illumos-gate VS systemd

It may become a footnote on Linux, but Linux isn't the only system out there -- and DTrace remains alive and well in many systems (not least in its reference implementation in illumos[0]).

[0] https://github.com/illumos/illumos-gate

Nobody's paid to have it pass Open Group Unix Branding certification tests

https://www.opengroup.org/openbrand/register/

so it can't use the UNIX™ trade mark.

But it's got the AT&T Unix kernel & userland sources contained in it.

PDP-11 Unix System III: https://www.tuhs.org/cgi-bin/utree.pl?file=SysIII/usr/src/ut...

IllumOS: https://github.com/illumos/illumos-gate/blob/b8169dedfa435c0...

> it seems like this bug might actually date back to the very beginning of ZFS with Sun

Looks like you might be right about that. The oldest commit referenced in the fix [0] was from 2006[1], which was just months after Sun released ZFS.

[0] https://github.com/openzfs/zfs/pull/15571

[1] https://github.com/illumos/illumos-gate/commit/c543ec060d

It could be good for in memory stores / log-structured merged trees / other data store applications although it isn't used much now-days. I find them simpler to implement and understand than red-black trees -- although that's a matter of taste I suppose. They beat red-black trees in read-heavy loads (i.e. writes / updates are more costly for AVL trees than for Red-Black trees although they beat R-B trees for read-heavy loads). You can find another implementation in Illumos (an open source Unix operating system) available here: https://github.com/illumos/illumos-gate/blob/master/usr/src/...

It's high time that the Illumos developers patched https://github.com/illumos/illumos-gate/blob/master/usr/src/... and https://github.com/illumos/illumos-gate/blob/master/usr/src/... to just set the error flag and return, and made the #ifndef TIOCSTI path in https://github.com/illumos/illumos-gate/blob/master/usr/src/... the only path.

Because by the looks of https://github.com/illumos/illumos-gate/blob/7c478bd95313f5f... the C shell was fixed years ago.

People are still actively working on Illumos. The last change was yesterday morning.

* https://illumos.org

People are still actively working on MirBSD. There's a CVS commit account that can be followed on the FediVerse.

* http://www.mirbsd.org

It's DragonFly BSD, not Dragon BSD, and the irony of that is that you missed FreeBSD, which is of course still going.

* https://dragonflybsd.org

* https://freebsd.org

As is GhostBSD, which tracks FreeBSD.

* https://ghostbsd.org

HardenedBSD is still going. Shawn Webb regularly talks about it on the FediVerse.

* https://hardenedbsd.org

Its successor is still out there: Illumos. Though it seems to be mainly focused on backwards compatibility for existing custom applications as it still enforces things like an 8 character username limit.

> Since then, illumos has rewritten all those components

But apparently kept the same license?

>> Most of the existing code is licensed under the CDDL and we expect new code will generally be under this license as well.[0]

[0] https://github.com/illumos/illumos-gate

No, the OP was not sent any harassment, the OP _did_ the harassment as it can be seen in the tweets. I mean, they are right there, just click on the links you shared. One of the OP's followers even openly called for the assassination of the project maintainer, and you have the galls to defend him? This is truly deranged stuff.

And again, there is no "vulnerability", there is simply a person that doesn't know how Linux works and has learned something new. Which again it's fine, nobody knows everything and we all learn new things everyday, it's just that normal and sensible people don't use that to make grand claims on social media and start harassment campaigns culminating in death threats.

Professional security researchers responsibly report real issues using the appropriate channels, such as defined at: https://github.com/systemd/systemd/security/policy this is not the work of a researcher, this is a grifter looking for self-promotion on social media.

> 3. even `adduser` will not allow it by default

5. useradd does allow it (as noted in a comment). 6. Local users are not the only source, there things like LDAP and AD.

7. POSIX allows it:

* https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/6237#issuecomment-...

> I for one love to type out 13 extra characters

FWIW, systemd is normally pretty good at providing autocomplete suggestions, so even if you don't want to set up an alias you'll probably just have to type `--b ` to set it.

> I wonder what random ASCII escape sequences we can send.

According to the man page source[0]:

> The color specified should be an ANSI X3.64 SGR background color, i.e. strings such as `40`, `41`, …, `47`, `48;2;…`, `48;5;…`

and a link to the relevant Wikipedia page[1]. Given systemd's generally decent track record wrt defects and security issues, and the simplicity of valid colour values, I expect there's a fairly robust parameter verifier in there.

In fact, given the focus on starting the elevated command in a highly controlled environment, I'd expect the colour codes to be output to the originating terminal, not forwarded to the secure pty. That way, the only thing malformed escapes can affect is your own process, which you already have full control over anyway.

(Happy to be shown if that's a mistaken expectation though.)

[0] https://github.com/systemd/systemd/blob/main/man/run0.xml

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ANSI_escape_code#SGR_(Select_G...

bash & zsh are supported by upstream: https://github.com/systemd/systemd/tree/main/shell-completio...

the right person to replace sudo, not: https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/6237

PS: https://pwnies.com/systemd-bugs/

https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/32028#issuecomment...

There are some very compelling arguments made there if you care to read them

Maybe it was because you weren't pointing out anything new?

There was a pull request to stop linking libzma to systemd before the attack even took place

https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/31550

This was likely one of many things that pushed the attackers to work faster, and forced them into making mistakes.

The PR for changing compression libraries to use dlopen() was opened several weeks before the xz-utils backdoor was revealed.

https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/31550