slsa VS enhancements

Short answer: not where it counts.

My work focuses on recognizing known functions in obfuscated binaries, but there are some papers you might want to check out related to deobfuscation, if not necessarily using ML for deobfuscation or decompilation.

My take is that ML can soundly defeat the "easy" and more static obfuscation types (encodings, control flow flattening, splitting functions). It's low hanging fruit, and it's what I worked on most, but adoption is slow. On the other hand, "hard" obfuscations like virtualized functions or programs which embed JIT compilers to obfuscate at runtime... as far as I know, those are still unsolved problems.

This is a good overview of the subject, but pretty old and doesn't cover "hard" obfuscations: https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?arnumber=1566145.

https://www.jinyier.me/papers/DATE19_Obf.pdf uses deobfuscation for RTL logic (FGPA/ASIC domain) with SAT solvers. Might be useful for a point of view from a fairly different domain.

https://advising.cs.arizona.edu/~debray/Publications/generic... uses "semantics-preserving transformations" to shed obfuscation. I think this approach is the way to go, especially when combined with dynamic/symbolic analysis to mitigate virt/jit types of transformations.

I'll mention this one as a cautionary tale: https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/2886012 has some good general info but glosses over the machine learning approach. It considers Hex-rays' FLIRT to be "machine learning", but FLIRT just hashes signatures, can be spoofed (i.e. https://siliconpr0n.org/uv/issues_with_flirt_aware_malware.p...), and is useless against obfuscation.

Eventually I think SBOM tools like Black Duck[1] and SLSA[2] will incorporate ML to improve the accuracy of even figuring out what dependencies a piece of software actually has.

[1]: https://www.synopsys.com/software-integrity/software-composi...

[2]: https://slsa.dev/

The dependency chain is certified! SLSA!

The things you mentioned are not solved by a typical "SBOM" but e.g. CycloneDX has extra fields to record provenance and pedigree and things like in-toto (https://in-toto.io/) or SLSA (https://slsa.dev/) also aim to work in this field.

I've spent the last six months in this field and people will tell you that this or that is an industry best practice or "a standard" but in my experience none of that is true. Everyone is still trying to figure out how best to protect the software supply chain security and things are still very much in flux.

It's multi-pronged and I imagine adopters may use a subset of features. Broadly, I think folks are going to be interested in a) branch/tag/reference protection rules, b) file protection rules (monorepo or otherwise, though monorepos do pose a very apt usecase for gittuf), and c) general key management for those who primarily care about Git signing.

For those who care about a and b, I think the work we want to do to support [in-toto attestations](https://github.com/in-toto/attestation) for [SLSA's upcoming source track](https://github.com/slsa-framework/slsa/issues/956) could be very interesting as well.

It doesn't have to be. Corporations which are FedRAMP[1] compliant, have to build software reproducibly in a fully isolated environment, only from reviewed code.[2]

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FedRAMP

[2] https://slsa.dev/

SLSA stands for Supply chain Levels for Software Artifacts, and it is a framework that aims to provide a set of best practices for the software supply chain, with a focus on OSS. It was created by Google, and it is now part of the OpenSSF. It consists of four levels of assurance, from Level 1 to Level 4, that correspond to different degrees of protection against supply chain attacks. Our CTO Paolo Mainardi mentioned SLSA in a very good article on software supply chain security, and we also mentioned it in another article about securing OCI Artifacts on Kubernetes.

SLSA.dev

Thanks for these links!

I picked out one at random just to check if my skeptical reaction is fair: https://github.com/kubernetes/enhancements/tree/master/keps/...

- OK, this is actually a really good and useful doc!

- However, it's not an up-front design doc, it has clearly been written after the bulk of the work has been done, to explain and justify rolling out a big change. (See the "implementation history" timeline: https://github.com/kubernetes/enhancements/tree/master/keps/...)

- It looks like the template wasn't very useful; most of the required sections are marked "N/A", and there are comments like The best test for work like this is, more or less, "did it work?"

> was always told early on that although they supported vault on kubernetes via a helm chart, they did not recommend using it on anything but EC2 instances (because of "security" which never really made sense their reasoning).

The reasoning is basically that there are some security and isolation guarantees you don't get in Kubernetes that you do get on bare metal or (to a somewhat lesser extent) in VMs.

In particular for Kubernetes, Vault wants to run as a non-root user and set the IPC_LOCK capability when it starts to prevent its memory from being swapped to disk. While in Docker you can directly enable this by adding capabilities when you launch the container, Kubernetes has an issue because of the way it handles non-root container users specified in a pod manifest, detailed in a (long-dormant) KEP: https://github.com/kubernetes/enhancements/blob/master/keps/... (tl;dr: Kubernetes runs the container process as root, with the specified capabilities added, but then switches it to the non-root UID, which causes the explicitly-added capabilities to be dropped).

You can work around this by rebuilding the container and setting the capability directly on the binary, but the upstream build of the binary and the one in the container image don't come with that set (because the user should set it at runtime if running the container image directly, and the systemd unit sets it via systemd if running as a systemd service, so there's no need to do that except for working around Kubernetes' ambient-capability issue).

> It always surprised me how these conversations went. "Well we don't really recommend kubernetes so we won't support (feature)."

0 is not the request we've defined. And that makes sense. Memory QoS has been in alpha since Kubernetes 1.22 (August 2021) and according to the KEP data was still in alpha as of 1.27.

Note: There's actually a Structured Authentication Config established via KEP-3331. It's in v1.28 as a feature flag gated option and removes the limitation of only having one OIDC provider. I may look into doing an article on it, but for now I'll deal with the issue in a manner that should work even with a bit older versions versions of Kubernetes.

Kubernetes supports a skew policy of n+2 between API server and kubelet. This means if your CP and DP are both on 1.20, you could upgrade your control plane twice (1.20 -> 1.21 -> 1.22) before you need to upgrade your data plane. And when it comes time to upgrade your data plane you can jump from 1.20 to 1.22 to minimize update churn. In the future, this skew will be opened to n+3 https://github.com/kubernetes/enhancements/tree/master/keps/sig-architecture/3935-oldest-node-newest-control-plane

The KEP (Kubernetes Enhancement Proposal) is linked to in the PR [1]. From the summary:

> Sidecar containers are a new type of containers that start among the Init containers, run through the lifecycle of the Pod and don’t block pod termination. Kubelet makes a best effort to keep them alive and running while other containers are running.

[1] https://github.com/kubernetes/enhancements/tree/master/keps/...

This is where the new feature of mutable scheduling directives for jobs comes into play. This feature enables the updating of a job's scheduling directives before it begins. Essentially, it allows custom queue controllers to influence pod placement without needing to directly handle the assignment of pods to nodes themselves. To learn more about this check out the Kubernetes Enhancement Proposal 2926.

What your asking is a (vanilla) Kubernetes non-goal, others have mentioned fluxcd and other add ons that provide primitives for dependency aware deployments. The problem space is so large, that it's unreasonable to to address these concerns in Kubernetes itself, instead, make it extensible... Look at this KEP for example: https://github.com/kubernetes/enhancements/issues/753 Sidecar containers have existed, and been named as such since WAY before that KEP's inception, defining what these things should and shouldn't do is largely arbitrary. Aka: your use-case is niche, if you don't like the behavior, use flux or argo, or write something yourself.

If further interested, I may recommend checking out the KEP. I love how they document the decision making, and all these edge cases :).