build-meta
sbctl
| build-meta | sbctl | |
|---|---|---|
| 5 | 94 | |
| - | 1,309 | |
| - | - | |
| - | 7.8 | |
| - | 7 days ago | |
| Go | ||
| - | MIT License |
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build-meta
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Distro that supports secure boot and FDE without asking for a password twice
Tracking issue: https://gitlab.com/carbonOS/build-meta/-/issues/140
- Tukzedo: A highly-opinionated, non-democratically led Linux distro concept based on ZFS and TPM. Immutable, rolling. Intended to be secure, install-once-and-use-for-life, functionally immortal. Some ideas may enrage ~1/3 of linux fans, and hopefully also RMS if it were to rise to his attention.
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Words/Letters missing in UI
"Re-created the install media" seems to imply you're building carbonOS yourself. Make sure your git checkout is newer than this commit: https://gitlab.com/carbonOS/build-meta/-/commit/f6a8db8af00808e8bacd3334952baff10487e49f. I suggest you just build off of the gnome branch. If you're building carbonOS, please check out the carbonOS Development Matrix channel: #carbonOS-devel:matrix.org
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Systemd 250 released
I'm working on one of those new-fangled atomic distros and I've been planning on how to actually securely verify every bit of OS data that loads and simultaneously keep every bit of user data encrypted. If you're interested, here's my tracking issue where I keep plans on how to best lock everything down: https://gitlab.com/carbonOS/build-meta/-/issues/44
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Im looking for some info
The main source for the actual OS is here: https://gitlab.com/carbonOS/build-meta
sbctl
- Show HN: Sbctl – Secure Boot key manager
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Show HN: SSH-tpm-agent – SSH agent for TPMs
No, this isn't true nor correct.
Secure Boot and TPM do offer tangible security benefits and is security features you can take ownership of.
Secure Boot allows your own key hierarchy, and TPM allows you to take ownership.
The linked boot disk isn't really proof that Secure Boot is useless. If you don't set a MOKManager password (as you should), and you change the security state of the machine while present at the keyboard. Yes you can boot things.
This is intended to make sure people can actually decide to trust things. And having insecure defaults makes this less useful. Not very surprising.
TPMs could also prevent attacks like this on your machine.
Incidentally I've invested quite a bit of time in making user-friendly Secure Boot tooling as well. https://github.com/Foxboron/sbctl
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Enabling secure boot for your Arch installation is very easy now with the "sbctl" tool
No problem! The sbctl package ships with a pretty extensive hook out of the box (https://github.com/Foxboron/sbctl/blob/master/contrib/pacman/ZZ-sbctl.hook). It's been very reliable for automatically resigning .efi executables after updates for me.
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sbctl fails to find EFI system partition
sbctl verify returns failed to find EFI system partition despite it definitely is there. It's the same issue as this but remounting or restarting doesn't fix it.
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Millions of PC Motherboards Were Sold With a Firmware Backdoor
lol
- The vendor-locking is for your own safety. Do not resist.
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Let's make a motherboard review guide
Must actually prevent unsigned images from booting
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[Kinoite/Silverblue]Decrypt LUKS volumes with a TPM on Fedora 35+
sudo dnf install asciidoc golang -y VERSION=0.11 cd /tmp curl -L "https://github.com/Foxboron/sbctl/releases/download/${VERSION}/sbctl-${VERSION}.tar.gz" | tar zxvf - cd "sbctl-${VERSION}" make sudo make install cd ~
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Setting up secure boot while dual booting Windows 11 and Arch Linux
By far the easiest is to use sbctl to generate, install and use keys to sign your efi images. You can use mkinitcpio to build the unified kernels automatically and a pacman trigger to rerun the sbctl signing when the kernel is updated. Pretty straightforward (once you've done it once).
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Intel OEM Private Key Leak: A Blow to UEFI Secure Boot Security
The question is whether you have any UEFI drivers or not. If they're in the ESP you can just look there to check, but UEFI drivers can also be loaded from PCI cards or baked in the firmware itself.
If you're using a TPM for Secure Boot, you can use the command in https://github.com/Foxboron/sbctl/wiki/FAQ#option-rom to know for sure.
What are some alternatives?
tang - Tang binding daemon
mortar - Framework to join Linux's physical security bricks.
booster - Fast and secure initramfs generator
mkinitcpio - Arch Linux initramfs generation tools (read-only mirror)
zorin-exec-guard - Zorin Exec Guard shows a warning when attempting to run unknown Linux or Windows executables and offers more trusted alternatives.
cryptboot - Encrypted boot partition manager with UEFI Secure Boot support
mainline - Install mainline kernel packages from kernel.ubuntu.com
simple-arch-installer
heads - A minimal Linux that runs as a coreboot or LinuxBoot ROM payload to provide a secure, flexible boot environment for laptops, workstations and servers.
tpm2-totp - Attest the trustworthiness of a device against a human using time-based one-time passwords
EmbeddedController - Embedded Controller firmware for the Framework Laptop
cryptsetup