misra-rust
seL4
misra-rust | seL4 | |
---|---|---|
8 | 60 | |
112 | 4,538 | |
0.0% | 0.9% | |
0.0 | 9.0 | |
almost 3 years ago | 9 days ago | |
Rust | C | |
MIT License | GNU General Public License v3.0 or later |
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misra-rust
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United States White House Report on Memory Safe Programming [pdf]
MISRA and Ferrocene are not really related.
MISRA is, as you say, a set of rules for writing C code, that restrict what you can do.
Ferrocene is a qualified compiler. You write any normal Rust code you want: it's still the upstream Rust compiler. There are no restrictions.
Incidentally, someone has compared what MISRA does to what Rust does: https://github.com/PolySync/misra-rust/blob/master/MISRA-Rul...
Given that they can't repeat the MISRA stuff there, it's a bit disjoined, but it sure is interesting!
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Misra C++:2023 Published
A fun github repo: "what would MISRA look like applied to Rust" https://github.com/PolySync/misra-rust/blob/master/MISRA-Rul...
(They're comparing with the C version, not the C++ version...)
- Memory Safe Languages in Android 13
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Ferrocene: Rust toolchain to safety-critical environments
> There are huge swathes of MISRA which forbid things which not only aren't possible in Rust or SPARK
I can't vouch for its accuracy, but https://github.com/PolySync/misra-rust
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High Assurance Rust: Developing Secure and Robust Software
When it comes to MISRA C, it is interesting to note how many (a majority) of its rules do not apply or have native enforcement[1].
You might have also seen the AUTOSTAR Rust in Automotive Working Group announcement recently[2].
[1]: https://github.com/PolySync/misra-rust/blob/master/MISRA-Rul...
[2]: for some reason the announcement was removed from the "News and events" site, https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache%3Ahttp... but it is still available as a PDF https://www.autosar.org/fileadmin/user_upload/20220308_RustW...
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AUTOSAR announces new Working Group for Programming Language Rust in Automotive Software context
There's actually already a comparison: https://github.com/PolySync/misra-rust/blob/master/MISRA-Rules.md
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AdaCore and Ferrous Systems Joining Forces to Support Rust
Rust makes quite a few things more rigorous (e.g. pairing allocations with deallocations and reference validity). It basically fulfills the job of a static analyzer baked into the language.
It's also a vastly more analyzable language (in that its syntax is reasonably unambiguous and there's no dynamic runtime in play) and it can be integrated well.
Toolchain quality (error reporting, built in testing, awareness of primitives like "libraries", etc.) is also a huge strong point.
We're reasonably confident that we can use safe Rust as is, with strong guidance on how to do unsafe Rust.
For a tangible investigation of that space, PolySync has a project that has a look at MISRA rules from a Rust perspective. https://github.com/PolySync/misra-rust/blob/master/MISRA-Rul...
Ada is a good example here: the language has not evolved something like MISRA-C (it has evolved SPARK for formal verification, but I see that differently).
- Resources for learning C/C++ coming from a Rust background
seL4
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From L3 to seL4 what have we learnt in 20 years of L4 microkernels? [video]
> People like to snob Unix but the fact is: the world runs on Unix.
The world you are aware of runs on it.
> Can we really do that much better or is it just hubris?
Yes. Have a look at seL4[1] and Barrelfish too[2], even though that's no longer active. seL4 in particular is powering a lot of highly secure computing systems. There is a surprisingly large sphere outside of Unix/POSIX.
[1] https://sel4.systems/
[2] https://barrelfish.org/
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On the Costs of Syscalls
There are also RTOS-capable microkernels such as seL4[0], with few but extremely fast syscalls[1]. Note times are in cycles, not usec.
0. https://sel4.systems/
1. https://sel4.systems/About/Performance/
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Can the language of proof assistants be used for general purpose programming?
https://sel4.systems
Working on a number of platforms, verified on some. Multicore support is an ongoing effort afaict.
On OS built on this kernel is still subject to some assumptions (like, hardware working correctly, bootloader doing its job, etc). But mostly those assumptions are less of a problem / easier to prove than the properties of a complex software system.
As I understand it, guarantees that seL4 does provide, go well beyond anything else currently out there.
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How to write TEE/Trusted OS for ARM microcontrollers?
Take a look at this: https://sel4.systems/
- Simulation: KI-Drohne der US Air Force eliminiert Operator für Punktemaximierung
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Paragon Graphite is a Pegasus spyware clone used in the US
It's probably have to be seL4 (https://sel4.systems), running on some fully OSS hardware.
There are question marks over much of available RISC-V chips due to chinese producers, so maybe OpenPower based hardware?
Plus, the entire system (motherboard, etc) would need to be manufactured using a good supply chain.
Hmmm, this has probably all been thought through in depth before by others. :)
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Basic SAT model of x86 instructions using Z3, autogenerated from Intel docs
You can use it to (mostly) validate small snippets are the same. See Alive2 for the application of Z3/formalization of programs as SMT for that [1]. As far as I'm aware there are some problems scaling up to arbitrarily sized programs due to a lack of formalization in higher level languages in addition to computational constraints. With a lot of time and effort it can be done though [2].
1. https://github.com/AliveToolkit/alive2
2. https://sel4.systems/
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What are the current hot topics in type theory and static analysis?
Formal methods. This is not in most general-purpose programming languages and probably never will be (maybe we'll see formal methods to verify unsafe code in Rust...) because it's a ton of boilerplate (you have to help the compiler type-check your code) and also extremely complicated. However, formal methods is very important for proving code secure, such as sel4 (microkernel formally verified to not have bugs or be exploitable) which has just received the ACM Software Systems Award 3 days ago.
- Rust Now Available for Real-Time Operating System and Hypervisor PikeOS
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Amiga and AmigaOS should move to ARM.
Today we'd look at seL4.
What are some alternatives?
Welcome - Welcome to AeroRust- a Rust 🦀 in Aerospace 🚀 community & working group
l4v - seL4 specification and proofs
high-assurance-rust - A free book about developing secure and robust systems software.
fprime - F´ - A flight software and embedded systems framework
creusot - Creusot helps you prove your code is correct in an automated fashion. [Moved to: https://github.com/creusot-rs/creusot]
nomicon - The Dark Arts of Advanced and Unsafe Rust Programming
rubble - (going to be a) BLE stack for embedded Rust
CompCert - The CompCert formally-verified C compiler
rust-verification-tools - RVT is a collection of tools/libraries to support both static and dynamic verification of Rust programs.
InitWare - The InitWare Suite of Middleware allows you to manage services and system resources as logical entities called units. Its main component is a service management ("init") system.
wayland-ada - Ada 2012 bindings for Wayland
4.4BSD-Lite2 - 4.4BSD Lite Release 2: last Unix operating system from Berkeley