steal-ur-stuff
cli
steal-ur-stuff | cli | |
---|---|---|
8 | 12 | |
21 | 99 | |
- | - | |
0.0 | 9.2 | |
almost 7 years ago | 5 days ago | |
Rust | ||
- | GNU General Public License v3.0 only |
Stars - the number of stars that a project has on GitHub. Growth - month over month growth in stars.
Activity is a relative number indicating how actively a project is being developed. Recent commits have higher weight than older ones.
For example, an activity of 9.0 indicates that a project is amongst the top 10% of the most actively developed projects that we are tracking.
steal-ur-stuff
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JavaScript registry NPM vulnerable to 'manifest confusion' abuse
I actually did a POC 7 years ago about this - https://github.com/tanepiper/steal-ur-stuff
It was reported to npm at the time, but they chose to ignore it - https://github.com/npm/npm/issues/17724
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I wish more developers understood the constant stream of malware that is posted to npm
postinstall malware I reported almost 7 years ago with npm - that it can run any arbitrary script locally or remotely.
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Dissecting Npm Malware: Five Packages And Their Evil Install Scripts
I should really get around to how I discovered this 6 years ago and still nothing done about it
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Attackers are hiding malware in minified packages distributed to NPM
Whenever something like this comes up I usually have to tap the sign (and the original report)
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npm package to upload your private ssh keys to a pastebin
Ahh this old one - I wrote a similar package a while back as a proof of concept that npx is a bad idea 5 years ago - the developer at npm at the time told me it wasn't a problem.
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A pastebin-like platform where you can easily paste code and import it as a module in our NPM projects
Please don't do this and never make it an actual dependency.
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Researcher hacks over 35 tech firms by creating public NPM packages
Not only that it can run arbitrary code contained in a Gist and I showed this 4 years ago https://github.com/tanepiper/steal-ur-stuff
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Getting rid of NPM scripts
[3] https://github.com/tanepiper/steal-ur-stuff
cli
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Ledger's NPM account has been hacked
Co-funder @ Phylum here (https://phylum.io) We have been actively scanning dependencies across npm (and PyPI, RubyGems, Crates.io, etc.) for nearly three years now; quite successfully, I might add (https://blog.phylum.io/tag/research/). We _automatically_ hit on this package when it was published, and our research team has been all over it.
A collective of us are active in Discord (https://discord.gg/Fe6pr5eW6p), continuing to hunt attacks like these. If that's something that interests you, we'd love to have you!
In addition to this, we've released several open source tools to help protect against supply chain attacks:
1. https://github.com/phylum-dev/birdcage - Birdcage is a cross-platform embeddable sandbox that's been baked into our CLI (which wraps npm, pypi, etc.) to sandbox package installations
2. https://github.com/phylum-dev/cli - Our CLI provides an extension capability so you can lock down random executables you might use during your software development (define _what_ it's allowed to do, e.g. network access, and then lock it down with Birdcage)
We also have a variety of integrations, including Github, Gitlab, BitBucket, CircleCI, Tines, Sophos, etc.
https://docs.phylum.io/docs/integrations_overview
It's unfortunate that software dependency attacks continue to plague open source registries. It seems unlikely this will let up in the near future. We are continuing to work closely with the open source ecosystems to try and get these sorts of packages removed when they pop up.
- A Study of Malicious Code in PyPI Ecosystem
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Rust Malware Staged on Crates.io
We're actively working on this with our sandbox (https://github.com/phylum-dev/birdcage). We've wrapped the likes of pip, yarn, and npm already and are making moves to similarly provide support for cargo.
Currently comes as part of the Phylum CLI (https://github.com/phylum-dev/cli), so that doing something like:
phylum npm install
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How Attackers Can Sneakily Slip Malware Packages Into Poetry.lock Files
cli - uses sandbox to block packages during installation, performs pre-install checks to determine (by hitting the API) if the package performs actions congruent with malware, e.g. phylum pip install requests will use pip wrapped by the sandbox to install requests after verifying that it doesn't have malware like behavior.
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Attackers Repurposing existing Python-based Malware for Distribution on NPM
This is bundled with our CLI tool today (which is also open source) and allows you to install packages with phylum npm install . We currently support npm, yarn and pip and are planning on rolling out further support for other ecosystems in coming months.
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Attackers are hiding malware in minified packages distributed to NPM
We open sourced our tooling to help with this problem specifically. We have an extension framework that wraps npm for three purposes:
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Active Malware Campaign Targeting Popular Python Packages Underway
Our CLI tool (also open source and free) will check for typosquats, dependency confusion, malicious code, vulnerabilities, etc. in your package dependencies. Works for pypi, npm, rubygems, maven, nuget and very recently golang and rust crates.
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Ransomware being published to PyPI in ongoing campaign
This is built into the Phylum CLI so you can do things like:
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Dozens of malicious PyPI packages discovered targeting developers
This is one of the projects we're working on (and open sourcing)!
Currently allows you to specify allowed resources during the package installation in a way very similar to what you've outlined [1].
The sandbox itself lives here [2] and can be integrated into other projects.
1. https://github.com/phylum-dev/cli/blob/main/extensions/npm/P...
2. https://github.com/phylum-dev/birdcage
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How To: Open Source Policy Automation via Phylum Extensions
We will start here with a slightly more in-depth, custom version of the existing NPM shim extension - a tool that enforces default project policy when installing NPM packages. This custom extension will do some additional custom validation before allowing the installation process to continue.
What are some alternatives?
actual-malware - Useful library dependency
secimport - eBPF Python runtime sandbox with seccomp (Blocks RCE).
asdf - Extendable version manager with support for Ruby, Node.js, Elixir, Erlang & more
rebuilderd - Independent verification of binary packages - reproducible builds
npm
packj - Packj stops :zap: Solarwinds-, ESLint-, and PyTorch-like attacks by flagging malicious/vulnerable open-source dependencies ("weak links") in your software supply-chain
HomeBrew - 🍺 The missing package manager for macOS (or Linux)
notes - Notes, Questions, Ideas
event-stream - EventStream is like functional programming meets IO
pypi-scan - Scan pypi for typosquatting
project
LavaMoat - tools for sandboxing your dependency graph