OpenSK
nrf52-u2f
OpenSK | nrf52-u2f | |
---|---|---|
12 | 2 | |
2,984 | 181 | |
0.4% | 1.7% | |
5.4 | 0.0 | |
11 days ago | about 5 years ago | |
Rust | C | |
Apache License 2.0 | MIT License |
Stars - the number of stars that a project has on GitHub. Growth - month over month growth in stars.
Activity is a relative number indicating how actively a project is being developed. Recent commits have higher weight than older ones.
For example, an activity of 9.0 indicates that a project is amongst the top 10% of the most actively developed projects that we are tracking.
OpenSK
- OpenSK – open-source implementation for security keys written in Rust
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Yubico is merging with ACQ Bure and intends to go public
https://github.com/google/OpenSK works, it runs on something like this $15 board. Could do with a case though.
https://www.nordicsemi.com/About-us/BuyOnline?search_token=n...
- How to Yubikey: A Configuration Cheatsheet
- Make Custom Yubikey
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WebAuthn, and Only WebAuthn
There are a huge number of other vendors supporting Webauthn apart from Yubikey. (From the top of my head Nitrokey, Solo, Tomu, Mooltipass, Ledger, Trezor, Google Titan, OnlyKey, Token2).
You could also use the system TPM (https://github.com/psanford/tpm-fido).
A brief search didn't yield any FIDO2 software-only solutions for Linux, but I see no reason why in principle you couldn't implement it (perhaps interfacing https://github.com/google/OpenSK through hidg - similar projects do exist for U2F).
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Apple, Google, and Microsoft commit to expanded support for FIDO standard
Cloudflare does, using a security key not found in the FIDO Metadata Service will unfortunately not work. This precludes the use of any hacker-friendly solution (making your own).
> Supported: All security keys found in the FIDO Metadata Service 3.0, unless they have been revoked for security reasons.
https://support.cloudflare.com/hc/en-us/articles/44068890480...
Attestation keys, as they're currently used, aren't very "privacy friendly" and it's much worse for those who wish to create their own key.
> Usually, the attestation private key is shared between a batch of at least 100,000 security keys of the same model. If you build your own OpenSK, your private key is unique to you. This makes you identifiable across registrations: Two websites could collaborate to track if registrations were attested with the same key material. If you use OpenSK beyond experimentation, please consider carefully if you want to take this privacy risk.
https://github.com/google/OpenSK/blob/f2496a8e6d71a4e8388849...
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Phone May Soon Replace Many of Your Passwords
There are a number of FOSS solutions.
- https://github.com/google/OpenSK <- DIY solution
- https://solokeys.com/
- https://www.nitrokey.com/
The issue with any FOSS solution is that FIDO requires an attestation private key which is shared between a batch of at least 100,000 security keys. Using a DIY or cli app (application running on the host) solution will likely mean you'll be generating that private key yourself, this makes you identifiable across registrations.
- Apple/Google/Microsoft to accelerate rollout of passwordless sign‑in standard
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Login with a Public Ed25519 Key
I'm not sure what you're replying to--this scheme is much closer to self-signed X509 client certs, not FIDO. But regarding FIDO, it does not prevent user-controlled hardware; it's up to RPs to choose if they require specific device manufacturers or not.
In my experience, the vast majority of (consumer) RPs do not require specific batch attestation, which is why you can make your own FIDO key: https://github.com/google/OpenSK.
I am under the impression support for attestation was controversial in FIDO--it's clearly useful for enterprise scenarios (e.g. where an enterprise requires some silly certification like FIPS: https://support.yubico.com/hc/en-us/articles/360016614760-Ac...), but there's always the risk that consumer-facing RPs require it for no good reason.
My employer requires FIPS certification due to FedRAMP; I'd be interested in how you would propose to change FIDO such that--as now--I can use a single key for work and for all my consumer needs while eliminating attestation.
- I read the federal government’s Zero-Trust Memo so you don’t have to
nrf52-u2f
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Is it possible to "protect" my code from being read / extracted?
He would need specialized hardware and some code examples, I was looking at something like this for a personal customized U2F key: https://github.com/makerdiary/nrf52-u2f
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Can WebAuthn and U2F finally give us safe and easy Two-Factor authentication?
makerdiary also has fido2 code that runs on a Nordic USB dongle : https://github.com/makerdiary/nrf52-u2f
What are some alternatives?
keyberon - A rust crate to create a pure rust keyboard firmware.
solo1 - Solo 1 firmware in C
rust-u2f - U2F security token emulator written in Rust
libfido2 - Provides library functionality for FIDO2, including communication with a device over USB or NFC.
smoltcp - a smol tcp/ip stack
python-fido2 - Provides library functionality for FIDO 2.0, including communication with a device over USB.
atsamd - Target atsamd microcontrollers using Rust
kr-u2f - DEPRECATED A Browser extension that lets you use your phone as a U2F/WebAuthN Authenticator for strong, unphishable 2FA.
ssh-mars - An experiment using SSH to sign in to websites
shisho - Lightweight static analyzer for several programming languages
x8 - Hidden parameters discovery suite