cosign
grype
cosign | grype | |
---|---|---|
30 | 56 | |
4,087 | 7,649 | |
1.7% | 1.9% | |
9.6 | 9.5 | |
1 day ago | 6 days ago | |
Go | Go | |
Apache License 2.0 | Apache License 2.0 |
Stars - the number of stars that a project has on GitHub. Growth - month over month growth in stars.
Activity is a relative number indicating how actively a project is being developed. Recent commits have higher weight than older ones.
For example, an activity of 9.0 indicates that a project is amongst the top 10% of the most actively developed projects that we are tracking.
cosign
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Securing CI/CD Images with Cosign and OPA
Cosign: In this context, Cosign from the Sigstore project offers a compelling solution. Its simplicity, registry compatibility, and effective link between images and their signatures provide a user-friendly and versatile approach. The integration of Fulcio for certificate management and Rekor for secure logging enhances Cosign's appeal, making it particularly suitable for modern development environments that prioritize security and agility.
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An Overview of Kubernetes Security Projects at KubeCon Europe 2023
sigstore is another suite of tools that focuses on attestation and provenance. Within the suite are two tools I heard mentioned a few times at KubeCon: Cosign and Rekor.
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Spin 1.0 — The Developer Tool for Serverless WebAssembly
Since we can distribute Spin applications using popular registry services, we can also take advantage of ecosystem tools such as Sigstore and Cosign, which address the software supply chain issue by signing and verifying applications using Sigstore's new keyless signatures (using OIDC identity tokens from providers such as GitHub).
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Iron Bank: Secure Registries, Secure Containers
Use distroless images (which contain only application and its runtime dependencies, and don't include package managers/shells or any other programs you would expect to find in a standard Linux distribution). All distroless images are signed by cosign.
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Getting hands on with Sigstore Cosign on AWS
$ COSIGN_EXPERIMENTAL=1 cosign verify-blob --cert https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/releases/download/v1.13.1/cosign-linux-amd64-keyless.pem --signature https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/releases/download/v1.13.1/cosign-linux-amd64-keyless.sig https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/releases/download/v1.13.1/cosign-linux-amd64
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How much are you 'trusting' a docker image from hub.docker.com?
Another thing to look for is, whether the image is signed using something like cosign (https://github.com/sigstore/cosign). This lets the publisher digitally sign the image, so you at least know that what's on the registry is what they intended to put there. Handy to avoid the risks of attackers squatting similar names and catching typos.
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What security controls to prevent someone from pushing arbitrary code into production?
i’m late but surprised no one has mentioned cosign
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Docker build fails on GitHub Action after net7 update
name: Docker # This workflow uses actions that are not certified by GitHub. # They are provided by a third-party and are governed by # separate terms of service, privacy policy, and support # documentation. on: push: branches: [ "main" ] # Publish semver tags as releases. tags: [ 'v*.*.*' ] pull_request: branches: [ "main" ] paths: - src/MamisSolidarias.WebAPI.Campaigns/Dockerfile - .github/workflows/docker-publish.yml workflow_dispatch: env: # Use docker.io for Docker Hub if empty REGISTRY: ghcr.io IMAGE_NAME: mamis-solidarias/campaigns jobs: build: runs-on: ubuntu-latest permissions: contents: read packages: write # This is used to complete the identity challenge # with sigstore/fulcio when running outside of PRs. id-token: write steps: - name: Checkout repository uses: actions/checkout@v3 # Install the cosign tool except on PR # https://github.com/sigstore/cosign-installer - name: Install cosign if: github.event_name != 'pull_request' uses: sigstore/cosign-installer@main with: cosign-release: 'v1.13.1' - name: Set up QEMU uses: docker/setup-qemu-action@v2 with: platforms: 'arm64' # Workaround: https://github.com/docker/build-push-action/issues/461 - name: Setup Docker buildx uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@v2 # Login against a Docker registry except on PR # https://github.com/docker/login-action - name: Log into registry ${{ env.REGISTRY }} if: github.event_name != 'pull_request' uses: docker/login-action@v2 with: registry: ${{ env.REGISTRY }} username: ${{ github.actor }} password: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }} # Extract metadata (tags, labels) for Docker # https://github.com/docker/metadata-action - name: Extract Docker metadata id: meta uses: docker/metadata-action@v4 with: images: ${{ env.REGISTRY }}/${{ env.IMAGE_NAME }} tags: | type=schedule type=ref,event=branch type=ref,event=pr type=semver,pattern={{version}} type=semver,pattern={{major}}.{{minor}} type=semver,pattern={{major}} type=sha # Build and push Docker image with Buildx (don't push on PR) # https://github.com/docker/build-push-action - name: Build and push Docker image id: build-and-push uses: docker/build-push-action@v3 with: context: . platforms: linux/amd64, linux/arm64 file: src/MamisSolidarias.WebAPI.Campaigns/Dockerfile push: ${{ github.event_name != 'pull_request' }} tags: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.tags }} labels: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.labels }} # Sign the resulting Docker image digest except on PRs. # This will only write to the public Rekor transparency log when the Docker # repository is public to avoid leaking data. If you would like to publish # transparency data even for private images, pass --force to cosign below. # https://github.com/sigstore/cosign - name: Sign the published Docker image if: ${{ github.event_name != 'pull_request' }} env: COSIGN_EXPERIMENTAL: "true" # This step uses the identity token to provision an ephemeral certificate # against the sigstore community Fulcio instance. run: echo "${{ steps.meta.outputs.tags }}" | xargs -I {} cosign sign {}@${{ steps.build-and-push.outputs.digest }}
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How to tag base image so images built from it can be tracked
After inspecting the layers i think you should start thinking about signing your images: https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/
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Understanding Kubernetes Limits and Requests
cosign
grype
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Introduction to the Kubernetes ecosystem
Trivy Operator : A simple and comprehensive vulnerability scanner for containers and other artifacts. It detects vulnerabilities of OS packages (Alpine, Debian, CentOS, etc.) and application dependencies (pip, npm, yarn, composer, etc.) (Alternatives : Grype, Snyk, Clair, Anchore, Twistlock)
- Suas imagens de container não estão seguras!
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I looked through attacks in my access logs. Here's what I found
Besides pointing pentester tools like metasploit at yourself, there are some nice scanners out there.
https://github.com/quay/clair
https://github.com/anchore/grype/
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Distroless images using melange and apko
Using Grype:
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Scanning and remediating vulnerabilities with Grype
In the lab to follow, we'll see how vulnerability scanning can be conveniently achieved with Grype and how various systematic techniques can be applied to start securing our microservices at the container image level.
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Understanding Container Security
Scanning your container images for vulnerabilities is a good approach. But this scanning is not one time job, it should be done regularly (weekly, monthly, etc.) You need to follow vulnerability reports and fix all of the vulnerabilities as soon as possible. I recommend some open-source tools that could be useful: Trivy, Docker-Bench, Grype.
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An Overview of Kubernetes Security Projects at KubeCon Europe 2023
Grype is another popular open source tool from Anchore. Working with SBOM files, Grype scans container images and filesystems for vulnerabilities. Grype supports different output formats for vulnerabilities and custom templates for output.
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Best vulnerability scanner for DevOps
Grype (https://github.com/anchore/grype)
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Security docker app
Grype will allow you to scan a container to see if you have any vulnerable packages.
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Open source container scanning tool to find vulnerabilities and suggest best practice improvements?
https://github.com/anchore/grype 5.6k stars, updated 3 days ago
What are some alternatives?
notation - A CLI tool to sign and verify artifacts
trivy - Find vulnerabilities, misconfigurations, secrets, SBOM in containers, Kubernetes, code repositories, clouds and more
in-toto-golang - A Go implementation of in-toto. in-toto is a framework to protect software supply chain integrity.
anchore-engine - A service that analyzes docker images and scans for vulnerabilities
connaisseur - An admission controller that integrates Container Image Signature Verification into a Kubernetes cluster
clair - Vulnerability Static Analysis for Containers
spire - The SPIFFE Runtime Environment
syft - CLI tool and library for generating a Software Bill of Materials from container images and filesystems
spiffe-vault - Integrates Spiffe and Vault to have secretless authentication
opencve - CVE Alerting Platform
rekor - Software Supply Chain Transparency Log
falco - Cloud Native Runtime Security