W4SP-Stealer
cargo-vet
| W4SP-Stealer | cargo-vet | |
|---|---|---|
| 2 | 12 | |
| 121 | 596 | |
| - | 5.4% | |
| 10.0 | 7.6 | |
| over 1 year ago | 29 days ago | |
| Python | Rust | |
| - | Apache License 2.0 |
Stars - the number of stars that a project has on GitHub. Growth - month over month growth in stars.
Activity is a relative number indicating how actively a project is being developed. Recent commits have higher weight than older ones.
For example, an activity of 9.0 indicates that a project is amongst the top 10% of the most actively developed projects that we are tracking.
W4SP-Stealer
- Phylum Discovers Dozens More PyPI Packages Attempting to Deliver W4SP Stealer in Ongoing Supply-Chain Attack
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Dozens of malicious PyPI packages discovered targeting developers
Yep. You can read the source code for it here: https://github.com/loTus04/W4SP-Stealer
cargo-vet
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Ferrocene – Rust for Critical Systems
For supply chain security, you might be interested in cargo-vet[0], a tool for coordinating and requiring manual reviews of open source dependencies. Both Mozilla and Google[1] have started publishing their audits.toml files, which are a machine-readable file describing what source code reviews they have performed.
[0] https://github.com/mozilla/cargo-vet
[1] https://opensource.googleblog.com/2023/05/open-sourcing-our-...
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Rust security scanning options
there is also cargo-vet for manual auditing of the source code of the crates, which is not something that can be done automatically. Quite a few companies and orgs use it now like Mozilla, Google, Bytecode Alliance, us (Embark Studios), ISRG, zcash etc. And believe its usage will expand significantly going forward with corporate users and security sensitive projects/orgs.
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NPM repository flooded with 15,000 phishing packages
If you don't know the author, signatures do nothing. Anybody can sign their package with some key. Even if you could check the author's identity, that still does very little for you, unless you know them personally.
It makes a lot more sense to use cryptography to verify that releases are not malicious directly. Tools like crev [1], vouch [2], and cargo-vet [3] allow you to trust your colleagues or specific people to review packages before you install them. That way you don't have to trust their authors or package repositories at all.
That seems like a much more viable path forward than expecting package repositories to audit packages or trying to assign trust onto random developers.
[1]: https://github.com/crev-dev/crev [2]: https://github.com/vouch-dev/vouch [3]: https://github.com/mozilla/cargo-vet
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How do regulates companies handle software of unknown Provence (SOUP) when using needed open source crates?
The other approach is https://github.com/mozilla/cargo-vet
- greater supply chain attack risk due to large dependency trees?
- Dozens of malicious PyPI packages discovered targeting developers
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Best way to protect a project from supply chain attacks?
cargo crev and cargo vet for reviewing dependencies and using reviewed versions
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Vetting the Cargo
Since the audits are designed to be used at a per project level and contributed directly into the VCS repo (allowing you to using git signing for example) I don't quite understand what additional off-line cryptographic signatures are required here (considering that Cargo's lockfiles already contain a hash of the crate which would prevent the project from getting an altered version of a crate accidentally and that SHA validation is being considered as part of vet as well https://github.com/mozilla/cargo-vet/issues/116).
- Mozilla/cargo-vet – supply-chain security for Rust
- Gitsign
What are some alternatives?
Luna-Grabber - The best discord token grabber made in python
cargo-crev - A cryptographically verifiable code review system for the cargo (Rust) package manager.
lunasec - LunaSec - Dependency Security Scanner that automatically notifies you about vulnerabilities like Log4Shell or node-ipc in your Pull Requests and Builds. Protect yourself in 30 seconds with the LunaTrace GitHub App: https://github.com/marketplace/lunatrace-by-lunasec/
git-ts - Git TimeStamp Utility
security-wg - Node.js Ecosystem Security Working Group
gitsign - Keyless Git signing using Sigstore
wapm-cli - 📦 WebAssembly Package Manager (CLI)
secimport - eBPF Python runtime sandbox with seccomp (Blocks RCE).
Contents - Community documentation, code, links to third-party resources, ... See the issues and pull requests for pending content. Contributions are welcome !
crev - Socially scalable Code REView and recommendation system that we desperately need. See http://github.com/crev-dev/cargo-crev for real implemenation.
advisory-db - Security advisory database for Rust crates published through crates.io