libavif VS l4v

It's 2023, surely this is not yet another bug related to memory unsafety that could be avoided if we'd stop writing critical code that deals with extremely complex untrusted input (media codecs) in memory unsafe languages?

Yep, of course it is: https://github.com/webmproject/libwebp/commit/902bc919033134...

I guess libwebp could be excused as it was started when there were no alternatives, but even for new projects today we're still committing the same mistake[1][2][3].

[1] -- https://code.videolan.org/videolan/dav1d

[2] -- https://github.com/AOMediaCodec/libavif

[3] -- https://github.com/AOMediaCodec/libiamf

Yep. Keep writing these in C; surely nothing will go wrong.

As far as I understand you are talking about this plugin. I don't know c++ and half of the code was like a black magic, but if I get it correctly, it encodes your images with libavif, and adds custom metadata ([solar/time of day] -> json -> base64).

So a few dozen comments, but so far it doesn't look like any mention the immediate thing that jumped out at me which was the claims vs AVIF:

>"In turn, what users will be given is yet another facet of the web that Google itself controls: the AVIF format."

Huh? I'll admit I haven't been following codecs as super ultra closely as I used to, but I thought AOM was a pretty broad coalition of varying interests and AV1 an open, royalty free codec that was plenty open source friendly? I've heard plenty of reasonable arguments that JPEG XL has some real technical advantages over AVIF and as well as superior performance is much more feature rich and scalable. So I could see people being bummed for that. But this is the first time I've heard the assertion that it's somehow a Google project? I mean, AOM's libavif reference is BSD too [0]? I'd love some more details on that from anyone who has been following this more closely. I can even understand if AOM isn't as community friendly and an accusation that it's dominated by big corps, but in that case why single out Google alone? From wiki:

>The governing members of the Alliance for Open Media are Amazon, Apple, ARM, Cisco, Facebook, Google, Huawei, Intel, Microsoft, Mozilla, Netflix, Nvidia, Samsung Electronics and Tencent.

Like, Google is certainly significant, but that's a lot of equally heavy hitters. And interesting that Mozilla is there too.

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0: https://github.com/AOMediaCodec/libavif

> You have a good point that AVIF layered image items can act like such P/B-frames. Do libavif (or other AVIF implementations if any) make use of them?

Seemingly. As search for "libavif progressive encoding" shows several issues about this, and a search for "progressive" in https://github.com/AOMediaCodec/libavif/blob/main/include/av... shows an enum for avifProgressiveState, appears to show support for it.

I mean, it already has it: https://github.com/AOMediaCodec/libavif/commit/570c42c2c10a878c8cc896f1c5daf1a955274142

Apart from mpv and ffplay, the only software I currently have installed that can play animated AVIF is Chromium. And from what I've read from this libavif bug report, I'm not sure if looping animated files in general is something that's just done by default by a lot of software regardless of whether the file is marked as a loop or not.

The support for progressive AVIF decoding has landed in libavif and in Chromium. But are there any docs on how to create and test progressive AVIF images?

The "for example" is the key here, because AVIF does support multi-layer coding per the spec now (though not currently implemented in libavif from what I can tell).

libavif is at version 0.11.1, see https://github.com/AOMediaCodec/libavif/tags

> C/C++ can be made memory safe

.. but it's much harder to prove your work is memory safe. sel4 is memory safe C, for example. The safety is achieved by a large external theorem prover and a synced copy written in Haskell. https://github.com/seL4/l4v

Typechecks are form of proof. It's easier to write provably safe Rust than provably safe C because the proofs and checker are integrated.

You can't really retrofit safety to C. The best that can be achieved is sel4, which while it is written in C has a separate proof of its correctness: https://github.com/seL4/l4v

The proof is much, much more work than the microkernel itself. A proof for something as large as webP might take decades.

When something like the seL4 microkernel is formally verified, the remaining bugs should only be bugs in the specification, not the implementation.

seL4 specifications and proofs are not a programming language.

Yes, especially 'logically impossible' when you dig into the details. From the blogpost:

> and the kernel modifications to seL4 that can reclaim the memory used by the rootserver.

MMMMMMMMMMMkkkkkk. So you then have to ask: were these changes also formally verified? There's a metric ton of kernel changes here: https://github.com/AmbiML/sparrow-kernel/commits/sparrow but I don't see a fork of https://github.com/seL4/l4v anywhere inside AmbiML.

I mean, it does also claim to be "almost entirely written in Rust", which is true if you ignore almost the entire OS part of the OS (the kernel and the minimal seL4 runtime).

Probably the only way to prevent this type of issue in an automated fashion is to change your perspective from proving that a bug exists, to proving that it doesn't exist. That is, you define some properties that your program must satisfy to be considered correct. Then, when you make optimizations such as bulk receiver fast-path, you must prove (to the static analysis tool) that your optimizations to not break any of the required properties. You also need to properly specify the required properties in a way that they are actually useful for what people want the code to do.

All of this is incredibly difficult, and an open area of research. Probably the biggest example of this approach is the Sel4 microkernel. To put the difficulty in perspective, I checkout out some of the sel4 repositories did a quick line count.

The repository for the microkernel itself [0] has 276,541

The testsuite [1] has 26,397

The formal verification repo [2] has 1,583,410, over 5 times as much as the source code.

That is not to say that formal verification takes 5x the work. You also have to write your source-code in such a way that it is ammenable to being formally verified, which makes it more difficult to write, and limits what you can reasonably do.

Having said that, this approach can be done in a less severe way. For instance, type systems are essentially a simple form of formal verification. There are entire classes of bugs that are simply impossible in a properly typed programs; and more advanced type systems can eliminate a larger class of bugs. Although, to get the full benefit, you still need to go out of your way to encode some invariant into the type system. You also find that mainstream languages that try to go in this direction always contain some sort of escape hatch to let the programmer assert a portion of code is correct without needing to convince the verifier.

[0] https://github.com/seL4/seL4

[1] https://github.com/seL4/sel4test

[2] https://github.com/seL4/l4v

I mean, just look at the commits with "fix" in the specs folder: https://github.com/seL4/l4v/commits/master?after=4f0bbd4fcbc...