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pulseview
Read-only mirror of the official repo at git://sigrok.org/pulseview. Pull requests welcome. Please file bugreports at sigrok.org/bugzilla.
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InfluxDB
Power Real-Time Data Analytics at Scale. Get real-time insights from all types of time series data with InfluxDB. Ingest, query, and analyze billions of data points in real-time with unbounded cardinality.
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Pulseview https://github.com/sigrokproject/pulseview and probably other parts of Sigrok project https://github.com/sigrokproject .
Or since author mentioned DSlogic possibly the corresponding forks of those programs from the company making the logic analyzer.
> The vulnerability also applies to other encryption systems using the TPM, like LUKS disk encryption.
No, this is a Bitlocker problem. Systemd LUKS disk encryption uses encryption on the bus by enabling TPM encrypted sessions: https://github.com/systemd/systemd/commit/acbb504eaf1be51572...
>> The discrete TPM's threat model was never designed to cover you from attackers using oscilloscope to probe your laptop's SPI bus during the boot process for unencrypted data.
This is not really true. All TPMs (or at least since v2.0, but no matter if discrete or not) support encrypted session against passive eavesdroppers. There is also the possibility to protect against MiTM attacks, but that is more complex (since you then need to setup credentials).
See here [0]:
"Encryption sessions are useful for when the path to a TPM is not trused, such as when a TPM is a remote TPM, or when otherwise the path to the TPM is not trusted."
The issue is that the OS / Bootloader does not implement such mechanism.
[0] https://github.com/tpm2dev/tpm.dev.tutorials/blob/master/Int...