verified-smart-contra VS publications

https://github.com/runtimeverification/verified-smart-contra...

or this (Djed):

https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/1069.pdf

The first just describes the system and then asserts preconditions hold which works well enough for verifying that the code matches the spec but the other actually verify that the spec is doing what the user & developer expect it to by formalising the system and analysing the properties of that system.

Compound's project wouldn't have been vulnerable to any of the attacks executed on CreamFi however they are vulnerable to the class of spec errors. Uniswap and Djed on the other hand would be protected from the majority of that class of issue that Compound experienced. This isn't to say that they are invulnerable but I'd be willing to say that they are approaching "cryptography-grade" security where you can trust these protocols just like you can trust AES, RSA, and ECC encryption & signing.

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This of course isn't to say that what Compound does is bad but as that incident shows, there is still room for their improvement in the security space. Cryptocurrency and "Decentralised Finance" are finally starting to grow up into proper subsets of the cryptocurrency and game theory communities. Now this might be a bit of general commentary on the SW space but hopefully long term this trend causes some of this security minded design to bleed over into the greater software engineering community.

Disagree, their reputation is tied to their audit quality.

But I'm pretty sure in this case the scope was bad. Like they coukd have had audits on "Do I use OpenSSL well?" and then misrepresent that all their privacy claims were audited.

Now it seems like Skiff conveniently didn't allow Trail of Bits to publish their reports, they are usually here: https://github.com/trailofbits/publications/tree/master/revi...

Disclaimer, I have used Trail of Bits service in the past (and 2 other auditors for an security campaign on a blockchain, cryptography + networking product).

Link to the report: https://github.com/trailofbits/publications/blob/master/revi...

They seem to not have analysed client-side of PIP itself, but I suppose there isn't anything you could say that isn't already obvious to everyone.

Audits are mentioned on the Trail of Bits website https://github.com/trailofbits/publications and the Skiff one https://skiff.com/transparency. Skiff has been externally audited 4 times.

Here's the URL https://github.com/trailofbits/publications/blob/master/reviews/SimpleXChat.pdf It was in the article I have already linked.

MYSO Finance Security Assesment by Trail of Bits

Trail of Bits

Hi! I'm Skiff's CEO. We've had 3 security audits, including 2 from Trail of Bits - one of the best security auditing firms in the world https://github.com/trailofbits/publications. Skiff Mail is also open-source: https://github.com/skiff-org/skiff-mail as is our whitepaper https://skiff.com/whitepaper We've also been in the news quite a bit: https://www.theverge.com/2022/5/17/23075804/skiff-mail-email-privacy, https://www.wsj.com/articles/encryption-bans-what-is-this-russia-hacking-online-privacy-security-data-signal-whatsapp-emails-protection-11675436242 (I wrote this with our team!), https://techcrunch.com/2023/01/30/russia-skiff-block/, and more, even though we're only a year old. We collect no personally identifying information - not even IP addresses used - no backup emails, phones, etc. - no advertising, and we end-to-end encrypt BOTH email subject + body and don't have any metadata (time sent/received an exception). What can we do to share more of this with more people? We're a younger company but it's so important this is made public.

Hi! I'm Skiff's CEO. We've had 3 security audits, including 2 from Trail of Bits - likely the best security auditing firm in the world https://github.com/trailofbits/publications. Skiff Mail is also open-source: https://github.com/skiff-org/skiff-mail as is our whitepaper https://skiff.com/whitepaper