l4v

seL4 specification and proofs (by seL4)

L4v Alternatives

Similar projects and alternatives to l4v

NOTE: The number of mentions on this list indicates mentions on common posts plus user suggested alternatives. Hence, a higher number means a better l4v alternative or higher similarity.

l4v reviews and mentions

Posts with mentions or reviews of l4v. We have used some of these posts to build our list of alternatives and similar projects. The last one was on 2024-02-28.
  • Rewrite the VP9 codec library in Rust
    5 projects | news.ycombinator.com | 28 Feb 2024
    > C/C++ can be made memory safe

    .. but it's much harder to prove your work is memory safe. sel4 is memory safe C, for example. The safety is achieved by a large external theorem prover and a synced copy written in Haskell. https://github.com/seL4/l4v

    Typechecks are form of proof. It's easier to write provably safe Rust than provably safe C because the proofs and checker are integrated.

  • CVE-2023-4863: Heap buffer overflow in WebP (Chrome)
    18 projects | news.ycombinator.com | 12 Sep 2023
    You can't really retrofit safety to C. The best that can be achieved is sel4, which while it is written in C has a separate proof of its correctness: https://github.com/seL4/l4v

    The proof is much, much more work than the microkernel itself. A proof for something as large as webP might take decades.

  • SeL4 Specification and Proofs
    1 project | news.ycombinator.com | 20 Aug 2023
  • What in the name of all that's holy is going on with software ?
    3 projects | /r/sysadmin | 7 Jun 2023
    When something like the seL4 microkernel is formally verified, the remaining bugs should only be bugs in the specification, not the implementation.
  • Elimination of programmers
    2 projects | /r/programming | 24 Nov 2022
    seL4 specifications and proofs are not a programming language.
  • Google Announces KataOS and Sparrow
    3 projects | news.ycombinator.com | 16 Oct 2022
    Yes, especially 'logically impossible' when you dig into the details. From the blogpost:

    > and the kernel modifications to seL4 that can reclaim the memory used by the rootserver.

    MMMMMMMMMMMkkkkkk. So you then have to ask: were these changes also formally verified? There's a metric ton of kernel changes here: https://github.com/AmbiML/sparrow-kernel/commits/sparrow but I don't see a fork of https://github.com/seL4/l4v anywhere inside AmbiML.

    I mean, it does also claim to be "almost entirely written in Rust", which is true if you ignore almost the entire OS part of the OS (the kernel and the minimal seL4 runtime).

  • A 24-year-old bug in the Linux Kernel (2021)
    4 projects | news.ycombinator.com | 15 Oct 2022
    Probably the only way to prevent this type of issue in an automated fashion is to change your perspective from proving that a bug exists, to proving that it doesn't exist. That is, you define some properties that your program must satisfy to be considered correct. Then, when you make optimizations such as bulk receiver fast-path, you must prove (to the static analysis tool) that your optimizations to not break any of the required properties. You also need to properly specify the required properties in a way that they are actually useful for what people want the code to do.

    All of this is incredibly difficult, and an open area of research. Probably the biggest example of this approach is the Sel4 microkernel. To put the difficulty in perspective, I checkout out some of the sel4 repositories did a quick line count.

    The repository for the microkernel itself [0] has 276,541

    The testsuite [1] has 26,397

    The formal verification repo [2] has 1,583,410, over 5 times as much as the source code.

    That is not to say that formal verification takes 5x the work. You also have to write your source-code in such a way that it is ammenable to being formally verified, which makes it more difficult to write, and limits what you can reasonably do.

    Having said that, this approach can be done in a less severe way. For instance, type systems are essentially a simple form of formal verification. There are entire classes of bugs that are simply impossible in a properly typed programs; and more advanced type systems can eliminate a larger class of bugs. Although, to get the full benefit, you still need to go out of your way to encode some invariant into the type system. You also find that mainstream languages that try to go in this direction always contain some sort of escape hatch to let the programmer assert a portion of code is correct without needing to convince the verifier.

    [0] https://github.com/seL4/seL4

    [1] https://github.com/seL4/sel4test

    [2] https://github.com/seL4/l4v

  • Formally Proven Binary Format Parsers
    2 projects | news.ycombinator.com | 4 Jul 2022
    I mean, just look at the commits with "fix" in the specs folder: https://github.com/seL4/l4v/commits/master?after=4f0bbd4fcbc...
  • Proofs and specifications
    1 project | /r/RISCV | 13 Mar 2022
    1 project | /r/kernel | 13 Mar 2022
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    www.saashub.com | 10 May 2024
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Stats

Basic l4v repo stats
15
490
9.6
8 days ago

seL4/l4v is an open source project licensed under GNU General Public License v3.0 or later which is an OSI approved license.

The primary programming language of l4v is Isabelle.


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