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tpm.dev.tutorials reviews and mentions
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Bypassing Bitlocker using a cheap logic analyzer on a Lenovo laptop
>> The discrete TPM's threat model was never designed to cover you from attackers using oscilloscope to probe your laptop's SPI bus during the boot process for unencrypted data.
This is not really true. All TPMs (or at least since v2.0, but no matter if discrete or not) support encrypted session against passive eavesdroppers. There is also the possibility to protect against MiTM attacks, but that is more complex (since you then need to setup credentials).
See here [0]:
"Encryption sessions are useful for when the path to a TPM is not trused, such as when a TPM is a remote TPM, or when otherwise the path to the TPM is not trusted."
The issue is that the OS / Bootloader does not implement such mechanism.
[0] https://github.com/tpm2dev/tpm.dev.tutorials/blob/master/Int...
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AMD's Firmware TPMs Vulnerable to Hardware Attacks, Defeating Disk Encryption
> A dTPM uses an unencrypted protocol to communicate with the CPU
While that is strictly speaking true, the TPM command set allows you to set up an encrypted session to the TPM using an ECDH or RSA key for key exchange that authenticates the TPM.
The problem is that the BMCs and BIOSes out there don't record a public key for a primary key on the TPM and then don't bother using encrypted sessions (not even opportunistically getting that public key from the TPM, which would defeat passive attacks).
That's a software problem, not a TPM problem!
I know that TPM 2.0 is a huge topic, so it's quite forgivable that people don't know these things. I've written a tutorial that might help: https://github.com/tpm2dev/tpm.dev.tutorials/tree/master/Int...
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The Trusted Platform Module Key Hierarchy
https://github.com/tpm2dev/tpm.dev.tutorials/tree/master/Int...
I have learned a fair bit since I wrote it, so I should probably edit it.
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A note from our sponsor - InfluxDB
www.influxdata.com | 3 May 2024
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tpm2dev/tpm.dev.tutorials is an open source project licensed under Creative Commons Attribution Share Alike 4.0 which is not an OSI approved license.
The primary programming language of tpm.dev.tutorials is Shell.
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