sbctl VS mortar

No, this isn't true nor correct.

Secure Boot and TPM do offer tangible security benefits and is security features you can take ownership of.

Secure Boot allows your own key hierarchy, and TPM allows you to take ownership.

The linked boot disk isn't really proof that Secure Boot is useless. If you don't set a MOKManager password (as you should), and you change the security state of the machine while present at the keyboard. Yes you can boot things.

This is intended to make sure people can actually decide to trust things. And having insecure defaults makes this less useful. Not very surprising.

TPMs could also prevent attacks like this on your machine.

Incidentally I've invested quite a bit of time in making user-friendly Secure Boot tooling as well. https://github.com/Foxboron/sbctl

No problem! The sbctl package ships with a pretty extensive hook out of the box (https://github.com/Foxboron/sbctl/blob/master/contrib/pacman/ZZ-sbctl.hook). It's been very reliable for automatically resigning .efi executables after updates for me.

sbctl verify returns failed to find EFI system partition despite it definitely is there. It's the same issue as this but remounting or restarting doesn't fix it.

lol

Must actually prevent unsigned images from booting

sudo dnf install asciidoc golang -y VERSION=0.11 cd /tmp curl -L "https://github.com/Foxboron/sbctl/releases/download/${VERSION}/sbctl-${VERSION}.tar.gz" | tar zxvf - cd "sbctl-${VERSION}" make sudo make install cd ~

By far the easiest is to use sbctl to generate, install and use keys to sign your efi images. You can use mkinitcpio to build the unified kernels automatically and a pacman trigger to rerun the sbctl signing when the kernel is updated. Pretty straightforward (once you've done it once).

The question is whether you have any UEFI drivers or not. If they're in the ESP you can just look there to check, but UEFI drivers can also be loaded from PCI cards or baked in the firmware itself.

If you're using a TPM for Secure Boot, you can use the command in https://github.com/Foxboron/sbctl/wiki/FAQ#option-rom to know for sure.

Bruteforce of such random password is just not plausible and talks about KDF "weakness" is just a distraction. I think most likely it was evil maid attack.

Here are projects which try to mitigate some of evil maid attack risks:

https://github.com/noahbliss/mortar

https://safeboot.dev/

Secure boot and TPM support (à la Mortar: https://github.com/noahbliss/mortar)

There are tools that look to be able to automate it: https://github.com/noahbliss/mortar/blob/master/docs/proxmox-install.md

I just went through the process of setting up new ubuntu VM's using full root disk LUKS encryption and auto-unlock via Proxmox's vTPM2.0 and UEFI ( via this extremely helpful resource https://github.com/noahbliss/mortar )

I have used this project with Debian+proxmox and it's been working great. https://github.com/noahbliss/mortar but I did read the arch wiki a bit which helped my understanding.

There's a project called "mortar" (as in, gluing all these bricks together) that was attempting to simplify this. Though it's lost steam, reading through it's simple bash scripts was a great place to start for me. This guide for Fedora also helped a lot.

There have been a number of attempts to solve this problem, but the most complete appear to be Mortar (a project I head) and safeboot.dev

I highly recommend taking a look at either of these projects if you want be able to improve both your convenience through auto unlocking, and security through broadened scope of audit.

https://github.com/noahbliss/mortar

https://safeboot.dev

Check out mortar. It uses secure boot and TPM along with LUKS. The creator is super helpful and available on the telegram.

A more advanced approach would be something like mortar to chain-load signed stuff.

There seems to be a workable solution out there for 2.0: https://github.com/noahbliss/mortar/blob/master/docs/proxmox-install.md