static-web-server VS nixpkgs

In here, we will fetch the OIDC configuration from the Kubernetes API server and expose them to the internet on HTTPS using the newly acquired TLS certificate with the help of static web server.

I swapped to static-web-server for exclusively static files, it's only 4MB and its envvars are much easier than nginx's config files

I use https://static-web-server.net/

Cross-platform, written in Rust, straightforward configuration, secure defaults, also has a hardened container image and a hardened NixOS module.

I wouldn't recommend Caddy. Their official docker image runs as root unnecessarily (and the reasoning suggests a lack of understanding) [1], and they don't provide a properly sandboxed systemd unit file [2].

[1]: https://github.com/caddyserver/caddy-docker/issues/104

but for security, maybe something rust (like this )would do.

I like rust binaries because they are cross-platform. I've found cool ones like

- https://github.com/static-web-server/static-web-server/

- https://github.com/Qovery/Replibyte

If you know any repos where I may find compilation of tools I'll be thankful!

I use static web server to host the image.

https://github.com/NixOS/nixpkgs/commits?author=neon-sunset

I see two signers in the top 6 displayed on https://github.com/NixOS/nixpkgs/graphs/contributors

For a single file script, nix can make the package management quite easy: https://github.com/NixOS/nixpkgs/blob/master/doc/languages-f...

For example,

```

Yes, Nix doesn't actually ensure that the builds are deterministic. In fact it works just fine if they aren't. There are packages in nixpkgs that aren't reproducible: https://github.com/NixOS/nixpkgs/issues?q=is%3Aopen+is%3Aiss...

I'm not familiar with Bazel, but Nix in it's current form wouldn't have solved this attack. First of all, the standard mkDerivation function calls the same configure; make; make install process that made this attack possible. Nixpkgs regularly pulls in external resources (fetchUrl and friends) that are equally vulnerable to a poisoned release tarball. Checkout the comment on the current xz entry in nixpkgs https://github.com/NixOS/nixpkgs/blob/master/pkgs/tools/comp...

NixOS uses a monorepo and I think everyone's love it.

I love being able to easily grep through all the packages source code and there's regularly PRs that harmonizes conventions across many packages.

Nixpkgs doesn't include the packaged software source code, so it's a lot more practical than what Debian is doing.

https://github.com/NixOS/nixpkgs

In this specific case, nix uses fetchFromGitHub to download the source archive, which are generated by GitHub for the specified revision[1]. Arch seems to just download the tarball from the releases page[2].

[1]: https://github.com/NixOS/nixpkgs/blob/3c2fdd0a4e6396fc310a6e...

[2]: https://gitlab.archlinux.org/archlinux/packaging/packages/ib...

True, but irrelevant -- _some packages_, _somewhere_, do depend on xz, which, if built, requires pulling the source from GitHub (see the default.nix: https://github.com/NixOS/nixpkgs/blob/nixos-23.11/pkgs/tools...)

It's not the vulnerability that's a problem right now (NixOS was protected by a couple of factors) but rather GitHub's hamfisted response.

That is the problem.