cryptsetup VS sbctl

Overall, “dm-crypt” is a device-mapper target (https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.5-rc3/source/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c#L3689) supported from kernel version 2.6.4 (https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v2.6.4/source/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c). It is responsible for transparent (aka real-time/on-the-fly encryption) block device encryption while using the kernel crypto API (https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/-/wikis/DMCrypt) .

For more information check section 5.21 Why is there no "Nuke-Option"? of LUKS FAQ.

Please read the section 5.21 Why is there no "Nuke-Option"? of the LUKS FAQ for more information (eg. when a "wipe" option could actually harm you).

Check out the section 5.2 and 5.18 of the LUKS FAQ for more information.

See section 5.2 of LUKS FAQ and Key disclosure law all over the world.

References: - Frequently Asked Questions Cryptsetup/LUKS - Question 2.15: "neither dm-crypt nor LUKS1 stores partition size and LUKS2 uses a generic "whole device" size as default." - Stackexchange: What does cryptsetup resize do if LUKS doesn't store partition size?

LUKS is probably what you want

No, this isn't true nor correct.

Secure Boot and TPM do offer tangible security benefits and is security features you can take ownership of.

Secure Boot allows your own key hierarchy, and TPM allows you to take ownership.

The linked boot disk isn't really proof that Secure Boot is useless. If you don't set a MOKManager password (as you should), and you change the security state of the machine while present at the keyboard. Yes you can boot things.

This is intended to make sure people can actually decide to trust things. And having insecure defaults makes this less useful. Not very surprising.

TPMs could also prevent attacks like this on your machine.

Incidentally I've invested quite a bit of time in making user-friendly Secure Boot tooling as well. https://github.com/Foxboron/sbctl

No problem! The sbctl package ships with a pretty extensive hook out of the box (https://github.com/Foxboron/sbctl/blob/master/contrib/pacman/ZZ-sbctl.hook). It's been very reliable for automatically resigning .efi executables after updates for me.

sbctl verify returns failed to find EFI system partition despite it definitely is there. It's the same issue as this but remounting or restarting doesn't fix it.

lol

Must actually prevent unsigned images from booting

sudo dnf install asciidoc golang -y VERSION=0.11 cd /tmp curl -L "https://github.com/Foxboron/sbctl/releases/download/${VERSION}/sbctl-${VERSION}.tar.gz" | tar zxvf - cd "sbctl-${VERSION}" make sudo make install cd ~

By far the easiest is to use sbctl to generate, install and use keys to sign your efi images. You can use mkinitcpio to build the unified kernels automatically and a pacman trigger to rerun the sbctl signing when the kernel is updated. Pretty straightforward (once you've done it once).

The question is whether you have any UEFI drivers or not. If they're in the ESP you can just look there to check, but UEFI drivers can also be loaded from PCI cards or baked in the firmware itself.

If you're using a TPM for Secure Boot, you can use the command in https://github.com/Foxboron/sbctl/wiki/FAQ#option-rom to know for sure.