godot-wasm-engine
cap-std
godot-wasm-engine | cap-std | |
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1 | 12 | |
- | 621 | |
- | 0.6% | |
- | 6.6 | |
- | about 1 month ago | |
Rust | ||
- | GNU General Public License v3.0 or later |
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godot-wasm-engine
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Why WebAssembly is innovative even outside the browser
For me, the most interesting potential of WASM is it provides a platform-independent sandboxed way to run untrusted code written in multiple programming languages.
This means it's in theory possible to run the same code on an embedded hardware platform, a desktop app or in the browser.
And while I'm sure there's "serious" business uses for that capability :) I'm most interested in what it enables in terms of user customisation/modding of games.
Which was my main motivation for creating a Wasmtime WASM runtime add-on for the Godot game engine: https://gitlab.com/RancidBacon/godot-wasm-engine
And also designing the "WebAssembly Calling Card" specification as a way of demonstrating how the same code could produce graphical output that is then used in 2D or 3D environments: https://wacc.rancidbacon.com
cap-std
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Rust Library Team Aspirations | Inside Rust Blog
I believe you mean capability based, like cap-std.
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A Performance Evaluation on Rust Asynchronous Frameworks
There might be another reason to prefer async-std right now: the Bytecode Alliance is working on a version of std with support for capability-based security (called cap-std: https://github.com/bytecodealliance/cap-std ), and their async version is based on async-std (called cap-async-std: https://github.com/bytecodealliance/cap-std/tree/main/cap-async-std ). Given the clout that the Bytecode Alliance has, async-std might end up carving a niche out in the Wasm domain.
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Backdooring Rust crates for fun and profit
Would love to see something like this implemented around creating a Process in cap-std ( https://github.com/bytecodealliance/cap-std/issues/190 )
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Scripting Languages of the Future
I think it's not discussed enough how things like language features shape how library APIs are formed. People usually seem to only consider the question "how would I use this feature?" and not "how would the standard library look like with this feature?", which is surprising given how much builtin libraries affect the pleasantness of a language.
One of the things I'm excited to see is the cap-std project for Rust [0] given what Pony [1] has demonstrated is possible with capabilities. I'm also hoping that languages like Koka [2] and OCaml [3] will demonstrate interesting use cases for algebraic effects.
[0] https://github.com/bytecodealliance/cap-std
[1] https://www.ponylang.io/discover
[2] https://koka-lang.github.io
[3] https://github.com/ocaml-multicore/effects-examples
- Is using crates more safe than using npm?
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Why WebAssembly is innovative even outside the browser
I'm not sure you could hack the control flow when running bytecode on the JVM, but I strongly doubt that. (The JVM is "high-level" as pointed out previously and doesn't execute ASM like code. So there is no of the attack surface you have to care on the ASM level).
And capabilities are anyway something that belongs into the OS — and than programs need to be written accordingly. The whole point of the capability-security model is that you can't add it after the fact. That's why UNIX isn't, and never will be, a capability secure OS.
But "sanboxing" some process running on a VM is completely independent of that!
WASM won't get you anything beyond a "simple sanbox" ootb. Exactly the same as you have in the other major VM runtimes.
If you want capability-secure Rust, there is much more to that. You have to change a lot of code, and use an alternative std. lib¹. Of course you can't than use any code (or OS functionality) when it isn't also capability-secure. Otherwise the model breaks.
To be capability-secure you have actually to rewrite the world…
¹ https://github.com/bytecodealliance/cap-std
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Security review of "please", a sudo replacement written in Rust
The type system could definitely help. There's all sorts of things we can do. One really cool project is https://github.com/bytecodealliance/cap-std
- Preparing rustls for wider adoption
- cap-std: Capability-oriented version of the Rust standard library
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First class I/O
On the topic of unsafe being used to describe raw file descriptors, on one hand, there is a sense in which file descriptors are pointers, into another memory. They can leak, dangle, alias, or be forged, in exactly the same way. On the other, there is an open issue about this.
What are some alternatives?
wasmtime - A fast and secure runtime for WebAssembly
watt - Runtime for executing procedural macros as WebAssembly
wasmer - 🚀 The leading Wasm Runtime supporting WASIX, WASI and Emscripten
cargo2nix - Granular builds of Rust projects for Nix
Uno Platform - Build Mobile, Desktop and WebAssembly apps with C# and XAML. Today. Open source and professionally supported.
rusty-wacc-viewer
cargo-supply-chain - Gather author, contributor and publisher data on crates in your dependency graph.
bsnes-plus-wasm - debug-oriented fork of bsnes, with added wasm runtime for scripting
effects-examples - Examples to illustrate the use of algebraic effects in Multicore OCaml
Graal - GraalVM compiles Java applications into native executables that start instantly, scale fast, and use fewer compute resources 🚀