Simos18_SBOOT
sa2_seed_key
Simos18_SBOOT | sa2_seed_key | |
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5 | 1 | |
84 | 64 | |
- | - | |
0.0 | 10.0 | |
about 2 years ago | over 1 year ago | |
Python | Python | |
- | MIT License |
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Simos18_SBOOT
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Can Injection: keyless car theft
I did find an older VW "emergency start" product that claims to only work with Bosch MED17 and MED9, and I suspect it's using a memory-access primitive (either UDS or CCP) to release the immobilizer.
It's trivial to disable an immobilizer in software by re-flashing the ECU, yes, but modern ECUs have two strong protections against this:
* Cryptographic signature checking against update/re-flash payloads (I've done extensive research on these on VW Continental ECUs - https://github.com/bri3d/VW_Flash )
and an even better and more obvious protection:
* The ECU application software won't descend into the re-flash software (Customer Bootloader) unless the immobilizer is free (a valid key is present).
This is a lot of what helps to reduce surface area from an "emergency start" style attack to an AKL attack - now that the Customer Bootloader won't start without the Immobilizer being unlocked, an attacker needs to remove the control unit to flash it with a Supplier Bootloader exploit ( https://github.com/bri3d/simos18_sboot ) or physical access (BDM/JTAG).
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ECU resources
SIMOS18 SBOOT: https://github.com/bri3d/simos18_sboot Illustrates common security vulnerabilities in modern control units (inadequate RNG entropy, reset exploits). Illustrates common "SBOOT recovery mode break-in" / "TSW Mode" concept that many control units have.
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Hyundai car software update private keys came from easily Googleable sample code
That's pretty cool! I wonder how properly they were really signed - there are _so many_ mistakes even in systems that at least don't use an example key off the Internet.
The most common ones I know of are:
* Out-of-bounds write issues allowing "signature was validated" flags to be overwritten in Flash memory, like https://github.com/jglim/UnsignedFlash
* State machine mistakes, like https://github.com/bri3d/VW_Flash/blob/master/docs/docs.md - allowing Flash to be written again after it was already written, without an erase first.
* Filesystem parsing mistakes, like those in a number of VW AG head units: https://github.com/jilleb/mib2-toolbox/issues/122
* The use of RSA with E=3 and inadequate padding validation, like https://words.filippo.io/bleichenbacher-06-signature-forgery... .
* Failure to understand the system boundaries, like in the second part of https://github.com/bri3d/simos18_sboot where "secret" data can be recovered by halting the system during a checksum process.
* Hardware fault injection issues, as used in https://fahrplan.events.ccc.de/congress/2015/Fahrplan/system... .
Fundamentally this is of course, a very hard problem, since in the "protect against firmware modification" case, the attacker has physical access. But, compared to the state of the art in mobile devices and game consoles, automotive stuff is still way behind.
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Hacking a VW Golf Power Steering ECU
My writeups and JG Lim's cover three of the common mistakes in modern modules (supplier backdoor bugs in Simos supplier bootloader, state machine issues in Simos VW bootloader, and block buffer validity confusion / bounds check issues in Mercedes instrument cluster).
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Simos18 Supplier Bootloader (SBOOT) Exploit: Reading Boot Passwords
I have glossed over all of the actual data details here for brevity. For details including exact messages (and code!), please visit https://github.com/bri3d/Simos18_SBOOT
sa2_seed_key
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ECU resources
SA2 Seed/Key: https://github.com/bri3d/sa2_seed_key VW AG Programming Mode Seed/Key is implemented using a byte code virtual machine shared across all VW control units. Other manufacturers have more or less secure Seed/Key mechanisms, but this one is interesting and clever.
What are some alternatives?
ghidra_tc1791_registers
TC1791_CAN_BSL - CAN Bootstrap Loader (BSL) for Tricore AudoMAX (TC1791 and friends), including arbitrary read/write as well as compressed read functionality.
mib2-toolbox - The ultimate MIB2-HIGH toolbox.
UnsignedFlash - Firmware signature bypass on the IC204
VWsFriend - VW WeConnect visualization and control
mig - Your own MySQL guru to deal with indexes in a friendly way.
ME7Sum - Checksum/CRC checker/corrector for Motronic ME7.1 firmware images. Download binaries here:
VW_Flash - Flashing tools for VW AG control units over UDS. Compression, encryption, RSA bypass, and checksums are supported for Simos18.1/6/10, DQ250-MQB, DQ381-MQB, and Haldex4Motion-Gen5-MQB.
ME7RomTool_Ferrari - Bosch ME7.3H4 RomTool for Ferrari 360's
NefMotoOpenSource - Open source collaborative projects driven by the NefMoto.com community