rebuilderd
cli
rebuilderd | cli | |
---|---|---|
6 | 12 | |
344 | 99 | |
- | - | |
5.3 | 9.2 | |
6 months ago | 3 days ago | |
Rust | Rust | |
GNU General Public License v3.0 only | GNU General Public License v3.0 only |
Stars - the number of stars that a project has on GitHub. Growth - month over month growth in stars.
Activity is a relative number indicating how actively a project is being developed. Recent commits have higher weight than older ones.
For example, an activity of 9.0 indicates that a project is amongst the top 10% of the most actively developed projects that we are tracking.
rebuilderd
-
Towards a Reproducible F-Droid
Arch Linux is heavily invested into it:
- https://reproducible.archlinux.org/ - Attempts to reproduce the distributed binary packages from source using reproducible builds tooling. This already works for a big chunk of packages.
- https://github.com/archlinux/archlinux-repro - This is a wrapper for Arch Linux build tooling that creates a build environment in a container that has the same packages installed as the original build environment back then. Software is expected to build reproducible in this environment and many ecosystems already do by default (Rust for example, to name one).
- https://github.com/kpcyrd/rebuilderd - This monitors the packages in Arch Linux, runs archlinux-repro on all of them and hosts the results. There are other projects supported but Arch Linux works best at the moment, and archlinux-repro offers the best integration I'm currently aware of.
There are surprisingly few people interested in running this stack on their own for verification purpose though.
-
Paranoia About Everything
Independent rebuilders can mitigate this to some degree, unless you can compromise all of them in some way. Some are listed on https://rebuilderd.com/, this is based on reproducible builds and only works for reproducible packages/software though.
-
Debian's rebuilds going up in Purdue's rebuilderd instance!
As many of you may know, one of Debian's most pressing issues for a long time has been working towards bit-for-bit reproducibility of its binary packages. Part of this initiative led to the Reproducible Builds project, in which other projects have joined with the goal of having reproducible builds of their instances. Until now, Debian's reproducibility was theoretical, as there was no proper rebuilding tool to verify its binary package reproducibility empirically. Recently, Arch Linux (and specifically one of its Trusted Users, who goes by 'kpcyrd' online, who in addition maintains packages for Debian and Alpine) produced an independent tool for verifying the reproducibility of binary packages called rebuilderd and has had its own instance running for quite some time. Apparently, collaboration between Arch Linux and Debian (and probably many other programmers and projects) lead to Debian's own instance of rebuilderd hosted by the Purdue University. You can see at Debian's reproducibility progress at:
- rebuilderd 0.9.0: reproducible builds verification system used by Arch Linux
- rebuilderd 0.9.0 has been released
cli
-
Ledger's NPM account has been hacked
Co-funder @ Phylum here (https://phylum.io) We have been actively scanning dependencies across npm (and PyPI, RubyGems, Crates.io, etc.) for nearly three years now; quite successfully, I might add (https://blog.phylum.io/tag/research/). We _automatically_ hit on this package when it was published, and our research team has been all over it.
A collective of us are active in Discord (https://discord.gg/Fe6pr5eW6p), continuing to hunt attacks like these. If that's something that interests you, we'd love to have you!
In addition to this, we've released several open source tools to help protect against supply chain attacks:
1. https://github.com/phylum-dev/birdcage - Birdcage is a cross-platform embeddable sandbox that's been baked into our CLI (which wraps npm, pypi, etc.) to sandbox package installations
2. https://github.com/phylum-dev/cli - Our CLI provides an extension capability so you can lock down random executables you might use during your software development (define _what_ it's allowed to do, e.g. network access, and then lock it down with Birdcage)
We also have a variety of integrations, including Github, Gitlab, BitBucket, CircleCI, Tines, Sophos, etc.
https://docs.phylum.io/docs/integrations_overview
It's unfortunate that software dependency attacks continue to plague open source registries. It seems unlikely this will let up in the near future. We are continuing to work closely with the open source ecosystems to try and get these sorts of packages removed when they pop up.
- A Study of Malicious Code in PyPI Ecosystem
-
Rust Malware Staged on Crates.io
We're actively working on this with our sandbox (https://github.com/phylum-dev/birdcage). We've wrapped the likes of pip, yarn, and npm already and are making moves to similarly provide support for cargo.
Currently comes as part of the Phylum CLI (https://github.com/phylum-dev/cli), so that doing something like:
phylum npm install
-
How Attackers Can Sneakily Slip Malware Packages Into Poetry.lock Files
cli - uses sandbox to block packages during installation, performs pre-install checks to determine (by hitting the API) if the package performs actions congruent with malware, e.g. phylum pip install requests will use pip wrapped by the sandbox to install requests after verifying that it doesn't have malware like behavior.
-
Attackers Repurposing existing Python-based Malware for Distribution on NPM
This is bundled with our CLI tool today (which is also open source) and allows you to install packages with phylum npm install . We currently support npm, yarn and pip and are planning on rolling out further support for other ecosystems in coming months.
-
Attackers are hiding malware in minified packages distributed to NPM
We open sourced our tooling to help with this problem specifically. We have an extension framework that wraps npm for three purposes:
-
Active Malware Campaign Targeting Popular Python Packages Underway
Our CLI tool (also open source and free) will check for typosquats, dependency confusion, malicious code, vulnerabilities, etc. in your package dependencies. Works for pypi, npm, rubygems, maven, nuget and very recently golang and rust crates.
-
Ransomware being published to PyPI in ongoing campaign
This is built into the Phylum CLI so you can do things like:
-
Dozens of malicious PyPI packages discovered targeting developers
This is one of the projects we're working on (and open sourcing)!
Currently allows you to specify allowed resources during the package installation in a way very similar to what you've outlined [1].
The sandbox itself lives here [2] and can be integrated into other projects.
1. https://github.com/phylum-dev/cli/blob/main/extensions/npm/P...
2. https://github.com/phylum-dev/birdcage
-
How To: Open Source Policy Automation via Phylum Extensions
We will start here with a slightly more in-depth, custom version of the existing NPM shim extension - a tool that enforces default project policy when installing NPM packages. This custom extension will do some additional custom validation before allowing the installation process to continue.
What are some alternatives?
libfaketime - libfaketime modifies the system time for a single application
secimport - eBPF Python runtime sandbox with seccomp (Blocks RCE).
git2-rs - libgit2 bindings for Rust
steal-ur-stuff - Steal Ur Stuff
pacman-bintrans - Experimental binary transparency for pacman with sigstore and rekor
packj - Packj stops :zap: Solarwinds-, ESLint-, and PyTorch-like attacks by flagging malicious/vulnerable open-source dependencies ("weak links") in your software supply-chain
modus - A language for building Docker/OCI container images
notes - Notes, Questions, Ideas
picosnitch - Monitor Network Traffic Per Executable, Beautifully Visualized
pypi-scan - Scan pypi for typosquatting
ismyarchverifiedyet - :construction: Experimental script to query rebuilderd for results :construction:
LavaMoat - tools for sandboxing your dependency graph