msquic VS winget-pkgs

I referred to sockets as an API design, not to express an opinion on whether you should place your protocol implementations inside or outside the kernel. (Although that’s undeniably an interesting question that by all rights should have been settled by now, but isn’t.)

Even then, I didn’t mean you should reproduce the Berkeley socket API verbatim (ZeroMQ-style); multiple streams per connection does not sound like a particularly good fit to it (although apparently people have managed to fit SCTP into it[1]?). I only meant that with the current mainstream libraries[2,3,4], establishing a QUIC connection and transmitting bytestreams or datagrams over it seems quite a bit more involved than performing the equivalent TCP actions using sockets.

[1] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6458

[2] https://quiche.googlesource.com/quiche

[3] https://github.com/microsoft/msquic

[4] https://github.com/litespeedtech/lsquic

The documentation of MS QUIC says it is cross-platform, it should work on Linux, it has a CMake preset for Linux and you can download the prebuilt binary releases for Linux.

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https://github.com/microsoft/msquic (QUIC / HTTP3)

7.0 is now available: https://github.com/microsoft/winget-pkgs/pull/147886

I researched this for a WinGet thing: https://github.com/microsoft/winget-pkgs/pull/110618

Ah, reminds me of that time I requested a .editorconfig file in a Microsoft repo: https://github.com/microsoft/winget-pkgs/issues/329

Take dropbox as an example. This is what the yaml manifest looks like for that if you install it through winget. It literally has a hardcoded link to an .exe installer hosted by dropbox and then just set the flags to silent. I am not spreading misinformation, you are.

It's not quite the same though, as there are different considerations when using a repository of things a unified group has decided should be included and built (or slightly modified existing) packages for and a repo where anyone can submit a package that will go through some level of vetting. In the end I still believe most this discussion is really about individuals and how much trust they apply towards different groups and sources and is not really about Linux or Windows in particular as much.

1: https://github.com/microsoft/winget-pkgs

I never used winget, but probably: - https://github.com/microsoft/winget-pkgs/issues/107858 - https://github.com/Genymobile/scrcpy/issues/4027

It's probably not on the Store, winget pulls from both the Store and a community collection of manifests on GitHub: https://github.com/microsoft/winget-pkgs

I think that's part of the problem, if you don't have that package manager to bootstrap your signature key ring, DNS is your next best bootstrap. It is, of course, a terrible bootstrap for trust, but it is one so many users on Windows have been relying on for such a long time.

For power users on any modern Windows 10/Windows 11 there is at least WinGet now. Its manifests repo is becoming a very interesting (open) source of truth for common Windows applications. Admittedly, it in most cases doesn't seem to be checking specific code signatures in most cases either, but at least includes SHA checksums.

For instance, 7zip's manifests: https://github.com/microsoft/winget-pkgs/tree/master/manifes...

It's too bad there's still not a great option for "average user that doesn't know/trust how to use a CLI", given how sadly polluted the Microsoft Store can be for many common, especially Open Source, applications. For direct instance, because winget kindly includes Microsoft Store results when searching, there is a "7zip 22" in the Microsoft Store that costs some amount of money (winget details say "PaidUnknownPrice" for the pricing information; I'm on a corporate machine right now with the actual Store access locked so can't search in the actual Store right now) and the Publisher is listed as RepackagerExpress.com. (That website currently doesn't go anywhere, giving it a spot check.)

Having seen this, I may boot up my personal machine and try to report this specific Store listing for violating the Store's Open Source policies, though I'm unsure if such whackamole is all that useful. (Seems like it might be a useful winget feature request for it to provide Store Report URLs.)

For example, see that Firefox has /S here.