cryptofuzz
rustls
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cryptofuzz | rustls | |
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6 | 57 | |
655 | 5,456 | |
- | 3.6% | |
9.0 | 9.9 | |
19 days ago | about 3 hours ago | |
C++ | Rust | |
GNU General Public License v3.0 only | GNU General Public License v3.0 or later |
Stars - the number of stars that a project has on GitHub. Growth - month over month growth in stars.
Activity is a relative number indicating how actively a project is being developed. Recent commits have higher weight than older ones.
For example, an activity of 9.0 indicates that a project is amongst the top 10% of the most actively developed projects that we are tracking.
cryptofuzz
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Java ECDSA trivial signature bypass
There is also the cryptofuzz
- What are some real-world security issues in cryptography?
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The biggest source of vulnerabilities in cryptographic libraries is memory safety bugs, not cryptography bugs
2) There's a popular fuzzing technique, called "differential fuzzing" that works especially well for cryptographic libraries. The idea is to have the fuzzer look for both memory safety issues (like buffer overflows, even if they're too small to cause a crash AddressSaniziter can detect) and actual logic bugs in the cryptography implementation (e.g. the output of one implementation not matching the output of another, given the same state/inputs).
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You Shouldn't Roll Your Own Crypto: An Empirical Study
I understand that they base their research on CVE data because it offers normalized quantifiers of severity and scope, but in my experience vendors by and large don't bother with CVE's for API bugs even when the affected primitive is clearly malfunctioning (memory or correctness issues).
I've been deeply fuzzing cryptographic libraries for a few years and found about 130 bugs [1]. The vast majority of these did not receive a CVE. Now some of these are merely theoretical, others will only manifest under particular circumstances like specific calling sequences, others were caught in the development phase before landing in stable releases, but a number of them are outright vulnerabilities. The usefulness of CVE incidence is questionable when it is so strongly influenced by the vendor's propensity for reporting these.
[1] https://github.com/guidovranken/cryptofuzz#bugs-found-by-cry...
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What Is Fuzz Testing?
[1]: https://guidovranken.com/2019/05/14/differential-fuzzing-of-...
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Cyber Security; Beginner Roadmap
I don't have any certs (apart from malformed X509 files..) so I can't speak of their effectiveness. What has worked for me is having a strong presence in open source. I just show people one of my projects like [1] and nobody asks about certs or education, ever. I spend most of my free time on these projects so cultivating a sizeable project might not be a suitable route for anyone who has a life outside of computers, though having some kind of publicly available utility where a prospective employer can check out your coding style and skills is probably a decent way to stand out amidst a sea of applicants.
[1] https://github.com/guidovranken/cryptofuzz
rustls
- Pingora: HTTP Server and Proxy Library, in Rust, by Cloudflare, Released
- Alternative to openssl for reqwest https with client certs.
- rustls 0.22 is out with pluggable crypto providers and better CRL support
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Exploring the Rust compiler benchmark suite
The RustTLS project is currently setting up their own CI benchmarking workflow, so I think that you could find some inspiration there: https://github.com/rustls/rustls/issues/1385 and https://github.com/rustls/rustls/issues/1205.
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What are the scenarios where "Rewrite it in Rust" didn't meet your expectations or couldn't be successfully implemented?
I also studied this question on FFI several weeks ago in terms of "rewrite part of the system in Rust". Unexpected results could be semantic issues (e.g., different error handling methods) or security issues (FFI could be a soundness hole). I suggest going through the issues of libraries that have started rewriting work such as rust-openssl or rustls (This is the one trying to rewrite in whole rust rather than using FFI; however, you will not be able to find the mapping function in the C version and compare them). I hope this helps!
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A brief guide to choosing TLS crates
Now for rust implementation of tls. Certificates can be loaded in two ways. * Finds and loads certificates using OS specific tools3 * Uses a rust implementation of webpki4 for loading with certificates5
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Microsoft is busy rewriting core Windows library code in memory-safe Rust
> Ring is mostly C/Assembly
Crypto needs to be written in Assembly to ensure that operations take a constant time, regardless of input. Writing it in a high level language like C or Rust opens you up to the compiler "optimising" routines and making them no longer constant time.
But you already knew this. And you also knew that the security audit (https://github.com/rustls/rustls/blob/master/audit/TLS-01-re...) of ring was favourable
> No issues were found with regards to the cryptographic engineering of rustls or its underlying ring library. A recommendation is provided in TLS-01-001 to optionally supplement the already solid cryptographic library with another cryptographic provider (EverCrypt) with an added benefit of formally verified cryptographic primitives. Overall, it is very clear that the developers of rustls have an extensive knowledge on how to correctly implement the TLS stack whilst avoiding the common pitfalls that surround the TLS ecosystem. This knowledge has translated reliably into an implementation of exceptional quality.
You said
> a standard library with feature flags and editions would make rust ridiculously much more productive
What's the difference between opting into a library with a feature flag and opting in with a line in Cargo.toml? Let's say you want to use the de-facto regex library. Would it really be ridiculously productive if you said you wanted the "regex" feature flag instead of the "regex" crate?
I do agree that the standard library does need a versioning story so they can remove long deprecated functions. Where it gets complicated is if a new method is reintroduced using the same name in a later edition.
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gRPC with mutual TLS on IPs only
I used the commands listed in the .sh file here: https://github.com/rustls/rustls/tree/main/test-ca to generate keys/certs for a server and a client (with IP.1 records for SANs). I have added the local root CA to the trust store of each VM.
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rustls 0.21 released with support for IP address server names
This is great news, this was our single biggest annoyance with rustls. One of our cloud providers choses to issue their hosted postgres instances with TLS certificates with IP addresses. Unusual, but valid per the spec, so why not. Apparently a practise that's also popular in kubernetes settings, so I'm somewhat surprised it took 5 years to close the issue, but now I can finally recommend people to use rustls without mentioning any gotchas.
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Is Rust really safe? How to identify functions that can potentially cause panic
I believe it is more relevant than you think: servers running in containers, web assembler tasks running in browsers, embedded devices and kernels with total control of the system, all have the ability to do something more sensible than plain out SIGABRT or similar, and in many the case is not that the complete system is falling down. For example RustTLS is looking into allowing fallible allocators and as a pretty general-purpose library that seems like a nice feature. I do wish ulimit -v worked in a sensible manner with applications.
What are some alternatives?
beacon-fuzz - Differential Fuzzer for Ethereum 2.0
rust-native-tls
onefuzz - A self-hosted Fuzzing-As-A-Service platform
rust-openssl - OpenSSL bindings for Rust
doubleback - Doubleback provides round-trip parsing and printing of 64-bit double-precision floating-point numbers using the Ryu algorithm implemented in multiple programming languages. Doubleback is biased towards "human-friendly" output which round-trips consistently between binary and decimal.
mkcert - A simple zero-config tool to make locally trusted development certificates with any names you'd like.
writeups - CTF writeups from The Flat Network Society
ring - Safe, fast, small crypto using Rust
Sloth - Sloth 🦥 is a coverage guided fuzzing framework for fuzzing Android Native libraries that makes use of libFuzzer and QEMU user-mode emulation
webpki - WebPKI X.509 Certificate Validation in Rust
radamsa
rust-crypto - A (mostly) pure-Rust implementation of various cryptographic algorithms.