Slsa Alternatives

slsa reviews and mentions

• SLSA – Supply-Chain Levels for Software Artifacts
  1 project | news.ycombinator.com | 2 Apr 2024
• Dogbolt Decompiler Explorer
  7 projects | news.ycombinator.com | 4 Dec 2023

  Short answer: not where it counts.

  My work focuses on recognizing known functions in obfuscated binaries, but there are some papers you might want to check out related to deobfuscation, if not necessarily using ML for deobfuscation or decompilation.

  My take is that ML can soundly defeat the "easy" and more static obfuscation types (encodings, control flow flattening, splitting functions). It's low hanging fruit, and it's what I worked on most, but adoption is slow. On the other hand, "hard" obfuscations like virtualized functions or programs which embed JIT compilers to obfuscate at runtime... as far as I know, those are still unsolved problems.

  This is a good overview of the subject, but pretty old and doesn't cover "hard" obfuscations: https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?arnumber=1566145.

  https://www.jinyier.me/papers/DATE19_Obf.pdf uses deobfuscation for RTL logic (FGPA/ASIC domain) with SAT solvers. Might be useful for a point of view from a fairly different domain.

  https://advising.cs.arizona.edu/~debray/Publications/generic... uses "semantics-preserving transformations" to shed obfuscation. I think this approach is the way to go, especially when combined with dynamic/symbolic analysis to mitigate virt/jit types of transformations.

  I'll mention this one as a cautionary tale: https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/2886012 has some good general info but glosses over the machine learning approach. It considers Hex-rays' FLIRT to be "machine learning", but FLIRT just hashes signatures, can be spoofed (i.e. https://siliconpr0n.org/uv/issues_with_flirt_aware_malware.p...), and is useless against obfuscation.

  Eventually I think SBOM tools like Black Duck[1] and SLSA[2] will incorporate ML to improve the accuracy of even figuring out what dependencies a piece of software actually has.

  [1]: https://www.synopsys.com/software-integrity/software-composi...

  [2]: https://slsa.dev/

• 10 reasons you should quit your HTTP client
  5 projects | dev.to | 15 Nov 2023

  The dependency chain is certified! SLSA!

• UEFI Software Bill of Materials Proposal
  8 projects | news.ycombinator.com | 14 Nov 2023

  The things you mentioned are not solved by a typical "SBOM" but e.g. CycloneDX has extra fields to record provenance and pedigree and things like in-toto (https://in-toto.io/) or SLSA (https://slsa.dev/) also aim to work in this field.

  I've spent the last six months in this field and people will tell you that this or that is an industry best practice or "a standard" but in my experience none of that is true. Everyone is still trying to figure out how best to protect the software supply chain security and things are still very much in flux.

• Gittuf – a security layer for Git using some concepts introduced by TUF
  5 projects | news.ycombinator.com | 24 Oct 2023

  It's multi-pronged and I imagine adopters may use a subset of features. Broadly, I think folks are going to be interested in a) branch/tag/reference protection rules, b) file protection rules (monorepo or otherwise, though monorepos do pose a very apt usecase for gittuf), and c) general key management for those who primarily care about Git signing.

  For those who care about a and b, I think the work we want to do to support [in-toto attestations](https://github.com/in-toto/attestation) for [SLSA's upcoming source track](https://github.com/slsa-framework/slsa/issues/956) could be very interesting as well.

• SLSA • Supply-Chain Levels for Software Artifacts
  1 project | news.ycombinator.com | 5 Oct 2023
• Password-stealing Linux malware served for 3 years and no one noticed
  2 projects | news.ycombinator.com | 12 Sep 2023

  It doesn't have to be. Corporations which are FedRAMP[1] compliant, have to build software reproducibly in a fully isolated environment, only from reviewed code.[2]

  [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FedRAMP

  [2] https://slsa.dev/

• OSCM: The Open Source Consumption Manifesto
  4 projects | dev.to | 4 Sep 2023

  SLSA stands for Supply chain Levels for Software Artifacts, and it is a framework that aims to provide a set of best practices for the software supply chain, with a focus on OSS. It was created by Google, and it is now part of the OpenSSF. It consists of four levels of assurance, from Level 1 to Level 4, that correspond to different degrees of protection against supply chain attacks. Our CTO Paolo Mainardi mentioned SLSA in a very good article on software supply chain security, and we also mentioned it in another article about securing OCI Artifacts on Kubernetes.

• CLOUD SECURITY PODCAST BY GOOGLE - EP116 SBOMs: A Step Towards a More Secure Software Supply Chain -
  1 project | /r/security_CPE | 10 Apr 2023

  SLSA.dev

• Supply Chain Levels for Software Artifacts (SLSA)
  1 project | news.ycombinator.com | 3 Apr 2023
• A note from our sponsor - SaaSHub
  www.saashub.com | 10 May 2024

  SaaSHub helps you find the best software and product alternatives Learn more →