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Super-UEFIinSecureBoot-Disk
Super UEFIinSecureBoot Disk: Boot any OS or .efi file without disabling UEFI Secure Boot
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This is a great idea. I now exclusively use SSH keys on hardware security modules of some kind. I use "Secretive", a mac app that does the same, plus a yubikey using yubikey-agent (https://github.com/FiloSottile/yubikey-agent; there are too many complicated ways to use SSH keys with a yubikey this is one of the friendliest ones). Depending on the security and frequency of which I access the service impacts whether I need presence confirmation or use secretive versus the yubikey.
I would be remiss to mention there are existing SSH TPM projects, not sure how this one differentiates. It seems to at least have the user experience pretty simple, similar to yubikey-agent (and secretive), and unlike some of the existing solutions which have quite a few extra steps:
You can edit UEFI drivers from the operating system's bootloader, and you can even flash the UEFI itself from the OS in most computers. While secure boot. Failing that, you can shim a preloader between the bootloader and the UEFI and load arbitrary drivers despite secure boot, like is done here : https://github.com/ValdikSS/Super-UEFIinSecureBoot-Disk
Any sufficiently motivated attacker can make a UEFI rootkit happen, and it's in the wild right now. TPM really do offer no protection to users, either against userspace malware, or rootkits. It's purely about DRM.
No, this isn't true nor correct.
Secure Boot and TPM do offer tangible security benefits and is security features you can take ownership of.
Secure Boot allows your own key hierarchy, and TPM allows you to take ownership.
The linked boot disk isn't really proof that Secure Boot is useless. If you don't set a MOKManager password (as you should), and you change the security state of the machine while present at the keyboard. Yes you can boot things.
This is intended to make sure people can actually decide to trust things. And having insecure defaults makes this less useful. Not very surprising.
TPMs could also prevent attacks like this on your machine.
Incidentally I've invested quite a bit of time in making user-friendly Secure Boot tooling as well. https://github.com/Foxboron/sbctl