in-toto
slsa
in-toto | slsa | |
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4 | 35 | |
827 | 1,424 | |
0.8% | 1.9% | |
8.9 | 8.5 | |
9 days ago | 3 days ago | |
Python | Shell | |
GNU General Public License v3.0 or later | GNU General Public License v3.0 or later |
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in-toto
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UEFI Software Bill of Materials Proposal
The things you mentioned are not solved by a typical "SBOM" but e.g. CycloneDX has extra fields to record provenance and pedigree and things like in-toto (https://in-toto.io/) or SLSA (https://slsa.dev/) also aim to work in this field.
I've spent the last six months in this field and people will tell you that this or that is an industry best practice or "a standard" but in my experience none of that is true. Everyone is still trying to figure out how best to protect the software supply chain security and things are still very much in flux.
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An Overview of Kubernetes Security Projects at KubeCon Europe 2023
in-toto is an open source project that focuses on the attestation part of software supply chain security. You use it to define a “layout” for a project, i.e., how the different components should fit together. A project ships this definition with its code, and then another user of that software can compare what they have with the attached definition to see if it matches the structure and contents they expect. If it doesn’t, then this could point to external tampering or other issues.
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How do you mitigate supply chain attacks?
But it's not all doom and gloom because the industry is evolving. Companies like Google are formulating tools like scorecard to heuristically reduce risk by encouraging you to rely on trustable dependencies only. There's also more complex tools like in-toto that actually look at the integrity of your supply chain (don't ask me how this one works, I just know that people like it).
- in-toto/in-toto: in-toto is a framework to protect supply chain integrity.
slsa
- SLSA – Supply-Chain Levels for Software Artifacts
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Dogbolt Decompiler Explorer
Short answer: not where it counts.
My work focuses on recognizing known functions in obfuscated binaries, but there are some papers you might want to check out related to deobfuscation, if not necessarily using ML for deobfuscation or decompilation.
My take is that ML can soundly defeat the "easy" and more static obfuscation types (encodings, control flow flattening, splitting functions). It's low hanging fruit, and it's what I worked on most, but adoption is slow. On the other hand, "hard" obfuscations like virtualized functions or programs which embed JIT compilers to obfuscate at runtime... as far as I know, those are still unsolved problems.
This is a good overview of the subject, but pretty old and doesn't cover "hard" obfuscations: https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?arnumber=1566145.
https://www.jinyier.me/papers/DATE19_Obf.pdf uses deobfuscation for RTL logic (FGPA/ASIC domain) with SAT solvers. Might be useful for a point of view from a fairly different domain.
https://advising.cs.arizona.edu/~debray/Publications/generic... uses "semantics-preserving transformations" to shed obfuscation. I think this approach is the way to go, especially when combined with dynamic/symbolic analysis to mitigate virt/jit types of transformations.
I'll mention this one as a cautionary tale: https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/2886012 has some good general info but glosses over the machine learning approach. It considers Hex-rays' FLIRT to be "machine learning", but FLIRT just hashes signatures, can be spoofed (i.e. https://siliconpr0n.org/uv/issues_with_flirt_aware_malware.p...), and is useless against obfuscation.
Eventually I think SBOM tools like Black Duck[1] and SLSA[2] will incorporate ML to improve the accuracy of even figuring out what dependencies a piece of software actually has.
[1]: https://www.synopsys.com/software-integrity/software-composi...
[2]: https://slsa.dev/
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10 reasons you should quit your HTTP client
The dependency chain is certified! SLSA!
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UEFI Software Bill of Materials Proposal
The things you mentioned are not solved by a typical "SBOM" but e.g. CycloneDX has extra fields to record provenance and pedigree and things like in-toto (https://in-toto.io/) or SLSA (https://slsa.dev/) also aim to work in this field.
I've spent the last six months in this field and people will tell you that this or that is an industry best practice or "a standard" but in my experience none of that is true. Everyone is still trying to figure out how best to protect the software supply chain security and things are still very much in flux.
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Gittuf – a security layer for Git using some concepts introduced by TUF
It's multi-pronged and I imagine adopters may use a subset of features. Broadly, I think folks are going to be interested in a) branch/tag/reference protection rules, b) file protection rules (monorepo or otherwise, though monorepos do pose a very apt usecase for gittuf), and c) general key management for those who primarily care about Git signing.
For those who care about a and b, I think the work we want to do to support [in-toto attestations](https://github.com/in-toto/attestation) for [SLSA's upcoming source track](https://github.com/slsa-framework/slsa/issues/956) could be very interesting as well.
- SLSA • Supply-Chain Levels for Software Artifacts
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Password-stealing Linux malware served for 3 years and no one noticed
It doesn't have to be. Corporations which are FedRAMP[1] compliant, have to build software reproducibly in a fully isolated environment, only from reviewed code.[2]
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FedRAMP
[2] https://slsa.dev/
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OSCM: The Open Source Consumption Manifesto
SLSA stands for Supply chain Levels for Software Artifacts, and it is a framework that aims to provide a set of best practices for the software supply chain, with a focus on OSS. It was created by Google, and it is now part of the OpenSSF. It consists of four levels of assurance, from Level 1 to Level 4, that correspond to different degrees of protection against supply chain attacks. Our CTO Paolo Mainardi mentioned SLSA in a very good article on software supply chain security, and we also mentioned it in another article about securing OCI Artifacts on Kubernetes.
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CLOUD SECURITY PODCAST BY GOOGLE - EP116 SBOMs: A Step Towards a More Secure Software Supply Chain -
SLSA.dev
- Supply Chain Levels for Software Artifacts (SLSA)
What are some alternatives?
snyk - Snyk CLI scans and monitors your projects for security vulnerabilities. [Moved to: https://github.com/snyk/cli]
ClojureDart - Clojure dialect for Flutter and Dart
scorecard - OpenSSF Scorecard - Security health metrics for Open Source
grype - A vulnerability scanner for container images and filesystems
ochrona-cli - A command line tool for detecting vulnerabilities in Python dependencies and doing safe package installs
DependencyCheck - OWASP dependency-check is a software composition analysis utility that detects publicly disclosed vulnerabilities in application dependencies.
pip-audit - Audits Python environments, requirements files and dependency trees for known security vulnerabilities, and can automatically fix them
sig-security - 🔐CNCF Security Technical Advisory Group -- secure access, policy control, privacy, auditing, explainability and more!
macOS-Security-and-Privacy-Guide - Guide to securing and improving privacy on macOS
trivy - Find vulnerabilities, misconfigurations, secrets, SBOM in containers, Kubernetes, code repositories, clouds and more
i-probably-didnt-backdoor-this - A practical experiment on supply-chain security using reproducible builds
checkov - Prevent cloud misconfigurations and find vulnerabilities during build-time in infrastructure as code, container images and open source packages with Checkov by Bridgecrew.