fulcio
packj
fulcio | packj | |
---|---|---|
6 | 38 | |
600 | 615 | |
0.7% | 3.4% | |
9.6 | 7.2 | |
6 days ago | about 1 month ago | |
Go | Python | |
Apache License 2.0 | GNU Affero General Public License v3.0 |
Stars - the number of stars that a project has on GitHub. Growth - month over month growth in stars.
Activity is a relative number indicating how actively a project is being developed. Recent commits have higher weight than older ones.
For example, an activity of 9.0 indicates that a project is amongst the top 10% of the most actively developed projects that we are tracking.
fulcio
-
NPM Provenance Public Beta
untrue.
The Root CA is generated by the sigstore community (five folks, two from academia) this is what is used for the trust root for the signing. Right now github exchanges a OIDC token for a sigstore root chained cert.
GitLab are currently adding themselves, to have the same capability.
https://github.com/sigstore/fulcio/pull/1097
- [pre-RFC] Using Sigstore for signing and verifying crates
-
Implementing code signing and verification
They also say thay they integrate with Fulcio which seems to be a self-managing CA. Never tried it, though.
-
Freezing Requirements with Pip-Tools
https://docs.sigstore.dev/ :
> sigstore empowers software developers to securely sign software artifacts such as release files, container images, binaries, bill of material manifests and more. Signing materials are then stored in a tamper-resistant public log.
> It’s free to use for all developers and software providers, with sigstore’s code and operational tooling being 100% open source, and everything maintained and developed by the sigstore community.
> How sigstore works: Using Fulcio, sigstore requests a certificate from our root Certificate Authority (CA). This checks you are who you say you are using OpenID Connect, which looks at your email address to prove you’re the author. Fulcio grants a time-stamped certificate, a way to say you’re signed in and that it’s you.
https://github.com/sigstore/fulcio
> You don’t have to do anything with keys yourself, and sigstore never obtains your private key. The public key that Cosign creates gets bound to your certificate, and the signing details get stored in sigstore’s trust root, the deeper layer of keys and trustees and what we use to check authenticity.
https://github.com/sigstore/cosign
> our certificate then comes back to sigstore, where sigstore exchanges keys, asserts your identity and signs everything off. The signature contains the hash itself, public key, signature content and the time stamp. This all gets uploaded to a Rekor transparency log, so anyone can check that what you’ve put out there went through all the checks needed to be authentic.
https://github.com/sigstore/rekor
-
Sigstore: A Solution to Software Supply Chain Security
fulcio is a root CA for code signing certs. Its job is to issue code-signing certificates and to embed OIDC identity into code-signing certificate. From this description we can see that it performs these tasks in steps 2, 3, 4 and 8.
-
Sigstore – A new standard for signing, verifying and protecting software
Did you follow the link to the project list on Github? The actual tool for doing the signing, cosign, is just a binary you can install on your device and generate signatures and keys yourself. The "service" part of it seems to just be having your public certificate vouched for by a trusted code signing CA. I don't see anything in the tooling that requires your users to only trust that CA. If you want to sign your cert with your own CA and tell your users to trust that instead, they seemingly can do that, just as you can do that today in browsers. That you can't do it with Firefox extensions and mobile app stores is a limitation intentionally built into the distribution channel. It's not a limitation of PKI itself. iOS, Android, and Mozilla could have chosen to let users install arbitrary trusted CAs. You shouldn't dismiss all PKI based on the fact that a few vendors have chosen to implement it in a crappy way to make walled gardens.
It doesn't say this on the announcement, but looking at the actual PKI service (https://github.com/sigstore/fulcio), it seems to be entirely possible to self-host the service and roll your own CA.
packj
-
Rust Without Crates.io
Creator of Packj [1] here. How do you envision sandboxing/security policies will be specified? Per-lib policies when you've hundreds of dependencies will become overwhelming. Having built an eBPF-based sandbox [2], I anticipate that accuracy will be another challenge here: too restrictive will block functionality, too permissive defeats the purpose.
1. https://github.com/ossillate-inc/packj flags malicious/risky NPM/PyPI/RubyGems/Rust/Maven/PHP packages by carrying out static+dynamic+metadata analysis.
-
A Study of Malicious Code in PyPI Ecosystem
Cool project. How do you feel about projects like OpenSSF scorecards or even the checks that socket.dev do today on these packages to help determine risk?
https://github.com/ossillate-inc/packj/blob/main/.packj.yaml
Secondly, what about impersonation where attackers imitate a popular package and its respective metadata?
-
How to use Podman inside of a container
I built Packj [1] sandboxing for securing “pip/NPM install”. It uses strace for sandboxing and blocks access to sensitive files and limits traffic to known-good IP addresses.
1. https://github.com/ossillate-inc/packj
-
NPM Provenance Public Beta
Great work! This provenance check is going to be very valuable for enforcing supply-chain security. We are working on adding support to check for provenance in Packj.
1. https://github.com/ossillate-inc/packj flags risky/malicious NPM/PyPI/Ruby dependencies
-
Show HN: TypeScript Security Scanner
Cool project. Would love to integrate this in Packj [1] as one of the open-source SAST scanners. Will DM you.
1. https://github.com/ossillate-inc/packj flags malicious/risky open-source dependencies.
- Packj flags malicious/risky open-source packages
-
Show HN: Coder Guard – Protect Your IDE from Malicious Extensions
Very cool! I've built something similar, but for packages: https://github.com/ossillate-inc/packj Would love to talk.
-
Ask HN: What Are You Working on This Year?
Working on a marketplace (based on Packj [1]) to allow open-source developers to make money by selling "assured" software artifacts.
1. Packj https://github.com/ossillate-inc/packj flags malicious and other "risky" open-source dependencies in your software supply chain.
-
Compromised PyTorch-nightly dependency chain December 30th, 2022
I’ve created Packj sandbox [1] for “safe installation” of PyPI/NPM/Rubygems packages
1. https://github.com/ossillate-inc/packj
It DOES NOT require a VM/Container; uses strace. It shows you a preview of file system changes that installation will make and can also block arbitrary network communication during installation (uses an allow-list).
-
Vulnerability scanner written in Go that uses osv.dev data
Great to see a developer-friendly tool around OSV! Packj [1] uses OSV APIs to report vulnerable PyPI/NPM/Rubygems packages. Disclaimer: I built it.
1. https://github.com/ossillate-inc/packj flags malicious/risky packages.
What are some alternatives?
rekor - Software Supply Chain Transparency Log
kubesploit - Kubesploit is a cross-platform post-exploitation HTTP/2 Command & Control server and agent written in Golang, focused on containerized environments.
cosign - Code signing and transparency for containers and binaries
paperclips - Universal Paperclips mirror
Rustup - The Rust toolchain installer
meta - Meta discussions and unicorns. Not necessarily in that order.
root-signing
maloss - Towards Measuring Supply Chain Attacks on Package Managers for Interpreted Languages
pyflow - An installation and dependency system for Python
roqr - QR codes that will rock your world
cargo-crev - A cryptographically verifiable code review system for the cargo (Rust) package manager.
firejail - Linux namespaces and seccomp-bpf sandbox