axolotl VS GrapheneOS-Knowledge

While searching around a bit more I found another unofficial Signal client for arm64 Linux optimized for mobile called Axolotl. The github page makes it look promising, but once installed I couldn't log in successfully. I intend to put more effort in there. Axolotl appears to be the most promising looking option for Signal on mobile Linux - assuming it works..

> Only a small thing, but due to Signals strict phone-desktop pairing mechanism, when registering Axolotl, both phone and regular Desktop wont work anymore.

> Also, you cant use Axolotl on Desktop together with Signal mobile.

> After deleting the Axolotl registration I had to wait a while to be able to register on Signal again, I didnt loose any backups and my codes didnt change.

> Nonetheless a warning should be displayed at the beginning, that users wanting to use regular mobile (iOS, Android) and Desktop (Windows, macOS, Flatpak or Snap), they should use a second phone number for testing.

https://github.com/nanu-c/axolotl/issues/811

>Signal also notably isn't self-hostable: there's no way to run your own signal server, and control your data. Marlinspike ruthlessly shuts down anyone attempting to build alternate clients or servers that could communicate with the main one.

That is perfectly wrong. As a maintainer of https://axolotl.chat, a third-party signal client initially built for Ubuntu Touch but which runs on almost everything now, I can tell you that our client is speaking without any problems to the official Signal servers, and also that the code of the server is available and is running fine, we used it to test our code.

Wouldn't Signal Desktop be a way to make backups?

I moved my home directory to a new computer and Signal Desktop started like if something changed. Sure you lose your messages on your phone, but you can still access them on your computer if needed.

On a rooted Android phone, you could use oandbackup to backup Signal. If you care about these things, maybe consider using a rooted Android phone?

I agree with you on the centralized platform aspect and the use of phone number (which is both a blessing (this makes it easy for new users to join) and a curse). I also agree with you on Element's UX, but it's getting better and most people can use it fine. I have a few groups on both apps.

I personally prefer Element, which seems more open than Signal and which I can actually use correctly on the PinePhone. Axolotl [1] still needs some work.

[1] https://github.com/nanu-c/axolotl

I think the best option to communicate through Signal will be Axolotl. Because the original desktop client of Signal might work as well but it's not optimized for touch input.

If you go to the git repo for Axolotl (https://github.com/nanu-c/axolotl), you will see links to the deb among other formats.

Ah well then I applaud you. :) Perhaps some ideas could come from past efforts like Axolotl, which I've had working in a basic way in the past.

This is just one example (linked below) but I've seen a fair bit of this type of behaviour just specifixally from the project founder/leader. There does seem to be a lot of other more level-headed folk involved with the project too however so not sure how insurmountable the problem is.

https://github.com/Peter-Easton/GrapheneOS-Knowledge/issues/...

The Librem 5 is not as open or libre as its marketing has tried to insinuate, simply having its binary blob signed and validated firmware saved in write-protected read-only memory and loaded by a secondary coprocessor to exploit a loophole in the definiton of "libre" hardware to allow it to qualify for the FSF's definiton of "Free" hardware. This renders the firmware unupdateable without shorting a connection. In the event a vulnerability is discovered in the modems or radios, the firmware cannot be updated without physically dismantling the phone. Firmware initialization is also no longer under the control of the host operating system because the initialization is carried out from outside the OS: changing or updating software on the host will not address these design defects. Although the modems and radios are not attached to the host via DMA, they rely on USB for isolation, which simply shifts the trust from the kernel driver to the kernel USB stack, and USB was never designed with distrusting the device plugged into it in mind unlike SMMU/IOMMU, which is specifically designed to mitigate unconstrained DMA.

Current releases of the Librem 5 have been plagued by thermal throttling issues and poor battery life which in some cases has clocked in at less than 1 hour at idle.

The Librem 5 does not even support software encryption and no progress has been made toward adding even LUKS encryption. The Librem 5 lacks a secure element for any hardware binding on the encryption and so would be entirely dependent on software-only encryption.

The rebranded version of Debian that the Librem 5 uses as an operating system uses the same security model as the desktop stack, which is a perimeter or "all or nothing" security model. In the future, applications may be installed utilizing FlatPak. The threat model and measures FlatPak takes to meet it are as of yet unclear and uncertain.

From https://github.com/Peter-Easton/GrapheneOS-Knowledge/blob/ma...