xmr-btc-swap VS research-lab

Running a swap provider is still relatively complex. If you really want to you can follow the instructions in this document https://github.com/comit-network/xmr-btc-swap/blob/master/docs/asb/README.md

Why would you use a custodial (and trustful) mixer rather than atomic swaps to and from Monero [0]? Maybe the NK hackers don't need real privacy?

[0]: https://github.com/comit-network/xmr-btc-swap

I'm down to contribute but not when basic functionality bugs are not fixed after the report was made 10 months ago!

https://github.com/monero-project/monero/issues/7921 https://github.com/monero-project/monero-gui/issues/3692 https://github.com/monero-project/monero/issues/8058 https://github.com/monero-project/monero/issues/8140 https://github.com/monero-project/monero-gui/issues/3819 https://github.com/monero-project/monero-gui/issues/3839 https://github.com/comit-network/xmr-btc-swap/issues/970 https://github.com/comit-network/xmr-btc-swap/issues/971

One of many open research questions u/Rucknium has listed here (under "Reducing or eliminating 10 block lock with acceptable drawbacks"). There is a chance of it being reduced but its "complicated"

https://github.com/monero-project/research-lab/raw/master/wh...

Welcome! I wrote this list of Monero's open research questions: https://github.com/monero-project/research-lab/issues/94

We also established an official list of topics we want to fund, expanding on the broad space of Monero. This is intended to help people realize actual tasks they may want to complete on behalf of Monero, rather than just the idea of tasks, and extends Monero's open research questions. We're further interested in security proofs, ensuring Monero's integrity, historic and present, and work on arithmetic-circuit based membership proofs. Arithmetic-circuit based membership proofs would remove ring signatures, and the statistical analysis possible on them, entirely, for complete privacy of which output you're spending.

There is actually something called a "truncated address", which is transparent by default. It is mentioned in the original CryptoNote whitepaper on page 8, but I don't think the official wallet software supports it. You could emulate it by calculating the view key manually as a = H(B).

Monero's privacy (i.e. fungibility) guarantees, while being extremely good, are still not mature enough to ossify the protocol yet, see here;