slsa
decompiler-explorer
slsa | decompiler-explorer | |
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35 | 18 | |
1,446 | 1,853 | |
3.4% | 3.5% | |
8.5 | 8.4 | |
4 days ago | 17 days ago | |
Shell | Python | |
GNU General Public License v3.0 or later | MIT License |
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slsa
- SLSA – Supply-Chain Levels for Software Artifacts
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Dogbolt Decompiler Explorer
Short answer: not where it counts.
My work focuses on recognizing known functions in obfuscated binaries, but there are some papers you might want to check out related to deobfuscation, if not necessarily using ML for deobfuscation or decompilation.
My take is that ML can soundly defeat the "easy" and more static obfuscation types (encodings, control flow flattening, splitting functions). It's low hanging fruit, and it's what I worked on most, but adoption is slow. On the other hand, "hard" obfuscations like virtualized functions or programs which embed JIT compilers to obfuscate at runtime... as far as I know, those are still unsolved problems.
This is a good overview of the subject, but pretty old and doesn't cover "hard" obfuscations: https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?arnumber=1566145.
https://www.jinyier.me/papers/DATE19_Obf.pdf uses deobfuscation for RTL logic (FGPA/ASIC domain) with SAT solvers. Might be useful for a point of view from a fairly different domain.
https://advising.cs.arizona.edu/~debray/Publications/generic... uses "semantics-preserving transformations" to shed obfuscation. I think this approach is the way to go, especially when combined with dynamic/symbolic analysis to mitigate virt/jit types of transformations.
I'll mention this one as a cautionary tale: https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/2886012 has some good general info but glosses over the machine learning approach. It considers Hex-rays' FLIRT to be "machine learning", but FLIRT just hashes signatures, can be spoofed (i.e. https://siliconpr0n.org/uv/issues_with_flirt_aware_malware.p...), and is useless against obfuscation.
Eventually I think SBOM tools like Black Duck[1] and SLSA[2] will incorporate ML to improve the accuracy of even figuring out what dependencies a piece of software actually has.
[1]: https://www.synopsys.com/software-integrity/software-composi...
[2]: https://slsa.dev/
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10 reasons you should quit your HTTP client
The dependency chain is certified! SLSA!
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UEFI Software Bill of Materials Proposal
The things you mentioned are not solved by a typical "SBOM" but e.g. CycloneDX has extra fields to record provenance and pedigree and things like in-toto (https://in-toto.io/) or SLSA (https://slsa.dev/) also aim to work in this field.
I've spent the last six months in this field and people will tell you that this or that is an industry best practice or "a standard" but in my experience none of that is true. Everyone is still trying to figure out how best to protect the software supply chain security and things are still very much in flux.
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Gittuf – a security layer for Git using some concepts introduced by TUF
It's multi-pronged and I imagine adopters may use a subset of features. Broadly, I think folks are going to be interested in a) branch/tag/reference protection rules, b) file protection rules (monorepo or otherwise, though monorepos do pose a very apt usecase for gittuf), and c) general key management for those who primarily care about Git signing.
For those who care about a and b, I think the work we want to do to support [in-toto attestations](https://github.com/in-toto/attestation) for [SLSA's upcoming source track](https://github.com/slsa-framework/slsa/issues/956) could be very interesting as well.
- SLSA • Supply-Chain Levels for Software Artifacts
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Password-stealing Linux malware served for 3 years and no one noticed
It doesn't have to be. Corporations which are FedRAMP[1] compliant, have to build software reproducibly in a fully isolated environment, only from reviewed code.[2]
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FedRAMP
[2] https://slsa.dev/
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OSCM: The Open Source Consumption Manifesto
SLSA stands for Supply chain Levels for Software Artifacts, and it is a framework that aims to provide a set of best practices for the software supply chain, with a focus on OSS. It was created by Google, and it is now part of the OpenSSF. It consists of four levels of assurance, from Level 1 to Level 4, that correspond to different degrees of protection against supply chain attacks. Our CTO Paolo Mainardi mentioned SLSA in a very good article on software supply chain security, and we also mentioned it in another article about securing OCI Artifacts on Kubernetes.
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CLOUD SECURITY PODCAST BY GOOGLE - EP116 SBOMs: A Step Towards a More Secure Software Supply Chain -
SLSA.dev
- Supply Chain Levels for Software Artifacts (SLSA)
decompiler-explorer
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Dogbolt Decompiler Explorer
Can I just say, thanks to the person who posted this for waiting until this week to do so. (Side note: I suspect it was due to the recent coverage from C++ Weekly which is a great resource: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h3F0Fw0R7ME)
As recently as last week we had some horrible performance problems but it looks like the queue (https://dogbolt.org/queue) is mostly still fine! Other than the long pole of a few of the decompilers being backed up, things are humming along quite smoothly! Josh + Glenn have done some great work on it! (https://github.com/decompiler-explorer/decompiler-explorer/c...)
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Revamping Binary Analysis with Sampling and Probabilistic Inference
(dogbolt.org, not .com by the way.)
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IDA Pro 8.3 released.
Also check out this comparison tool https://dogbolt.org/ (https://github.com/decompiler-explorer/decompiler-explorer) - it's a clear illustration that tool effectiveness is highly dependent on the specific binary input and task complexity
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How to determine original language an .exe was coded with?
The c++-looking code you see is rebuild from the disasm, e.g for clarity, it's supposed to make the low level code more readable, so it does not mean anything about the language. (aside: several other product do that, see https://dogbolt.org/)
- MCU Firmware unpacking, decrypting? Find Security Keys, Checksums, Memory Map
- IDA Pro 8.0 released.
- Decompiler Explorer – Compare tools on the forefront of static analysis from your web browser
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