slsa
stb
slsa | stb | |
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35 | 164 | |
1,446 | 25,389 | |
3.4% | - | |
8.5 | 6.4 | |
2 days ago | 14 days ago | |
Shell | C | |
GNU General Public License v3.0 or later | GNU General Public License v3.0 or later |
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Activity is a relative number indicating how actively a project is being developed. Recent commits have higher weight than older ones.
For example, an activity of 9.0 indicates that a project is amongst the top 10% of the most actively developed projects that we are tracking.
slsa
- SLSA – Supply-Chain Levels for Software Artifacts
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Dogbolt Decompiler Explorer
Short answer: not where it counts.
My work focuses on recognizing known functions in obfuscated binaries, but there are some papers you might want to check out related to deobfuscation, if not necessarily using ML for deobfuscation or decompilation.
My take is that ML can soundly defeat the "easy" and more static obfuscation types (encodings, control flow flattening, splitting functions). It's low hanging fruit, and it's what I worked on most, but adoption is slow. On the other hand, "hard" obfuscations like virtualized functions or programs which embed JIT compilers to obfuscate at runtime... as far as I know, those are still unsolved problems.
This is a good overview of the subject, but pretty old and doesn't cover "hard" obfuscations: https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?arnumber=1566145.
https://www.jinyier.me/papers/DATE19_Obf.pdf uses deobfuscation for RTL logic (FGPA/ASIC domain) with SAT solvers. Might be useful for a point of view from a fairly different domain.
https://advising.cs.arizona.edu/~debray/Publications/generic... uses "semantics-preserving transformations" to shed obfuscation. I think this approach is the way to go, especially when combined with dynamic/symbolic analysis to mitigate virt/jit types of transformations.
I'll mention this one as a cautionary tale: https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/2886012 has some good general info but glosses over the machine learning approach. It considers Hex-rays' FLIRT to be "machine learning", but FLIRT just hashes signatures, can be spoofed (i.e. https://siliconpr0n.org/uv/issues_with_flirt_aware_malware.p...), and is useless against obfuscation.
Eventually I think SBOM tools like Black Duck[1] and SLSA[2] will incorporate ML to improve the accuracy of even figuring out what dependencies a piece of software actually has.
[1]: https://www.synopsys.com/software-integrity/software-composi...
[2]: https://slsa.dev/
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10 reasons you should quit your HTTP client
The dependency chain is certified! SLSA!
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UEFI Software Bill of Materials Proposal
The things you mentioned are not solved by a typical "SBOM" but e.g. CycloneDX has extra fields to record provenance and pedigree and things like in-toto (https://in-toto.io/) or SLSA (https://slsa.dev/) also aim to work in this field.
I've spent the last six months in this field and people will tell you that this or that is an industry best practice or "a standard" but in my experience none of that is true. Everyone is still trying to figure out how best to protect the software supply chain security and things are still very much in flux.
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Gittuf – a security layer for Git using some concepts introduced by TUF
It's multi-pronged and I imagine adopters may use a subset of features. Broadly, I think folks are going to be interested in a) branch/tag/reference protection rules, b) file protection rules (monorepo or otherwise, though monorepos do pose a very apt usecase for gittuf), and c) general key management for those who primarily care about Git signing.
For those who care about a and b, I think the work we want to do to support [in-toto attestations](https://github.com/in-toto/attestation) for [SLSA's upcoming source track](https://github.com/slsa-framework/slsa/issues/956) could be very interesting as well.
- SLSA • Supply-Chain Levels for Software Artifacts
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Password-stealing Linux malware served for 3 years and no one noticed
It doesn't have to be. Corporations which are FedRAMP[1] compliant, have to build software reproducibly in a fully isolated environment, only from reviewed code.[2]
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FedRAMP
[2] https://slsa.dev/
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OSCM: The Open Source Consumption Manifesto
SLSA stands for Supply chain Levels for Software Artifacts, and it is a framework that aims to provide a set of best practices for the software supply chain, with a focus on OSS. It was created by Google, and it is now part of the OpenSSF. It consists of four levels of assurance, from Level 1 to Level 4, that correspond to different degrees of protection against supply chain attacks. Our CTO Paolo Mainardi mentioned SLSA in a very good article on software supply chain security, and we also mentioned it in another article about securing OCI Artifacts on Kubernetes.
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CLOUD SECURITY PODCAST BY GOOGLE - EP116 SBOMs: A Step Towards a More Secure Software Supply Chain -
SLSA.dev
- Supply Chain Levels for Software Artifacts (SLSA)
stb
- Lessons learned about how to make a header-file library (2013)
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Nebula is an open-source and free-to-use modern C++ game engine
Have you considered not using an engine at all, in favor of libraries? There are many amazing libraries I've used for game development - all in C/C++ - that you can piece together:
* General: [stb](https://github.com/nothings/stb)
- STB: Single-file public domain libraries for C/C++
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Writing a TrueType font renderer
Great to see more accessible references on font internals. I have dabbled on this a bit last year and managed to have a parser and render the points of a glyph's contour (I stopped before Bezier and shape filling stuff). I still have not considered hinting, so it's nice that it's covered. What helped me was an article from the Handmade Network [1] and the source of stb_truetype [2] (also used in Dear ImGUI).
[1] https://handmade.network/forums/articles/t/7330-implementing....
[2] https://github.com/nothings/stb/blob/master/stb_truetype.h
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Capturing the WebGPU Ecosystem
So I read through the materials on mesh shaders and work graphs and looked at sample code. These won't really work (see below). As I implied previously, it's best to research/discuss these sort of matters with professional graphics programmers who have experience actually using the technologies under consideration.
So for the sake of future web searchers who discover this thread: there are only two proven ways to efficiently draw thousands of unique textures of different sizes with a single draw call that are actually used by experienced graphics programmers in production code as of 2023.
Proven method #1: Pack these thousands of textures into a texture atlas.
Proven method #2: Use bindless resources, which is still fairly bleeding edge, and will require fallback to atlases if targeting the PC instead of only high end console (Xbox Series S|X...).
Mesh shaders by themselves won't work: These have similar texture access limitations to the old geometry/tessellation stage they improve upon. A limited, fixed number of textures still must be bound before each draw call (say, 16 or 32 textures, not 1000s), unless bindless resources are used. So mesh shaders must be used with an atlas or with bindless resources.
Work graphs by themselves won't work: This feature is bleeding edge shader model 6.8 whereas bindless resources are SM 6.6. (Xbox Series X|S might top out at SM 6.7, I can't find an authoritative answer.) It looks like work graphs might only work well on nVidia GPUs and won't work well on Intel GPUs anytime soon (but, again, I'm not knowledgeable enough to say this authoritatively). Furthermore, this feature may have a hard dependency on using bindless to begin with. That is, I can't tell if one is allowed to execute a work graph that binds and unbinds individual texture resources. And if one could do such a thing, it would certainly be slower than using bindless. The cost of bindless is paid "up front" when the textures are uploaded.
Some programmers use Texture2DArray/GL_TEXTURE_2D_ARRAY as an alternative to atlases but two limitations are (1) the max array length (e.g. GL_MAX_ARRAY_TEXTURE_LAYERS) might only be 256 (e.g. for OpenGL 3.0), (2) all textures must be the same size.
Finally, for the sake of any web searcher who lands on this thread in the years to come, to pack an atlas well a good packing algorithm is needed. It's harder to pack triangles than rectangles but triangles use atlas memory more efficiently and a good triangle packing will outperform the fancy new bindless rendering. Some open source starting points for packing:
https://github.com/nothings/stb/blob/master/stb_rect_pack.h
https://github.com/ands/trianglepacker
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Www Which WASM Works
The STB headers are mostly built like that: https://github.com/nothings/stb
You could also add an optional 'convenience API' over the lower-level flexible-but-inconvenient core API, as long as core library can be compiled on its own.
In essence it's just a way to decouple the actually important library code from runtime environment details which might be better implemented outside the C/C++ stdlib.
It's already as simple as the stdlib IO functions not being asynchrononous while many operating systems provide more modern alternatives. For a specific type of library (such an image decoder) it's often better to delegate such details to the library user instead of circumventing the stdlib and talking directly to OS APIs.
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File for Divorce from LLVM
My stuff for instance:
https://github.com/floooh/sokol
...inspired by:
https://github.com/nothings/stb
But it's not so much about the build system, but requiring a separate C/C++ compiler toolchain (Rust needs this, Zig currently does not - unless the proposal is implemented).
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What C libraries do you use the most?
STB Libraries: https://github.com/nothings/stb
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[Noob Question] How do C programmers get around not having hash maps?
stb_ds is also very popular.
- Is there an existing multidimensional hash table implementation in C?
What are some alternatives?
ClojureDart - Clojure dialect for Flutter and Dart
Vcpkg - C++ Library Manager for Windows, Linux, and MacOS
grype - A vulnerability scanner for container images and filesystems
imgui-node-editor - Node Editor built using Dear ImGui
DependencyCheck - OWASP dependency-check is a software composition analysis utility that detects publicly disclosed vulnerabilities in application dependencies.
ZXing - ZXing ("Zebra Crossing") barcode scanning library for Java, Android
sig-security - 🔐CNCF Security Technical Advisory Group -- secure access, policy control, privacy, auditing, explainability and more!
freetype-gl - OpenGL text using one vertex buffer, one texture and FreeType
trivy - Find vulnerabilities, misconfigurations, secrets, SBOM in containers, Kubernetes, code repositories, clouds and more
ImageMagick - 🧙♂️ ImageMagick 7
checkov - Prevent cloud misconfigurations and find vulnerabilities during build-time in infrastructure as code, container images and open source packages with Checkov by Bridgecrew.
Cppcheck - static analysis of C/C++ code