rfcs VS warehouse

I can give a limited answer based on my own day-to-day work. I work in Ruby Dependency Security, which is the team who are most involved in helping out with rubygems.org and RubyGems work. Our biggest effort lately has been about rolling out MFA requirements for owners of top-most-downloaded gems. What I'd like to do afterwards is focus on gem signing using sigstore, which would make it a "one click" experience for authors. We did some work on it earlier this year[0] but chose to focus on MFA as our first big push. We also aim to devote a substantial fraction of our time to chopping wood and carrying water: looking at honeybadger exception reports, etc.

In terms of the long run there's a whole bunch that can be done to continuously harden every aspect of the Ruby supply chain. One thing we've been involved in founding is the OpenSSF Securing Software Repos working group[1], which has meant that RubyGems maintainers are now talking directly with folks from PyPI, npm, Maven Central, Cargo and others. We all face shared threats (eg, dependency confusion, resurrection attacks etc), so getting together to work collectively and share ideas has been super awesome.

[0] https://github.com/rubygems/rfcs/pull/37

[1] https://github.com/ossf/wg-securing-software-repos

That’s correct. If you’re a maintainer of a very popular gem, as of 15th August you’ll no longer be able to e.g. `gem push` if you haven’t enabled MFA on your RubyGems account. You will of course still be able to log in and enable it.

More details in the RFC: https://github.com/rubygems/rfcs/blob/master/text/0007-mfa-r...

> < 10% had useful 2FA enabled.

I expect this to change. NPM will roll out mandatory MFA for the most-downloaded packages[0] (RubyGems as well[1]). I expect this will rise to a 100% requirement at some point because Github's decision to require MFA by the end of 2023 will massively raise the waterline of folks who have the capability to MFA and experience with MFA.

[0] https://github.blog/2021-11-15-githubs-commitment-to-npm-eco...

[1] https://github.com/rubygems/rfcs/issues/35

The RFC trying to introduce sigstore for RubyGems is an interesting look at this in practice: https://github.com/rubygems/rfcs/pull/37

pip install PackageName: installs a package (you can browse the available packages in the Python Package Index)

python3 -m pip install \ --trusted-host test.pypi.org --trusted-host test-files.pythonhosted.org \ --index-url https://test.pypi.org/simple/ \ --extra-index-url https://pypi.org/simple/ \ piper_whistle==$(python3 -m src.piper_whistle.version)

In my experience so far, I can use a vast amount of the Python Standard Library to build Wasm-powered serverless applications. The caveat I currently understand is that Python’s implementation of TCP and UDP sockets, as well as Python libraries that use threads, processes, and signal handling behind the scenes, will not compile to Wasm. It is worth noting that a similar caveat exists with libraries that I find on The Python Package Index (PyPI) site. While these caveats might limit what can be compiled to Wasm, there are still a ton of extremely powerful libraries to leverage.

We believe that poetry is currently the best tool for this purpose, besides of being the most popular one at the moment. This is why we will use poetry to manage the dependencies of our project throughout this series of posts. Poetry allows you to declare the libraries your project depends on, and it will manage (install/update) them for you. Poetry also allows you to package your project into a distributable format and publish it to a repository, such as PyPI. We strongly recommend you to learn more about this tool by reading the official documentation.

From there, I needed to learn a bit about PyPi or Python Package Index, which is the home for all the wonderful packages that you know if you have ever run the handy pip install command. PyPi has a pretty quick and easy onboarding, which requires a secured account be created and, for the purposes of submitting packages from CLI, an API token be generated. This can be done in your PyPi profile. Once logg just navigate to https://pypi.org/manage/account/ and scroll down to the API tokens section. Click “Add Token” and follow the few steps to generate an API token which is your access point to uploading packages. With all this in place, I was able to use twine to handle the package upload. First I needed to install twine, again as simple as pip install twine. In order for twine to access my API token during the package upload process, it needed to read it from .pypirc file that contains the token info. For some that file may exist already, for me I was required to create it. Working in windows I simply used a text editor to create it in my home user directory ($HOME/.pypirc). The file contents had a TOML like format looked like this:

I have published the package to Python Package Index, commonly called PyPi, and in this post, I'll be sharing the steps I had to follow in the process.

Register at PyPI.org

According to the stats on the original link, there are over 25,000 identified secret ids/keys/tokens in the data. And it looks like that's just identifiable secrets, e.g. "Google API Keys" that I'm guessing are identifiable because they have a specific pattern, and may be missing other secrets that use less recognizable patterns.

I mean, sure, compared to the 478,876 Projects claimed on https://pypi.org/, that's a pretty small minority. On the other hand, I'd guess a many Python packages don't use these particular services, or even need to connect to a remote service at all, so the area for this class of mistake should be even smaller.

And mistakes do happen, but that's a pretty big thing to miss if you are knowingly publishing your code with the expectation other people will be reading it.

PyPi package

Does pypi.org display the Union of all keywords, the keywords of the most recent release, the keywords of the first release or some other weird combination like the intersection?