aurman
openssh-portable
aurman | openssh-portable | |
---|---|---|
2 | 41 | |
567 | 2,830 | |
- | 2.7% | |
3.4 | 9.4 | |
3 months ago | about 21 hours ago | |
Python | C | |
MIT License | GNU General Public License v3.0 or later |
Stars - the number of stars that a project has on GitHub. Growth - month over month growth in stars.
Activity is a relative number indicating how actively a project is being developed. Recent commits have higher weight than older ones.
For example, an activity of 9.0 indicates that a project is amongst the top 10% of the most actively developed projects that we are tracking.
aurman
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Project on GitHub - Customizable Arch Linux Podman images based on the official Arch Linux Docker image
Automatic installation of packages during building utilizes pacman and aurman with the supported "package sources" being:
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Arch Linux - News: Git migration announcement
tl;dr I'm the aurman developer and I have a new project to share with the Arch community. It's a combination of Podman, the official Arch Linux Docker image, mdev, X2Go and aurman itself...
openssh-portable
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New startup sells coffee through SSH and exclusively through SSH
Default for the last 24 years according to https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/blame/385ecb31e1...
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Systemd Wants to Expand to Include a Sudo Replacement
They didn't need to use the library to make use of the systemd notify mechanism, which is simple to interface and quite a nice feature in the first place.
The free-standing implementation: https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/08f579231...
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Terrapin Attack for prefix injection in SSH
Unless I'm misunderstanding what this is about RFC5647 merely points out that the sequence number is included as AAD due to RFC4253 requirements. The [email protected] specification is not exactly the most rigorous thing I've ever seen (https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/blob/master/PROT...) but reading it, the sequence number is only included in the IV, and not as AAD, which directly runs afoul of the RFC4253 section 6.4 requirement for it to be included in the MAC.
- SSH3: SSH using HTTP/3 and QUIC
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SSH keys stolen by stream of malicious PyPI and NPM packages
The key layout is described in https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/blob/master/PROT... and you can view it pretty easily via
cat private_key_here | head -n -1 | tail -n +2 | base64 -d | xxd
One I created in 2016 is using aes256-cbc with bcrypt for the kdf, which isn't awful at all.
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Microsoft signing keys were leaked
Interestingly, it looks like ssh-agent disables core dumps[1], but I don't see similar usage for sshd
1: https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/blob/694150ad927...
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An Excruciatingly Detailed Guide to SSH (But Only the Things I Find Useful)
There's a current pull request for adding AF_UNIX support, which should make all kinds of exciting forwarding possible, since it will make it easy to proxy ssh connections through an arbitrary local process which can do anything to forward the data to the remote end.
https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/431
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Project on GitHub - Customizable Arch Linux Podman images based on the official Arch Linux Docker image
OpenSSH server (allows connecting to containers)
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Funds of every Trust Wallet browser extension could have been stolen
It doesn't, at least not for generic/unmodified cryptographic applications.
WebAuthN signatures are of a very specific challenge/response format that applications need to explicitly support. For example, SSH had to add new key and signature formats [1] to support it.
Theoretically, a blockchain/cryptocurrency application could adopt the WebAuthN signature format as its canonical or an alternative signature format, but I'm not aware of any popular one having done so.
[1] https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/blob/master/PROT...
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We updated our RSA SSH host key
I just tested it and looked at the code briefly; the client fortunately does seem to remove all keys not provided by the server: https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/blob/36c6c3eff5e...
It seems like at least a `known_hosts` compromise would be "self-healing" after connecting to the legitimate github.com server once.
What are some alternatives?
lightdm - Display Manager
gentoo - [MIRROR] Official Gentoo ebuild repository
packages - The packages Mason, what do they mean? (Package requests and bug reports here) 📑
guardian-agent - [beta] Guardian Agent: secure ssh-agent forwarding for Mosh and SSH
auv - Arch Userland Virtualization
wezterm - A GPU-accelerated cross-platform terminal emulator and multiplexer written by @wez and implemented in Rust
svntogit-packages - Automatic import of svn 'packages' repo (read-only mirror)
ssh-mitm - SSH-MITM - ssh audits made simple
mac-ssh-confirm - Protect against SSH Agent Hijacking on Mac OS X with the ability to confirm agent identities prior to each use
ports - Read-only git conversion of OpenBSD's official cvs ports repository. Pull requests not accepted - send diffs to the ports@ mailing list.
OpenSSL - TLS/SSL and crypto library
daemon - turns other processes into daemons