cosign
dependency-track
cosign | dependency-track | |
---|---|---|
30 | 18 | |
4,087 | 2,329 | |
1.7% | 2.8% | |
9.6 | 9.8 | |
1 day ago | 7 days ago | |
Go | Java | |
Apache License 2.0 | Apache License 2.0 |
Stars - the number of stars that a project has on GitHub. Growth - month over month growth in stars.
Activity is a relative number indicating how actively a project is being developed. Recent commits have higher weight than older ones.
For example, an activity of 9.0 indicates that a project is amongst the top 10% of the most actively developed projects that we are tracking.
cosign
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Securing CI/CD Images with Cosign and OPA
Cosign: In this context, Cosign from the Sigstore project offers a compelling solution. Its simplicity, registry compatibility, and effective link between images and their signatures provide a user-friendly and versatile approach. The integration of Fulcio for certificate management and Rekor for secure logging enhances Cosign's appeal, making it particularly suitable for modern development environments that prioritize security and agility.
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An Overview of Kubernetes Security Projects at KubeCon Europe 2023
sigstore is another suite of tools that focuses on attestation and provenance. Within the suite are two tools I heard mentioned a few times at KubeCon: Cosign and Rekor.
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Spin 1.0 — The Developer Tool for Serverless WebAssembly
Since we can distribute Spin applications using popular registry services, we can also take advantage of ecosystem tools such as Sigstore and Cosign, which address the software supply chain issue by signing and verifying applications using Sigstore's new keyless signatures (using OIDC identity tokens from providers such as GitHub).
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Iron Bank: Secure Registries, Secure Containers
Use distroless images (which contain only application and its runtime dependencies, and don't include package managers/shells or any other programs you would expect to find in a standard Linux distribution). All distroless images are signed by cosign.
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Getting hands on with Sigstore Cosign on AWS
$ COSIGN_EXPERIMENTAL=1 cosign verify-blob --cert https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/releases/download/v1.13.1/cosign-linux-amd64-keyless.pem --signature https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/releases/download/v1.13.1/cosign-linux-amd64-keyless.sig https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/releases/download/v1.13.1/cosign-linux-amd64
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How much are you 'trusting' a docker image from hub.docker.com?
Another thing to look for is, whether the image is signed using something like cosign (https://github.com/sigstore/cosign). This lets the publisher digitally sign the image, so you at least know that what's on the registry is what they intended to put there. Handy to avoid the risks of attackers squatting similar names and catching typos.
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What security controls to prevent someone from pushing arbitrary code into production?
i’m late but surprised no one has mentioned cosign
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Docker build fails on GitHub Action after net7 update
name: Docker # This workflow uses actions that are not certified by GitHub. # They are provided by a third-party and are governed by # separate terms of service, privacy policy, and support # documentation. on: push: branches: [ "main" ] # Publish semver tags as releases. tags: [ 'v*.*.*' ] pull_request: branches: [ "main" ] paths: - src/MamisSolidarias.WebAPI.Campaigns/Dockerfile - .github/workflows/docker-publish.yml workflow_dispatch: env: # Use docker.io for Docker Hub if empty REGISTRY: ghcr.io IMAGE_NAME: mamis-solidarias/campaigns jobs: build: runs-on: ubuntu-latest permissions: contents: read packages: write # This is used to complete the identity challenge # with sigstore/fulcio when running outside of PRs. id-token: write steps: - name: Checkout repository uses: actions/checkout@v3 # Install the cosign tool except on PR # https://github.com/sigstore/cosign-installer - name: Install cosign if: github.event_name != 'pull_request' uses: sigstore/cosign-installer@main with: cosign-release: 'v1.13.1' - name: Set up QEMU uses: docker/setup-qemu-action@v2 with: platforms: 'arm64' # Workaround: https://github.com/docker/build-push-action/issues/461 - name: Setup Docker buildx uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@v2 # Login against a Docker registry except on PR # https://github.com/docker/login-action - name: Log into registry ${{ env.REGISTRY }} if: github.event_name != 'pull_request' uses: docker/login-action@v2 with: registry: ${{ env.REGISTRY }} username: ${{ github.actor }} password: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }} # Extract metadata (tags, labels) for Docker # https://github.com/docker/metadata-action - name: Extract Docker metadata id: meta uses: docker/metadata-action@v4 with: images: ${{ env.REGISTRY }}/${{ env.IMAGE_NAME }} tags: | type=schedule type=ref,event=branch type=ref,event=pr type=semver,pattern={{version}} type=semver,pattern={{major}}.{{minor}} type=semver,pattern={{major}} type=sha # Build and push Docker image with Buildx (don't push on PR) # https://github.com/docker/build-push-action - name: Build and push Docker image id: build-and-push uses: docker/build-push-action@v3 with: context: . platforms: linux/amd64, linux/arm64 file: src/MamisSolidarias.WebAPI.Campaigns/Dockerfile push: ${{ github.event_name != 'pull_request' }} tags: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.tags }} labels: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.labels }} # Sign the resulting Docker image digest except on PRs. # This will only write to the public Rekor transparency log when the Docker # repository is public to avoid leaking data. If you would like to publish # transparency data even for private images, pass --force to cosign below. # https://github.com/sigstore/cosign - name: Sign the published Docker image if: ${{ github.event_name != 'pull_request' }} env: COSIGN_EXPERIMENTAL: "true" # This step uses the identity token to provision an ephemeral certificate # against the sigstore community Fulcio instance. run: echo "${{ steps.meta.outputs.tags }}" | xargs -I {} cosign sign {}@${{ steps.build-and-push.outputs.digest }}
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How to tag base image so images built from it can be tracked
After inspecting the layers i think you should start thinking about signing your images: https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/
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Understanding Kubernetes Limits and Requests
cosign
dependency-track
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Show HN: Pre-alpha tool for analyzing spdx SBOMs generated by GitHub
I've become interested in SBOM recently, and found there were great tools like https://dependencytrack.org/ for CycloneDX SBOMs, but all I have is SPDX SBOMs generated by GitHub.
I decided to have a go at writing my own dependency track esque tool aiming to integrate with the APIs GitHub provides.
It's pretty limited in functionality so far, but can give a high level summary of the types of licenses your repository dependencies use, and let you drill down into potentially problematic ones.
Written in NextJS + mui + sqlite, and using another project of mine to generate most of the API boilerplate/glue (https://github.com/mnahkies/openapi-code-generator)
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SQL Injection Isn't Dead Yet
To detect these types of vulnerabilities, we should first and foremost know our dependencies and versions, and which of them have vulnerabilities. The OWASP Top 10 2021 identifies this need as A06:2021-Vulnerable and Outdated Components. OWASP has several tools for this, including Dependency Check and Dependency Track. These tools will warn about the use of components with vulnerabilities.
- Dependency-Track
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Krita fund has 0 corporate support
https://dependencytrack.org/
You just need to use one of the various tools out there to scan.
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Friends - needs help choosing solution for SBOM vulnerability
OWASP Dependency Track - https://dependencytrack.org/
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An Overview of Kubernetes Security Projects at KubeCon Europe 2023
Dependency-Track
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software inventory of my ECS tasks
I actually want to build the same thing you are after, and I think I’ll go for the setup you describe in idea 2. The tool you can use for this is Trivy (https://trivy.dev), have it generate a SBOM and send it to Dependencytrack (https://dependencytrack.org).
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The ultimate guide to Java Security Vulnerabilities (CVE)
If you like Dependency-Track, consider moving to Dependency-Track ( https://dependencytrack.org ), which makes administration much easier.
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Is there any news about 64 bit Steam?
Even if you roll up the sleeves and add the feature yourself there is no guarantee it will be accepted upstream and you should always be prepared for the possibility of wasting time.
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The SBOM Frenzy Is Premature
I don't quite understand the deployment issue. I mean, I understand people might not be tracking what's deployed, but I don't understand what is missing for it to be happening today, other than will.
For example: I build some software into a Docker image, version tag it, sign it, and generate an SBOM for it. That image goes into production with signature validation. Even if I've included 100 jar files in there, I should know exactly which ones I have. I can upload the SBOM to my DependencyTrack[1] instance to so over time no dependencies have vulnerabilities I'm not aware of.
What doesn't work in that scenario? What scenarios can't conform to that one?
[1] https://dependencytrack.org
What are some alternatives?
notation - A CLI tool to sign and verify artifacts
trivy - Find vulnerabilities, misconfigurations, secrets, SBOM in containers, Kubernetes, code repositories, clouds and more
in-toto-golang - A Go implementation of in-toto. in-toto is a framework to protect software supply chain integrity.
DependencyCheck - OWASP dependency-check is a software composition analysis utility that detects publicly disclosed vulnerabilities in application dependencies.
connaisseur - An admission controller that integrates Container Image Signature Verification into a Kubernetes cluster
scancode-toolkit - :mag: ScanCode detects licenses, copyrights, dependencies by "scanning code" ... to discover and inventory open source and third-party packages used in your code. Sponsored by NLnet project https://nlnet.nl/project/vulnerabilitydatabase, the Google Summer of Code, Azure credits, nexB and others generous sponsors!
spire - The SPIFFE Runtime Environment
gitlab
spiffe-vault - Integrates Spiffe and Vault to have secretless authentication
sbt-dependency-check - SBT Plugin for OWASP DependencyCheck. Monitor your dependencies and report if there are any publicly known vulnerabilities (e.g. CVEs). :rainbow:
rekor - Software Supply Chain Transparency Log
ort - A suite of tools to automate software compliance checks.