozilla and Google[1] have started publishing their audits.toml files, which are a machine-readable file describing what source code reviews they have performed.

[0] https://github.com/mozilla/cargo-vet

[1] https://opensource.googleblog.com/2023/05/open-sourcing-our-...

there is also cargo-vet for manual auditing of the source code of the crates, which is not something that can be done automatically. Quite a few companies and orgs use it now like Mozilla, Google, Bytecode Alliance, us (Embark Studios), ISRG, zcash etc. And believe its usage will expand significantly going forward with corporate users and security sensitive projects/orgs.

If you don't know the author, signatures do nothing. Anybody can sign their package with some key. Even if you could check the author's identity, that still does very little for you, unless you know them personally.

It makes a lot more sense to use cryptography to verify that releases are not malicious directly. Tools like crev [1], vouch [2], and cargo-vet [3] allow you to trust your colleagues or specific people to review packages before you install them. That way you don't have to trust their authors or package repositories at all.

That seems like a much more viable path forward than expecting package repositories to audit packages or trying to assign trust onto random developers.

[1]: https://github.com/crev-dev/crev [2]: https://github.com/vouch-dev/vouch [3]: https://github.com/mozilla/cargo-vet

The other approach is https://github.com/mozilla/cargo-vet

cargo crev and cargo vet for reviewing dependencies and using reviewed versions

Since the audits are designed to be used at a per project level and contributed directly into the VCS repo (allowing you to using git signing for example) I don't quite understand what additional off-line cryptographic signatures are required here (considering that Cargo's lockfiles already contain a hash of the crate which would prevent the project from getting an altered version of a crate accidentally and that SHA validation is being considered as part of vet as well https://github.com/mozilla/cargo-vet/issues/116).

Creator of Packj [1] here. How do you envision sandboxing/security policies will be specified? Per-lib policies when you've hundreds of dependencies will become overwhelming. Having built an eBPF-based sandbox [2], I anticipate that accuracy will be another challenge here: too restrictive will block functionality, too permissive defeats the purpose.

1. https://github.com/ossillate-inc/packj flags malicious/risky NPM/PyPI/RubyGems/Rust/Maven/PHP packages by carrying out static+dynamic+metadata analysis.

Cool project. How do you feel about projects like OpenSSF scorecards or even the checks that socket.dev do today on these packages to help determine risk?

https://github.com/ossillate-inc/packj/blob/main/.packj.yaml

Secondly, what about impersonation where attackers imitate a popular package and its respective metadata?

I built Packj [1] sandboxing for securing “pip/NPM install”. It uses strace for sandboxing and blocks access to sensitive files and limits traffic to known-good IP addresses.

1. https://github.com/ossillate-inc/packj

Great work! This provenance check is going to be very valuable for enforcing supply-chain security. We are working on adding support to check for provenance in Packj.

1. https://github.com/ossillate-inc/packj flags risky/malicious NPM/PyPI/Ruby dependencies

Cool project. Would love to integrate this in Packj [1] as one of the open-source SAST scanners. Will DM you.

1. https://github.com/ossillate-inc/packj flags malicious/risky open-source dependencies.

Very cool! I've built something similar, but for packages: https://github.com/ossillate-inc/packj Would love to talk.

Working on a marketplace (based on Packj [1]) to allow open-source developers to make money by selling "assured" software artifacts.

1. Packj https://github.com/ossillate-inc/packj flags malicious and other "risky" open-source dependencies in your software supply chain.

I’ve created Packj sandbox [1] for “safe installation” of PyPI/NPM/Rubygems packages

1. https://github.com/ossillate-inc/packj

It DOES NOT require a VM/Container; uses strace. It shows you a preview of file system changes that installation will make and can also block arbitrary network communication during installation (uses an allow-list).

Great to see a developer-friendly tool around OSV! Packj [1] uses OSV APIs to report vulnerable PyPI/NPM/Rubygems packages. Disclaimer: I built it.

1. https://github.com/ossillate-inc/packj flags malicious/risky packages.