attestation
packj
attestation | packj | |
---|---|---|
3 | 38 | |
197 | 616 | |
6.6% | 3.6% | |
8.6 | 7.2 | |
15 days ago | about 2 months ago | |
Go | Python | |
GNU General Public License v3.0 or later | GNU Affero General Public License v3.0 |
Stars - the number of stars that a project has on GitHub. Growth - month over month growth in stars.
Activity is a relative number indicating how actively a project is being developed. Recent commits have higher weight than older ones.
For example, an activity of 9.0 indicates that a project is amongst the top 10% of the most actively developed projects that we are tracking.
attestation
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Gittuf – a security layer for Git using some concepts introduced by TUF
It's multi-pronged and I imagine adopters may use a subset of features. Broadly, I think folks are going to be interested in a) branch/tag/reference protection rules, b) file protection rules (monorepo or otherwise, though monorepos do pose a very apt usecase for gittuf), and c) general key management for those who primarily care about Git signing.
For those who care about a and b, I think the work we want to do to support [in-toto attestations](https://github.com/in-toto/attestation) for [SLSA's upcoming source track](https://github.com/slsa-framework/slsa/issues/956) could be very interesting as well.
- NPM Provenance Public Beta
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There is no “software supply chain”
I have. I actually worked a few desks down from dpc when he was creating it and we talked about it at length. I felt then and now that it has good goals but a very limiting implementation in that it does not pursue a portable spec and instead anchors a very opinionated format to git, and github, instead of cryptographic keys held in hardware owned controlled by reviewers. I want to see the same keys that sign git commits also sign reviews, for instance.
I think for broad adoption a review system should ask essentially the same questions as crev, but store them in a format like in-toto including signatures by the reviewers created with a user choice of pgp smartcards, ssh keys, or webauthn devices. These reviews would be anchored to hashes of a particular state of a particular tree of code and not to any type of VCS or distribution system. Important code is distributed via Perforce, mercurial subversion, and tar files depending if we are talking about big corps, or linux distro building blocks. A good OSS review system should be also be usable by teams in their internal proprietary codebases too if we wish to see wide adoption. Even for OSS we may wish to share some reviews as standalone objects privately while security embargos are in place, etc. Proofs should also be verified standalone easily from local cache, when github is down, when original repos vanish, etc.
Something that meets these broader needs will make it easy for large orgs with very different internal setups to participate and play nice with other supply chain efforts by the OpenSSF using in-toto for reproducible builds, etc.
My experience tells me we need something much more ambitious than crev, but crev proved to me many people have real interest in this problem which I really thank dpc for.
The biggest blocker for starting this project is the human review spec settling in in-toto https://github.com/in-toto/attestation/issues/77
packj
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Rust Without Crates.io
Creator of Packj [1] here. How do you envision sandboxing/security policies will be specified? Per-lib policies when you've hundreds of dependencies will become overwhelming. Having built an eBPF-based sandbox [2], I anticipate that accuracy will be another challenge here: too restrictive will block functionality, too permissive defeats the purpose.
1. https://github.com/ossillate-inc/packj flags malicious/risky NPM/PyPI/RubyGems/Rust/Maven/PHP packages by carrying out static+dynamic+metadata analysis.
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A Study of Malicious Code in PyPI Ecosystem
Cool project. How do you feel about projects like OpenSSF scorecards or even the checks that socket.dev do today on these packages to help determine risk?
https://github.com/ossillate-inc/packj/blob/main/.packj.yaml
Secondly, what about impersonation where attackers imitate a popular package and its respective metadata?
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How to use Podman inside of a container
I built Packj [1] sandboxing for securing “pip/NPM install”. It uses strace for sandboxing and blocks access to sensitive files and limits traffic to known-good IP addresses.
1. https://github.com/ossillate-inc/packj
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NPM Provenance Public Beta
Great work! This provenance check is going to be very valuable for enforcing supply-chain security. We are working on adding support to check for provenance in Packj.
1. https://github.com/ossillate-inc/packj flags risky/malicious NPM/PyPI/Ruby dependencies
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Show HN: TypeScript Security Scanner
Cool project. Would love to integrate this in Packj [1] as one of the open-source SAST scanners. Will DM you.
1. https://github.com/ossillate-inc/packj flags malicious/risky open-source dependencies.
- Packj flags malicious/risky open-source packages
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Show HN: Coder Guard – Protect Your IDE from Malicious Extensions
Very cool! I've built something similar, but for packages: https://github.com/ossillate-inc/packj Would love to talk.
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Ask HN: What Are You Working on This Year?
Working on a marketplace (based on Packj [1]) to allow open-source developers to make money by selling "assured" software artifacts.
1. Packj https://github.com/ossillate-inc/packj flags malicious and other "risky" open-source dependencies in your software supply chain.
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Compromised PyTorch-nightly dependency chain December 30th, 2022
I’ve created Packj sandbox [1] for “safe installation” of PyPI/NPM/Rubygems packages
1. https://github.com/ossillate-inc/packj
It DOES NOT require a VM/Container; uses strace. It shows you a preview of file system changes that installation will make and can also block arbitrary network communication during installation (uses an allow-list).
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Vulnerability scanner written in Go that uses osv.dev data
Great to see a developer-friendly tool around OSV! Packj [1] uses OSV APIs to report vulnerable PyPI/NPM/Rubygems packages. Disclaimer: I built it.
1. https://github.com/ossillate-inc/packj flags malicious/risky packages.
What are some alternatives?
malicious-software-packages-dataset - An open-source dataset of malicious software packages found in the wild, 100% vetted by humans.
kubesploit - Kubesploit is a cross-platform post-exploitation HTTP/2 Command & Control server and agent written in Golang, focused on containerized environments.
root-signing
paperclips - Universal Paperclips mirror
dsse - A specification for signing methods and formats used by Secure Systems Lab projects.
meta - Meta discussions and unicorns. Not necessarily in that order.
gittuf - A security layer for Git repositories
maloss - Towards Measuring Supply Chain Attacks on Package Managers for Interpreted Languages
fulcio - Sigstore OIDC PKI
roqr - QR codes that will rock your world
reactjs.org - The React documentation website [Moved to: https://github.com/reactjs/react.dev]
firejail - Linux namespaces and seccomp-bpf sandbox