sbctl
tpm2-totp
sbctl | tpm2-totp | |
---|---|---|
94 | 5 | |
1,304 | 149 | |
- | 7.4% | |
7.8 | 0.0 | |
4 days ago | about 1 month ago | |
Go | C | |
MIT License | BSD 3-clause "New" or "Revised" License |
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sbctl
- Show HN: Sbctl – Secure Boot key manager
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Show HN: SSH-tpm-agent – SSH agent for TPMs
No, this isn't true nor correct.
Secure Boot and TPM do offer tangible security benefits and is security features you can take ownership of.
Secure Boot allows your own key hierarchy, and TPM allows you to take ownership.
The linked boot disk isn't really proof that Secure Boot is useless. If you don't set a MOKManager password (as you should), and you change the security state of the machine while present at the keyboard. Yes you can boot things.
This is intended to make sure people can actually decide to trust things. And having insecure defaults makes this less useful. Not very surprising.
TPMs could also prevent attacks like this on your machine.
Incidentally I've invested quite a bit of time in making user-friendly Secure Boot tooling as well. https://github.com/Foxboron/sbctl
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Enabling secure boot for your Arch installation is very easy now with the "sbctl" tool
No problem! The sbctl package ships with a pretty extensive hook out of the box (https://github.com/Foxboron/sbctl/blob/master/contrib/pacman/ZZ-sbctl.hook). It's been very reliable for automatically resigning .efi executables after updates for me.
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sbctl fails to find EFI system partition
sbctl verify returns failed to find EFI system partition despite it definitely is there. It's the same issue as this but remounting or restarting doesn't fix it.
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Millions of PC Motherboards Were Sold With a Firmware Backdoor
lol
- The vendor-locking is for your own safety. Do not resist.
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Let's make a motherboard review guide
Must actually prevent unsigned images from booting
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[Kinoite/Silverblue]Decrypt LUKS volumes with a TPM on Fedora 35+
sudo dnf install asciidoc golang -y VERSION=0.11 cd /tmp curl -L "https://github.com/Foxboron/sbctl/releases/download/${VERSION}/sbctl-${VERSION}.tar.gz" | tar zxvf - cd "sbctl-${VERSION}" make sudo make install cd ~
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Setting up secure boot while dual booting Windows 11 and Arch Linux
By far the easiest is to use sbctl to generate, install and use keys to sign your efi images. You can use mkinitcpio to build the unified kernels automatically and a pacman trigger to rerun the sbctl signing when the kernel is updated. Pretty straightforward (once you've done it once).
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Intel OEM Private Key Leak: A Blow to UEFI Secure Boot Security
The question is whether you have any UEFI drivers or not. If they're in the ESP you can just look there to check, but UEFI drivers can also be loaded from PCI cards or baked in the firmware itself.
If you're using a TPM for Secure Boot, you can use the command in https://github.com/Foxboron/sbctl/wiki/FAQ#option-rom to know for sure.
tpm2-totp
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TOTP tokens on my wrist with the smartest dumb watch
You need a TPM 2.0 compatible CPU, but something like this sounds really excellent: https://github.com/tpm2-software/tpm2-totp
This means your laptop itself would be your hardware device, the TOTP secret would be stored in the TPM and theoretically impossible to steal/copy. Of course this means you will probably want a mobile device (possibly a second laptop also) as a backup.)
- Can you detect tampering in /boot without SecureBoot on Linux?
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Authenticated Boot and Disk Encryption on Linux
>But okay, you may extend my attack by saying that you exchange the motherboard between the victim and the attacker laptop, so that you don't need to replicate the chassis.
Modern computers has tamper detection and if you open them you'll need to type the BIOS password.
However, replacing the motherboard is going to replace the TPM. This is easily detectable with something like tpm2_totp in the bootchain.
https://github.com/tpm2-software/tpm2-totp
- Attest computer secure boot state to phone via time-based OTP and TPM
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Does the TPM boost secure boot security?
You could also use TOTP for a kind of remote attestation (e.g., with your phone computing TOTP). In this setup, the CPU sends the timestamp to the TPM, and it returns the TOTP value. So instead of you looking at your phone to give the TOTP to a service provider to prove that you're in possession of your phone, the computer gives you a TOTP value to prove that it's in possession (inside the TPM, sealed to the boot chain hashes) of the TOTP secret, and you use your phone to verify this. A possible weakness (short of a full-blown TPM compromise) would be to send a bunch of forged timestamps to the TPM while your computer is running and store the resulting TOTP values, then tamper with Secure Boot and emit the precomputed TOTP corresponding to the current timestamp whenever you boot up your computer. But this would require running malicious code on your compute while you're logged in with the trusted boot chain.
What are some alternatives?
mortar - Framework to join Linux's physical security bricks.
mkinitcpio - Arch Linux initramfs generation tools (read-only mirror)
btrfs-todo - An issues only repo to organize our TODO items
zorin-exec-guard - Zorin Exec Guard shows a warning when attempting to run unknown Linux or Windows executables and offers more trusted alternatives.
heads - A minimal Linux that runs as a coreboot or LinuxBoot ROM payload to provide a secure, flexible boot environment for laptops, workstations and servers.
cryptboot - Encrypted boot partition manager with UEFI Secure Boot support
mainline - Install mainline kernel packages from kernel.ubuntu.com
decrypt-otpauth-files - Decrypt files created by OTP Auth
simple-arch-installer
BangleApps - Bangle.js App Loader (and Apps)