cosign
conduit
cosign | conduit | |
---|---|---|
30 | 33 | |
4,068 | 10,358 | |
1.7% | 0.7% | |
9.6 | 9.9 | |
9 days ago | 3 days ago | |
Go | Go | |
Apache License 2.0 | Apache License 2.0 |
Stars - the number of stars that a project has on GitHub. Growth - month over month growth in stars.
Activity is a relative number indicating how actively a project is being developed. Recent commits have higher weight than older ones.
For example, an activity of 9.0 indicates that a project is amongst the top 10% of the most actively developed projects that we are tracking.
cosign
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Securing CI/CD Images with Cosign and OPA
Cosign: In this context, Cosign from the Sigstore project offers a compelling solution. Its simplicity, registry compatibility, and effective link between images and their signatures provide a user-friendly and versatile approach. The integration of Fulcio for certificate management and Rekor for secure logging enhances Cosign's appeal, making it particularly suitable for modern development environments that prioritize security and agility.
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An Overview of Kubernetes Security Projects at KubeCon Europe 2023
sigstore is another suite of tools that focuses on attestation and provenance. Within the suite are two tools I heard mentioned a few times at KubeCon: Cosign and Rekor.
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Spin 1.0 — The Developer Tool for Serverless WebAssembly
Since we can distribute Spin applications using popular registry services, we can also take advantage of ecosystem tools such as Sigstore and Cosign, which address the software supply chain issue by signing and verifying applications using Sigstore's new keyless signatures (using OIDC identity tokens from providers such as GitHub).
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Iron Bank: Secure Registries, Secure Containers
Use distroless images (which contain only application and its runtime dependencies, and don't include package managers/shells or any other programs you would expect to find in a standard Linux distribution). All distroless images are signed by cosign.
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Getting hands on with Sigstore Cosign on AWS
$ COSIGN_EXPERIMENTAL=1 cosign verify-blob --cert https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/releases/download/v1.13.1/cosign-linux-amd64-keyless.pem --signature https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/releases/download/v1.13.1/cosign-linux-amd64-keyless.sig https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/releases/download/v1.13.1/cosign-linux-amd64
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How much are you 'trusting' a docker image from hub.docker.com?
Another thing to look for is, whether the image is signed using something like cosign (https://github.com/sigstore/cosign). This lets the publisher digitally sign the image, so you at least know that what's on the registry is what they intended to put there. Handy to avoid the risks of attackers squatting similar names and catching typos.
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What security controls to prevent someone from pushing arbitrary code into production?
i’m late but surprised no one has mentioned cosign
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Docker build fails on GitHub Action after net7 update
name: Docker # This workflow uses actions that are not certified by GitHub. # They are provided by a third-party and are governed by # separate terms of service, privacy policy, and support # documentation. on: push: branches: [ "main" ] # Publish semver tags as releases. tags: [ 'v*.*.*' ] pull_request: branches: [ "main" ] paths: - src/MamisSolidarias.WebAPI.Campaigns/Dockerfile - .github/workflows/docker-publish.yml workflow_dispatch: env: # Use docker.io for Docker Hub if empty REGISTRY: ghcr.io IMAGE_NAME: mamis-solidarias/campaigns jobs: build: runs-on: ubuntu-latest permissions: contents: read packages: write # This is used to complete the identity challenge # with sigstore/fulcio when running outside of PRs. id-token: write steps: - name: Checkout repository uses: actions/checkout@v3 # Install the cosign tool except on PR # https://github.com/sigstore/cosign-installer - name: Install cosign if: github.event_name != 'pull_request' uses: sigstore/cosign-installer@main with: cosign-release: 'v1.13.1' - name: Set up QEMU uses: docker/setup-qemu-action@v2 with: platforms: 'arm64' # Workaround: https://github.com/docker/build-push-action/issues/461 - name: Setup Docker buildx uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@v2 # Login against a Docker registry except on PR # https://github.com/docker/login-action - name: Log into registry ${{ env.REGISTRY }} if: github.event_name != 'pull_request' uses: docker/login-action@v2 with: registry: ${{ env.REGISTRY }} username: ${{ github.actor }} password: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }} # Extract metadata (tags, labels) for Docker # https://github.com/docker/metadata-action - name: Extract Docker metadata id: meta uses: docker/metadata-action@v4 with: images: ${{ env.REGISTRY }}/${{ env.IMAGE_NAME }} tags: | type=schedule type=ref,event=branch type=ref,event=pr type=semver,pattern={{version}} type=semver,pattern={{major}}.{{minor}} type=semver,pattern={{major}} type=sha # Build and push Docker image with Buildx (don't push on PR) # https://github.com/docker/build-push-action - name: Build and push Docker image id: build-and-push uses: docker/build-push-action@v3 with: context: . platforms: linux/amd64, linux/arm64 file: src/MamisSolidarias.WebAPI.Campaigns/Dockerfile push: ${{ github.event_name != 'pull_request' }} tags: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.tags }} labels: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.labels }} # Sign the resulting Docker image digest except on PRs. # This will only write to the public Rekor transparency log when the Docker # repository is public to avoid leaking data. If you would like to publish # transparency data even for private images, pass --force to cosign below. # https://github.com/sigstore/cosign - name: Sign the published Docker image if: ${{ github.event_name != 'pull_request' }} env: COSIGN_EXPERIMENTAL: "true" # This step uses the identity token to provision an ephemeral certificate # against the sigstore community Fulcio instance. run: echo "${{ steps.meta.outputs.tags }}" | xargs -I {} cosign sign {}@${{ steps.build-and-push.outputs.digest }}
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How to tag base image so images built from it can be tracked
After inspecting the layers i think you should start thinking about signing your images: https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/
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Understanding Kubernetes Limits and Requests
cosign
conduit
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Optimal JMX Exposure Strategy for Kubernetes Multi-Node Architecture
Leverage a service mesh like Istio or Linkerd to manage communication between microservices within the Kubernetes cluster. These service meshes can be configured to intercept JMX traffic and enforce access control policies. Benefits:
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Linkerd no longer shipping open source, stable releases
Looks like CNCF waved them through Graduation anyway, let's look at policies from July 28, 2021 when they were deemed "Graduated"
All maintainers of the LinkerD project had @boyant.io email addresses. [0] They do list 4 other members of a "Steering Committee", but LinkerD's GOVERNANCE.md gives all of the power to maintainers: [1]
> Ideally, all project decisions are resolved by maintainer consensus. If this is not possible, maintainers may call a vote. The voting process is a simple majority in which each maintainer receives one vote.
And CNCF Graduation policy says a project must "Have committers from at least two organizations" [2]. So it appears that the CNCF accepted the "Steering Committee" as an acceptable 2nd committer, even though the Governance policy still gave the maintainers all of the power.
I would like to know if the Steering Committee voted to remove stable releases from an un-biased position acting in the best interest of the project, or if they were simply ignored or not even advised on the decision.
I'm all for Boyant doing what they need to do to make money and survive as a Company. But at that point my opinion is that they should withdraw the project from the CNCF and stop pretending like the foundation has any influence on the project's governance.
[0] https://github.com/linkerd/linkerd2/blob/489ca1e3189b6a5289d...
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Ultimate EKS Baseline Cluster: Part 1 - Provision EKS
From here, we can explore other developments and tutorials on Kubernetes, such as o11y or observability (PLG, ELK, ELF, TICK, Jaeger, Pyroscope), service mesh (Linkerd, Istio, NSM, Consul Connect, Cillium), and progressive delivery (ArgoCD, FluxCD, Spinnaker).
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Istio moved to CNCF Graduation stage
https://linkerd.io/ is a much lighter-weight alternative but you do still get some of the fancy things like mtls without needing any manual configuration. Install it, label your namespaces, and let it do it's thing!
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Custom Authorization
Would it be possible to create a custom extension with the code that authorize traffic based on my custom access token?
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API release strategies with API Gateway
Open source API Gateway (Apache APISIX and Traefik), Service Mesh (Istio and Linkerd) solutions are capable of doing traffic splitting and implementing functionalities like Canary Release and Blue-Green deployment. With canary testing, you can make a critical examination of a new release of an API by selecting only a small portion of your user base. We will cover the canary release next section.
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GKE with Consul Service Mesh
I have experimented with other service meshes and I was able to get up to speed quickly: Linkerd = 1 day, Istio = 3 days, NGINX Service Mesh = 5 days, but Consul Connect service mesh took at least 11 days to get off the ground. This is by far the most complex solution available.
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How is a service mesh implemented on low level?
https://github.com/linkerd/linkerd2 (random example)
- Kubernetes operator written in rust
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What is a service mesh?
Out of the number of service mesh solutions that exist, the most popular open source ones are: Linkerd, Istio, and Consul. Here at Koyeb, we are using Kuma.
What are some alternatives?
notation - A CLI tool to sign and verify artifacts
Zone of Control - ⬡ Zone of Control is a hexagonal turn-based strategy game written in Rust. [DISCONTINUED]
in-toto-golang - A Go implementation of in-toto. in-toto is a framework to protect software supply chain integrity.
Parallel
connaisseur - An admission controller that integrates Container Image Signature Verification into a Kubernetes cluster
Fractalide - Reusable Reproducible Composable Software
spire - The SPIFFE Runtime Environment
keda - KEDA is a Kubernetes-based Event Driven Autoscaling component. It provides event driven scale for any container running in Kubernetes
spiffe-vault - Integrates Spiffe and Vault to have secretless authentication
istio - Connect, secure, control, and observe services.
rekor - Software Supply Chain Transparency Log
traefik - The Cloud Native Application Proxy