tfc
sydent
tfc | sydent | |
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50 | 712 | |
1,168 | 283 | |
- | 2.1% | |
0.0 | 6.4 | |
11 days ago | 1 day ago | |
Python | Python | |
GNU General Public License v3.0 only | Apache License 2.0 |
Stars - the number of stars that a project has on GitHub. Growth - month over month growth in stars.
Activity is a relative number indicating how actively a project is being developed. Recent commits have higher weight than older ones.
For example, an activity of 9.0 indicates that a project is amongst the top 10% of the most actively developed projects that we are tracking.
tfc
- Tinfoil Chat – Onion-routed, endpoint secure messaging system
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Signal's president vows to reject UK law on message scanning before encryption
>No e2ee app has compromised device part of their threat model.
Oh really, here's one I made earlier https://github.com/maqp/tfc :-)
>The whole OS can.
So how are you backdooring a bash script that comments out lines of code from Linux source before compiling it?
You lying to policy makers with "it can be done" mindset sound like a stupid con that burns a lot of money and time in the process.
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Most secure and private (trace resistant) messaging app in market?
But as I said, it is way easier to install Pegasus on your phone or to grab / steal the unlocked phone from your hand, than break any of these. If you want absolute privacy, you should think about your physical security, and the trustworthiness of your devices before choosing the right chat app. Check the Tinfoil Chat for more information.
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Are there fully anonymous alternatives to Session/Telegram?
TFC
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Testing a new encrypted messaging app's extraordinary claims
There is software that lives up to these claims, it's Tinfoil Chat. The article is correct about the necessary trade-offs: due to peer to peer transport (onion hidden service 2 onion hidden service) both ends of the conversation have to be online -- it at least spools the message waiting for the recipient to appear.
For hole punching and signaling that has to be done by third party, well, the third party is TOR
TFC then goes on to break out the encryption and decryption machines from the network and passes messaging over opto-couplers to prevent your keys from getting exfiltrated. Qubes qrexec could similarly isolate the components.
https://github.com/maqp/tfc
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Apple advances user security with powerful new data protections
> If you want maximum security use an air gapped computer. But that won't let you send messages on the go.
You can, with some inconvenience, use optical diodes to transmit data from a trusted input device to an untrusted network device for transport over tor, and then push the received messages over a second diode to a display device that decrypts the messages, so that even if you receive an exploit/malware, there is no physical connection that allows unencrypted data to be exfiltrated.
https://github.com/maqp/tfc
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Peer-to-Peer Encrypted Messaging
Briar is one of the most important secure messaging projects currently. Not only does it remove the need to trust the vendor about content (like with all E2EE messaging apps), you also get to keep the metadata about communication to yourself as data transits from one Tor Onion Service to another.
The downside is of course, you need to keep the endpoint powered on when you want to be reachable so it will increase the battery drain on your phone.
Note: There's also a desktop client if that's easier to keep online https://briarproject.org/download-briar-desktop/
One extremely important thing Briar is doing, is it's using the P2P as means to host alternative social interaction formats, like forums and blogs. Similar to Signal/WhatsApp stories (which is somewhat similar to microblogs/FB wall), it's a way to indirectly share information. You could pretty much emulate any social media platform on top of E2EE protocol with ~zero infrastructure cost and without having to worry about data mining. I'd argue what Briar's innovating on here is one of the most important aspects in what's left for secure messaging.
Finally a small caveat: Briar will share your Bluetooth MAC address with all peers so it can automatically use that when you're in close proximity with your peer. Thus sharing your Briar ID publicly is not a good idea for two reasons:
1) major global adversaries may have access to that information (e.g. if Google aggregates it) which can deanonymize your account. This also allows slightly technical person to confirm identity of briar account if they suspect it's you (a bit wonky threat model but still).
2) it ties everything you do across your accounts on same device together, so there's strong linkability even if you rotate the identity key by reinstalling the app.
Briar is pretty clear about this in it's FAQ, but it's still not very well known although it definitely should be.
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That being said, if you want similar Onion Service based communication with no such linkability, there's https://cwtch.im/ which is a fantastic project.
There's also https://www.ricochetrefresh.net/
Both are spiritual successors to John Brooks' `Ricochet` application.
You can also chat and share files (among other things) with https://onionshare.org/
(And finally, you can get remote exfiltration security for keys/plaintexts with TFC https://github.com/maqp/tfc (my personal work), at the cost of losing some features like message forwarding etc that the architecture prevents you from doing.)
- 'Stay away from WhatsApp, been spy tool for 13 years': Telegram founder Pavel Durov warns users
- Tin Foil Chat – Security Trough Light Diode
- Offline Encryption?
sydent
- Discord is nuking Nintendo Switch emulator devs and their entire servers
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Qilin: A Starter Project Template For Every Open Source Project
GitHub Discussions can also be a great place for support as long as these are regularly monitored. Another option along the same lines is Discourse and the Open Source Matrix which is used by quite a few Open Source and community-based projects.
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A man has been swatted 47 times for making a joke about Norm Macdonald
Tangential: the article notes that Telegram is an “encrypted messaging app”. While this is technically true, it's worth keeping in mind that it's not end-to-end encrypted, so it's less secure in that regard than, say, Signal or even WhatsApp. Telegram does have opt-in end-to-end encrypted one-on-one chats, but those are very inconvenient to use.
For a properly encrypted chat app, including group chats (opt-in), try Matrix instead: https://matrix.org/
- Matrix is a decentralized messaging ecosystem worth checking out
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Launching Default End-to-End Encryption on Messenger
I'd love something like the Matrix [0] data model (JSON messages aggregated in an eventually-consistent chatroom CRDT) transmitted over something like simplex for metadata resistance.
[0] https://matrix.org
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Meta is pulling the plug on Messenger chats on Instagram
Trillian mod here. There's this new thing called Beeper, works on matrix.org. It's not as the good old times, but I'm currently using whatsapp, FB messenger, discord, telegram, signal, imessage and a few more. It's not Cerulean experience, but it's... slowly improving.
- Show HN: Beeper Mini – iMessage Client for Android
- Um pouco da realidade de Copacabana - principalmente aos finais de semana
- O Fazueli está destruindo o Sul do Brasil
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Connect to Element One in Element X?
I'm trying to change my account provider from "matrix.org" to whatever Element One needs, and for the life of me I just don't understand what values I have to put where to be able to log in. I tried `element.io`, which takes me to sso.element.io but this doesn't seem like the right thing (no credentials work as I expect.
What are some alternatives?
Telegram - Telegram for Android source
matrix-docker-ansible-deploy - 🐳 Matrix (An open network for secure, decentralized communication) server setup using Ansible and Docker
ivpn.net - Official IVPN Website
matrix-synapse - The Matrix Synapse homeserver for Docker / k8s - deprecated, use upstream
EndGame - EndGame DDoS filter.
Mattermost - Mattermost is an open source platform for secure collaboration across the entire software development lifecycle..
session-desktop - Session Desktop - Onion routing based messenger
apprise-api - A lightweight REST framework that wraps the Apprise Notification Library
go-libp2p-tor-transport - 🚧 WIP: tor transport for libp2p
Synapse - Synapse: Matrix homeserver written in Python/Twisted.
OnionShare - Securely and anonymously share files, host websites, and chat with friends using the Tor network
Mastodon - Your self-hosted, globally interconnected microblogging community