totp-cli VS tpm2-totp

Several options...

Not exactly the same, but if you're using Bitwarden (which is compatible with generating TOTP tokens) to manage your passwords, you can use their bitwarden-cli tool to request tokens from the cli: https://bitwarden.com/help/cli/#get

But if you want the simplest cli thing, you can probably can use this golang ( https://github.com/yitsushi/totp-cli ) or this python ( https://github.com/WhyNotHugo/totp-cli ) implementations.

Have you checked Authy or totp-cli ? I've used Authy for a long time but have now moved to totp-cli which I use with rofi.

totp-cli written in python, uses pass

You need a TPM 2.0 compatible CPU, but something like this sounds really excellent: https://github.com/tpm2-software/tpm2-totp

This means your laptop itself would be your hardware device, the TOTP secret would be stored in the TPM and theoretically impossible to steal/copy. Of course this means you will probably want a mobile device (possibly a second laptop also) as a backup.)

>But okay, you may extend my attack by saying that you exchange the motherboard between the victim and the attacker laptop, so that you don't need to replicate the chassis.

Modern computers has tamper detection and if you open them you'll need to type the BIOS password.

However, replacing the motherboard is going to replace the TPM. This is easily detectable with something like tpm2_totp in the bootchain.

https://github.com/tpm2-software/tpm2-totp

You could also use TOTP for a kind of remote attestation (e.g., with your phone computing TOTP). In this setup, the CPU sends the timestamp to the TPM, and it returns the TOTP value. So instead of you looking at your phone to give the TOTP to a service provider to prove that you're in possession of your phone, the computer gives you a TOTP value to prove that it's in possession (inside the TPM, sealed to the boot chain hashes) of the TOTP secret, and you use your phone to verify this. A possible weakness (short of a full-blown TPM compromise) would be to send a bunch of forged timestamps to the TPM while your computer is running and store the resulting TOTP values, then tamper with Secure Boot and emit the precomputed TOTP corresponding to the current timestamp whenever you boot up your computer. But this would require running malicious code on your compute while you're logged in with the trusted boot chain.