pacman-bintrans
nonguix
pacman-bintrans | nonguix | |
---|---|---|
8 | 79 | |
83 | - | |
- | - | |
2.2 | - | |
about 2 months ago | - | |
Rust | ||
GNU General Public License v3.0 only | - |
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pacman-bintrans
- Pacman-bintrans – Experimental binary transparency for pacman via sigstore/rekor
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ProtonMail Is Inherently Insecure, Your Emails Are Likely Compromised
If you trust them with your keys, why not trust them with your plaintext? At which point, why bother with E2EE at all?
The answer should be "because one day web browsers will be able to pin specific versions of specific web apps, with specific hashes, corresponding to specific releases tagged in their repo, which have been audited by a certain threshold of auditors that I trust".
What that looks like in practice is probably some mixture of the following projects:
https://github.com/kpcyrd/pacman-bintrans
https://users.rust-lang.org/t/rust-code-reviews-web-site-for...
https://paragonie.com/blog/2022/01/solving-open-source-suppl...
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Solving Open Source Supply Chain Security for the PHP Ecosystem
Generally speaking, Transparency Logs for securing software distribution has been a research topic since around 2015, I also wrote my master thesis on the subject.
Sigstore is a Transparency Log intended for provenance and software artifacts which has support for a few different build artifacts. The container ecosystems also appears to be embracing it.
Cool practical example is pacman-bintrans from kpcyrd that throws Arch Linux packages on sigstore and (optionally) checks each package for being reproducible before installation.
https://github.com/kpcyrd/pacman-bintrans
https://www.sigstore.dev/
I think this is generally useful for a lot of ecosystems indeed, and it's cool to also see similar scoped projects pop up to address the these issues.
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I Love Arch, but GNU Guix Is My New Distro
Reproducible builds are an important part of efforts to secure the software supply chain. Ideally you want multiple independent parties vouching that a given package (whether a compiled binary, or a source tarball) corresponds to a globally immutably published revision in a source code repository.
That gives you Binary Transparency, which is already being attempted in the Arch Linux package ecosystem[0], and it protects the user from compromised build environments and software updates that are targeted at a specific user or that occur without upstream's knowledge.
Once updates can be tied securely to version control tags, it is possible to add something like Crev[1] to allow distributed auditing of source code changes. That still leaves open the questions of who to trust for audits, and how to fund that auditing work, but it greatly mitigates other classes of attack.
[0] https://github.com/kpcyrd/pacman-bintrans
[1] https://github.com/crev-dev/cargo-crev
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CII' FOSS best practices criteria
It's good that having a reproducible build process is a requirement for the Gold rating, as is signed releases.
Perhaps there needs to be a Platinum level which involves storing the hash of each release in a distributed append-only log, with multiple third parties vouching that they can build the binary from the published source.
Obviously I'm thinking of something like sigstore[0] which the Arch Linux package ecosystem is being experimentally integrated with.[1] Then there's Crev for distributed code review.[2]
[0] https://docs.sigstore.dev/
[1] https://github.com/kpcyrd/pacman-bintrans
[2] https://github.com/crev-dev/crev
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Thousands of Debian packages updated from their upstream Git repository
> Of course, since these packages are built automatically without human supervision it’s likely that some of them will have bugs in them that would otherwise have been caught by the maintainer.
Human supervision isn't enough to protect the supply chain, and I can't think of a time that it's actually stopped an attack at the packaging stage, but having some extra "friction" in the process seems like it should be a benefit. Ideally an attacker would have to get past both the upstream author and the Debian maintainer, rather than these being two separate single points of failure.
Fortunately the Debian project is improving the situation with regards to supply chain attacks by continuing to work on Reproducible Builds. I think the next step from there needs to be Binary Transparency, with the adoption of the sort of approach being trialled by Arch Linux:
https://github.com/kpcyrd/pacman-bintrans
- Binary transparency logs for pacman, the Arch Linux package manager
nonguix
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Nix – A One Pager
Their software freedom policy seems to be similar to Debian. All free by default, allow separate nonfree addon. In the case of Guix you can find that here: https://gitlab.com/nonguix/nonguix .
- Guix on the Framework 13 AMD
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Write Guix package definitions in a breeze: Introducing Guix Packager
The GUIX community has a non-free package repo, you just add it as a GUIX channel and problem solved:
https://gitlab.com/nonguix/nonguix
- The many issues plaguing Nix
- Nonguix
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My Void experience, so you don't have to
Yes, being a GNU project Guix has a strict free software only policy. The biggest channel (repo) with proprietary stuff for Guix is called nonguix. It has the vanilla kernel, Nvidia drivers and a number of other proprietary packages including Steam, Chrome and the like. I don't know what the state of ZFS on Guix is though as I don't care for it myself, but I can see why its inclusion would be questioned with regards to licensing.
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Differences between nixos and guix?
Since Guix is a GNU project, it doesn't support proprietary software (Steam, Discord, Zoom...). Third-party repos are available for it.
- Cannot install firefox in guix
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I'm not fond of nix syntax, how difficult will it be to switch to guix
There's a git lab repo for non-free/libre software that you can add as a channel when installing. I used the following guide that shows you how to do this.
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Invalid Field Specifier
I'm trying to enable substitues for nonguix. I added the code snippet from the nonguix website to my system.scm file per the instructions. When I try to reconfigure I get the following error:
What are some alternatives?
paru - Feature packed AUR helper
guix-nonfree - Unofficial collection of packages that are not going to be accepted in to guix
arch-audit - A utility like pkg-audit for Arch Linux. Based on Arch Security Team data.
zfsbootmenu - ZFS Bootloader for root-on-ZFS systems with support for snapshots and native full disk encryption
dysnomia - Dysnomia: A tool for deploying mutable components
com.valvesoftware.Steam
webext-signed-pages - A browser extension to verify the authenticity (PGP signature) of web pages
guix-nonfree
OpenCart - A free shopping cart system. OpenCart is an open source PHP-based online e-commerce solution.
nixpkgs - Nix Packages collection & NixOS
gitian-builder - Build packages in a secure deterministic fashion inside a VM
nixos-hardware - A collection of NixOS modules covering hardware quirks.