sbctl VS clevis

No, this isn't true nor correct.

Secure Boot and TPM do offer tangible security benefits and is security features you can take ownership of.

Secure Boot allows your own key hierarchy, and TPM allows you to take ownership.

The linked boot disk isn't really proof that Secure Boot is useless. If you don't set a MOKManager password (as you should), and you change the security state of the machine while present at the keyboard. Yes you can boot things.

This is intended to make sure people can actually decide to trust things. And having insecure defaults makes this less useful. Not very surprising.

TPMs could also prevent attacks like this on your machine.

Incidentally I've invested quite a bit of time in making user-friendly Secure Boot tooling as well. https://github.com/Foxboron/sbctl

No problem! The sbctl package ships with a pretty extensive hook out of the box (https://github.com/Foxboron/sbctl/blob/master/contrib/pacman/ZZ-sbctl.hook). It's been very reliable for automatically resigning .efi executables after updates for me.

sbctl verify returns failed to find EFI system partition despite it definitely is there. It's the same issue as this but remounting or restarting doesn't fix it.

lol

Must actually prevent unsigned images from booting

sudo dnf install asciidoc golang -y VERSION=0.11 cd /tmp curl -L "https://github.com/Foxboron/sbctl/releases/download/${VERSION}/sbctl-${VERSION}.tar.gz" | tar zxvf - cd "sbctl-${VERSION}" make sudo make install cd ~

By far the easiest is to use sbctl to generate, install and use keys to sign your efi images. You can use mkinitcpio to build the unified kernels automatically and a pacman trigger to rerun the sbctl signing when the kernel is updated. Pretty straightforward (once you've done it once).

The question is whether you have any UEFI drivers or not. If they're in the ESP you can just look there to check, but UEFI drivers can also be loaded from PCI cards or baked in the firmware itself.

If you're using a TPM for Secure Boot, you can use the command in https://github.com/Foxboron/sbctl/wiki/FAQ#option-rom to know for sure.

Recently learned that Clevis also supports Shamir Secret Sharing, and it's in fact the only way to configure multiple pins even if they're of the same type and authority (ie. the RAID0 of SSS):

https://github.com/latchset/clevis#pin-shamir-secret-sharing

Have a look at clevis and tang. These allow you do have one server - which could be your remote you want to pull from - to be source of the LUKS decryption on the system using tang.

Interesting question. I think so?

https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterp...

Looks like clevis is gpl3 - so I expect it's not packaged as standard for any of the bsds?

https://github.com/latchset/clevis

See also:

https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/194081/use-tpm2...

https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/39329/how-does-...

https://superuser.com/questions/619721/can-i-use-the-tpm-on-...

I haven't used it myself, but a solution with LUKS, TPM2, and clevis is the way I've seen other people set it up https://github.com/latchset/clevis

There are 3 ways to unlock a volume in a headless environment: - use a keyfile, located on an already available volume - use your device's TPM and utilize systemd-cryptenroll - use Clevis/Tang to unlock volumes remotely

I don't think there is a turnkey solution, but you can build what you are looking for with clevis, LUKS, and dm-crypt

We use clevis against multiple tang servers to provide Network Bound Disk Encryption (NBDE). It's possible to also use TPM2 but it's easier to use multiple tang servers (requiring more than one server to decrypt) in the datacenter.