gittuf VS attestation

Compare gittuf vs attestation and see what are their differences.

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gittuf attestation
2 3
397 197
6.0% 3.2%
9.6 8.6
about 3 hours ago 8 days ago
Go Go
Apache License 2.0 GNU General Public License v3.0 or later
The number of mentions indicates the total number of mentions that we've tracked plus the number of user suggested alternatives.
Stars - the number of stars that a project has on GitHub. Growth - month over month growth in stars.
Activity is a relative number indicating how actively a project is being developed. Recent commits have higher weight than older ones.
For example, an activity of 9.0 indicates that a project is amongst the top 10% of the most actively developed projects that we are tracking.

gittuf

Posts with mentions or reviews of gittuf. We have used some of these posts to build our list of alternatives and similar projects. The last one was on 2023-11-23.
  • Git Branches: Intuition and Reality
    6 projects | news.ycombinator.com | 23 Nov 2023
    It actually does but it's very much in alpha/active development (under the umbrella of OpenSSF with the intent of being integrated into mainline git eventually).

    https://github.com/gittuf/gittuf

  • Gittuf – a security layer for Git using some concepts introduced by TUF
    5 projects | news.ycombinator.com | 24 Oct 2023
    Hey Will, thanks!

    The paper is from quite a few years ago now and the reference is for a subset of gittuf's threat model, specifically the metadata manipulation / reference state attacks. The paper talks about MITM as one way to carry out a ref state attack, but if you're communicating with a compromised repository, you can be a victim of such an attack even if you're using authenticated transport and using signed commits / tags that you have a way of verifying.

    We do have a threat model for gittuf that we've been meaning to add [0] to the design doc. I'll try and get that done today. It should probably be in there before we tag our alpha release. :)

    [0] https://github.com/gittuf/gittuf/issues/95

attestation

Posts with mentions or reviews of attestation. We have used some of these posts to build our list of alternatives and similar projects. The last one was on 2023-10-24.
  • Gittuf – a security layer for Git using some concepts introduced by TUF
    5 projects | news.ycombinator.com | 24 Oct 2023
    It's multi-pronged and I imagine adopters may use a subset of features. Broadly, I think folks are going to be interested in a) branch/tag/reference protection rules, b) file protection rules (monorepo or otherwise, though monorepos do pose a very apt usecase for gittuf), and c) general key management for those who primarily care about Git signing.

    For those who care about a and b, I think the work we want to do to support [in-toto attestations](https://github.com/in-toto/attestation) for [SLSA's upcoming source track](https://github.com/slsa-framework/slsa/issues/956) could be very interesting as well.

  • NPM Provenance Public Beta
    5 projects | news.ycombinator.com | 19 Apr 2023
  • There is no “software supply chain”
    3 projects | news.ycombinator.com | 19 Sep 2022
    I have. I actually worked a few desks down from dpc when he was creating it and we talked about it at length. I felt then and now that it has good goals but a very limiting implementation in that it does not pursue a portable spec and instead anchors a very opinionated format to git, and github, instead of cryptographic keys held in hardware owned controlled by reviewers. I want to see the same keys that sign git commits also sign reviews, for instance.

    I think for broad adoption a review system should ask essentially the same questions as crev, but store them in a format like in-toto including signatures by the reviewers created with a user choice of pgp smartcards, ssh keys, or webauthn devices. These reviews would be anchored to hashes of a particular state of a particular tree of code and not to any type of VCS or distribution system. Important code is distributed via Perforce, mercurial subversion, and tar files depending if we are talking about big corps, or linux distro building blocks. A good OSS review system should be also be usable by teams in their internal proprietary codebases too if we wish to see wide adoption. Even for OSS we may wish to share some reviews as standalone objects privately while security embargos are in place, etc. Proofs should also be verified standalone easily from local cache, when github is down, when original repos vanish, etc.

    Something that meets these broader needs will make it easy for large orgs with very different internal setups to participate and play nice with other supply chain efforts by the OpenSSF using in-toto for reproducible builds, etc.

    My experience tells me we need something much more ambitious than crev, but crev proved to me many people have real interest in this problem which I really thank dpc for.

    The biggest blocker for starting this project is the human review spec settling in in-toto https://github.com/in-toto/attestation/issues/77

What are some alternatives?

When comparing gittuf and attestation you can also consider the following projects:

gitsign - Keyless Git signing using Sigstore

malicious-software-packages-dataset - An open-source dataset of malicious software packages found in the wild, 100% vetted by humans.

build-extra - Additional files and scripts to help build Git for Windows on MSYS2.

root-signing

git-secret - :busts_in_silhouette: A bash-tool to store your private data inside a git repository.

dsse - A specification for signing methods and formats used by Secure Systems Lab projects.

go-tuf - Go implementation of The Update Framework (TUF)

packj - Packj stops :zap: Solarwinds-, ESLint-, and PyTorch-like attacks by flagging malicious/vulnerable open-source dependencies ("weak links") in your software supply-chain

example

fulcio - Sigstore OIDC PKI

slsa - Supply-chain Levels for Software Artifacts

reactjs.org - The React documentation website [Moved to: https://github.com/reactjs/react.dev]