cosign VS in-toto-golang

Compare cosign vs in-toto-golang and see what are their differences.


Container Signing (by sigstore)


A Go implementation of in-toto. in-toto is a framework to protect software supply chain integrity. (by in-toto)
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cosign in-toto-golang
30 0
3,762 109
1.9% 3.7%
0.0 0.0
5 days ago 5 days ago
Go Go
Apache License 2.0 GNU General Public License v3.0 or later
The number of mentions indicates the total number of mentions that we've tracked plus the number of user suggested alternatives.
Stars - the number of stars that a project has on GitHub. Growth - month over month growth in stars.
Activity is a relative number indicating how actively a project is being developed. Recent commits have higher weight than older ones.
For example, an activity of 9.0 indicates that a project is amongst the top 10% of the most actively developed projects that we are tracking.


Posts with mentions or reviews of cosign. We have used some of these posts to build our list of alternatives and similar projects. The last one was on 2023-11-15.
  • Securing CI/CD Images with Cosign and OPA
    4 projects | | 15 Nov 2023
    Cosign: In this context, Cosign from the Sigstore project offers a compelling solution. Its simplicity, registry compatibility, and effective link between images and their signatures provide a user-friendly and versatile approach. The integration of Fulcio for certificate management and Rekor for secure logging enhances Cosign's appeal, making it particularly suitable for modern development environments that prioritize security and agility.
  • An Overview of Kubernetes Security Projects at KubeCon Europe 2023
    17 projects | | 22 May 2023
    sigstore is another suite of tools that focuses on attestation and provenance. Within the suite are two tools I heard mentioned a few times at KubeCon: Cosign and Rekor.
  • Spin 1.0 — The Developer Tool for Serverless WebAssembly
    17 projects | | 28 Mar 2023
    Since we can distribute Spin applications using popular registry services, we can also take advantage of ecosystem tools such as Sigstore and Cosign, which address the software supply chain issue by signing and verifying applications using Sigstore's new keyless signatures (using OIDC identity tokens from providers such as GitHub).
  • Iron Bank: Secure Registries, Secure Containers
    3 projects | | 8 Feb 2023
    Use distroless images (which contain only application and its runtime dependencies, and don't include package managers/shells or any other programs you would expect to find in a standard Linux distribution). All distroless images are signed by cosign.
  • Getting hands on with Sigstore Cosign on AWS
    3 projects | | 31 Jan 2023
    $ COSIGN_EXPERIMENTAL=1 cosign verify-blob --cert --signature
  • How much are you 'trusting' a docker image from
    3 projects | /r/docker | 27 Dec 2022
    Another thing to look for is, whether the image is signed using something like cosign ( This lets the publisher digitally sign the image, so you at least know that what's on the registry is what they intended to put there. Handy to avoid the risks of attackers squatting similar names and catching typos.
  • Docker build fails on GitHub Action after net7 update
    9 projects | /r/dotnet | 14 Dec 2022
    name: Docker # This workflow uses actions that are not certified by GitHub. # They are provided by a third-party and are governed by # separate terms of service, privacy policy, and support # documentation. on: push: branches: [ "main" ] # Publish semver tags as releases. tags: [ 'v*.*.*' ] pull_request: branches: [ "main" ] paths: - src/MamisSolidarias.WebAPI.Campaigns/Dockerfile - .github/workflows/docker-publish.yml workflow_dispatch: env: # Use for Docker Hub if empty REGISTRY: IMAGE_NAME: mamis-solidarias/campaigns jobs: build: runs-on: ubuntu-latest permissions: contents: read packages: write # This is used to complete the identity challenge # with sigstore/fulcio when running outside of PRs. id-token: write steps: - name: Checkout repository uses: actions/checkout@v3 # Install the cosign tool except on PR # - name: Install cosign if: github.event_name != 'pull_request' uses: sigstore/cosign-installer@main with: cosign-release: 'v1.13.1' - name: Set up QEMU uses: docker/setup-qemu-action@v2 with: platforms: 'arm64' # Workaround: - name: Setup Docker buildx uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@v2 # Login against a Docker registry except on PR # - name: Log into registry ${{ env.REGISTRY }} if: github.event_name != 'pull_request' uses: docker/login-action@v2 with: registry: ${{ env.REGISTRY }} username: ${{ }} password: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }} # Extract metadata (tags, labels) for Docker # - name: Extract Docker metadata id: meta uses: docker/metadata-action@v4 with: images: ${{ env.REGISTRY }}/${{ env.IMAGE_NAME }} tags: | type=schedule type=ref,event=branch type=ref,event=pr type=semver,pattern={{version}} type=semver,pattern={{major}}.{{minor}} type=semver,pattern={{major}} type=sha # Build and push Docker image with Buildx (don't push on PR) # - name: Build and push Docker image id: build-and-push uses: docker/build-push-action@v3 with: context: . platforms: linux/amd64, linux/arm64 file: src/MamisSolidarias.WebAPI.Campaigns/Dockerfile push: ${{ github.event_name != 'pull_request' }} tags: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.tags }} labels: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.labels }} # Sign the resulting Docker image digest except on PRs. # This will only write to the public Rekor transparency log when the Docker # repository is public to avoid leaking data. If you would like to publish # transparency data even for private images, pass --force to cosign below. # - name: Sign the published Docker image if: ${{ github.event_name != 'pull_request' }} env: COSIGN_EXPERIMENTAL: "true" # This step uses the identity token to provision an ephemeral certificate # against the sigstore community Fulcio instance. run: echo "${{ steps.meta.outputs.tags }}" | xargs -I {} cosign sign {}@${{ }}
  • How to tag base image so images built from it can be tracked
    2 projects | /r/devops | 6 Dec 2022
    After inspecting the layers i think you should start thinking about signing your images:
  • Understanding Kubernetes Limits and Requests
    9 projects | | 1 Dec 2022
  • Kubernetes Hardening Guidance [pdf]
    2 projects | | 5 Oct 2022


Posts with mentions or reviews of in-toto-golang. We have used some of these posts to build our list of alternatives and similar projects.

We haven't tracked posts mentioning in-toto-golang yet.
Tracking mentions began in Dec 2020.

What are some alternatives?

When comparing cosign and in-toto-golang you can also consider the following projects:

connaisseur - An admission controller that integrates Container Image Signature Verification into a Kubernetes cluster

notation - A CLI tool to sign and verify artifacts

spire - The SPIFFE Runtime Environment

spiffe-vault - Integrates Spiffe and Vault to have secretless authentication

rekor - Software Supply Chain Transparency Log

slsa-provenance-action - Github Action implementation of SLSA Provenance Generation

fulcio - An instance of Sigstore's OIDC-powered signing CA

cosign-installer - Cosign Github Action

fosite - Extensible security first OAuth 2.0 and OpenID Connect SDK for Go.

notation - Collection of quotes on notation design & how it affects thought.