coq VS systemd

The page summarizing the considered new names and their pros/cons is interesting: https://github.com/coq/coq/wiki/Alternative-names

Naming is hard...

Are those more important than, say:

- Proven with Coq, a formal proof management system: https://coq.inria.fr/

See in the real world: https://aws.amazon.com/security/provable-security/

And check out Computer-Aided Verification (CAV).

To be ruthlessly, uselessly pedantic - after all, we're mathematicians - there's reasonable definitions of "academic" where logical unsoundness is still academic if it never interfered with the reasoning behind any proofs of interest ;)

But: so long as we're accepting that unsoundness in your checker or its underlying theory are intrinsically deal breakers, there's definitely a long history of this, perhaps more somewhat more relevant than the HM example, since no proof checkers of note, AFAIK, have incorporated mutation into their type theory.

For one thing, the implementation can very easily have bugs. Coq itself certainly has had soundness bugs occasionally [0]. I'm sure Agda, Lean, Idris, etc. have too, but I've followed them less closely.

But even the underlying mathematics have been tricky. Girard's Paradox broke Martin-Löf's type theory, which is why in these dependently typed proof assistants you have to deal with the bizarre "Tower of Universes"; and Girard's Paradox is an analogue of Russell's Paradox which broke more naive set theories. And then Russell himself and his system of universal mathematics was very famously struck down by Gödel.

But we've definitely gotten it right this time...

[0] https://github.com/coq/coq/issues/4294

Dafny and Whiley are two examples with explicit verification support. Idris and other dependently typed languages should all be rich enough to express the required predicate but might not necessarily be able to accept a reasonable implementation as proof. Isabelle, Lean, Coq, and other theorem provers definitely can express the capability but aren't going to churn out much in the way of executable programs; they're more useful to guide an implementation in a more practical functional language but then the proof is separated from the implementation, and you could also use tools like TLA+.

https://dafny.org/

https://whiley.org/

https://www.idris-lang.org/

https://isabelle.in.tum.de/

https://leanprover.github.io/

https://coq.inria.fr/

http://lamport.azurewebsites.net/tla/tla.html

Still, there are many useful tools based on these ideas, used by programmers and mathematicians alike. What you describe sounds rather like Datalog (e.g. Soufflé Datalog), where you supply some rules and an initial fact, and the system repeatedly expands out the set of facts until nothing new can be derived. (This has to be finite, if you want to get anywhere.) In Prolog (e.g. SWI Prolog) you also supply a set of rules and facts, but instead of a fact as your starting point, you give a query containing some unknown variables, and the system tries to find an assignment of the variables that proves the query. And finally there is a rich array of theorem provers and proof assistants such as Agda, Coq, Lean, and Twelf, which can all be used to help check your reasoning or explore new ideas.

What ever happened to the effort [1] to rename Coq in order to make it less offensive? There were a number of excellent proposals [2] that seemed to die on the vine.

[1] https://github.com/coq/coq/wiki/Alternative-names

[2] https://github.com/coq/coq/wiki/Alternative-names#c%E1%B5%A3...

Information about the Coq proof assistant: https://coq.inria.fr/ , https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coq

This type of thing can help you formally verify code.

So, if your proof is correct, and your description of the (language/CPU) is correct, you can prove the code does what you think it does.

Formal proof systems are still growing up, though, and they are still pretty hard to use. See Coq for an introduction: https://coq.inria.fr/

Most of the proof assistants out there: Lean, Coq, Dafny, Isabelle, F*, Idris 2, and Agda. And the main concepts are dependent types, Homotopy Type Theory AKA HoTT, and Category Theory. Warning: HoTT and Category Theory are really dense, you're going to really need to research them.

No, the OP was not sent any harassment, the OP _did_ the harassment as it can be seen in the tweets. I mean, they are right there, just click on the links you shared. One of the OP's followers even openly called for the assassination of the project maintainer, and you have the galls to defend him? This is truly deranged stuff.

And again, there is no "vulnerability", there is simply a person that doesn't know how Linux works and has learned something new. Which again it's fine, nobody knows everything and we all learn new things everyday, it's just that normal and sensible people don't use that to make grand claims on social media and start harassment campaigns culminating in death threats.

Professional security researchers responsibly report real issues using the appropriate channels, such as defined at: https://github.com/systemd/systemd/security/policy this is not the work of a researcher, this is a grifter looking for self-promotion on social media.

> 3. even `adduser` will not allow it by default

5. useradd does allow it (as noted in a comment). 6. Local users are not the only source, there things like LDAP and AD.

7. POSIX allows it:

* https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/6237#issuecomment-...

> I for one love to type out 13 extra characters

FWIW, systemd is normally pretty good at providing autocomplete suggestions, so even if you don't want to set up an alias you'll probably just have to type `--b ` to set it.

> I wonder what random ASCII escape sequences we can send.

According to the man page source[0]:

> The color specified should be an ANSI X3.64 SGR background color, i.e. strings such as `40`, `41`, …, `47`, `48;2;…`, `48;5;…`

and a link to the relevant Wikipedia page[1]. Given systemd's generally decent track record wrt defects and security issues, and the simplicity of valid colour values, I expect there's a fairly robust parameter verifier in there.

In fact, given the focus on starting the elevated command in a highly controlled environment, I'd expect the colour codes to be output to the originating terminal, not forwarded to the secure pty. That way, the only thing malformed escapes can affect is your own process, which you already have full control over anyway.

(Happy to be shown if that's a mistaken expectation though.)

[0] https://github.com/systemd/systemd/blob/main/man/run0.xml

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ANSI_escape_code#SGR_(Select_G...

bash & zsh are supported by upstream: https://github.com/systemd/systemd/tree/main/shell-completio...

the right person to replace sudo, not: https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/6237

PS: https://pwnies.com/systemd-bugs/

https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/32028#issuecomment...

There are some very compelling arguments made there if you care to read them

Maybe it was because you weren't pointing out anything new?

There was a pull request to stop linking libzma to systemd before the attack even took place

https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/31550

This was likely one of many things that pushed the attackers to work faster, and forced them into making mistakes.

The PR for changing compression libraries to use dlopen() was opened several weeks before the xz-utils backdoor was revealed.

https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/31550