pacman-bintrans
Intel-Linux-Processor-Microcode-Data-Files | pacman-bintrans | |
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20 | 8 | |
661 | 83 | |
2.1% | - | |
4.7 | 5.1 | |
10 days ago | 4 months ago | |
Rust | ||
GNU General Public License v3.0 or later | GNU General Public License v3.0 only |
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For example, an activity of 9.0 indicates that a project is amongst the top 10% of the most actively developed projects that we are tracking.
Intel-Linux-Processor-Microcode-Data-Files
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There is no fix for Intel's crashing 13th/14th Gen CPUs – damage is permanent
So where is the microcode update? I don't see anything for Linux yet.
https://github.com/intel/Intel-Linux-Processor-Microcode-Dat...
- Intel Issues New CPU Microcode Going Back To Gen8 For New, Undisclosed Security Updates
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N100 wait or done with it ?
https://github.com/intel/Intel-Linux-Processor-Microcode-Data-Files/blob/main/releasenote.md looks like they released a new microcode (24000024) affecting these units on Feb 14th this year.
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Why is intel-microcode missing in the unstable repo?
Package: intel-microcode Version: 3.20221108.1 Priority: optional Section: non-free/admin Maintainer: Henrique de Moraes Holschuh Installed-Size: 6460 kB Depends: iucode-tool (>= 1.0) Recommends: initramfs-tools (>= 0.113~) Conflicts: microcode.ctl (<< 0.18~0) Homepage: https://github.com/intel/Intel-Linux-Processor-Microcode-Data-Files Tag: hardware::TODO, role::app-data, use::driver Download-Size: 4509 kB APT-Sources: http://deb.debian.org/debian testing/non-free amd64 Packages Description: Processor microcode firmware for Intel CPUs
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On “I don't trust microcode”
They have been sort of cracked, but it doesn't matter. The web or chain of trust of those updates from the vendor to the processor is what matters. They're at least CRC checked to prevent loading corrupt files.
https://ieeeaccess.ieee.org/featured-articles/reverseenginee...
https://github.com/intel/Intel-Linux-Processor-Microcode-Dat...
https://github.com/platomav/CPUMicrocodes
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Westworld - 4x06 "Fidelity" - Post-Episode Discussion
Not to “well aktchually”, but all modern processors do have regularly updated microcode that’s uploaded at boot time - https://github.com/intel/Intel-Linux-Processor-Microcode-Data-Files
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My CPU's microcode is missing
6-94-3 would become 6-5E-3. https://github.com/intel/Intel-Linux-Processor-Microcode-Data-Files/blob/6c0c4691e5bb446e0e428ebca595164709c59586/intel-ucode/06-5e-03
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amd cpu firmware microcode ? (-current)
OpenBSD kernel has no support for loading microcode on AMD CPUs, A number of issues/errata on AMD systems may be fixed as part of AGESA updates, in addition to microcode as part of BIOS/firmware updates. While there have been microcode updates released for Zen+ or newer CPUs, but these seem to be less frequent than Intel.
- Will you still use Cloudready? Yes/No and why? Please...
- Why is it assumed that microcode updates improve security?
pacman-bintrans
- Pacman-bintrans – Experimental binary transparency for pacman via sigstore/rekor
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ProtonMail Is Inherently Insecure, Your Emails Are Likely Compromised
If you trust them with your keys, why not trust them with your plaintext? At which point, why bother with E2EE at all?
The answer should be "because one day web browsers will be able to pin specific versions of specific web apps, with specific hashes, corresponding to specific releases tagged in their repo, which have been audited by a certain threshold of auditors that I trust".
What that looks like in practice is probably some mixture of the following projects:
https://github.com/kpcyrd/pacman-bintrans
https://users.rust-lang.org/t/rust-code-reviews-web-site-for...
https://paragonie.com/blog/2022/01/solving-open-source-suppl...
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Solving Open Source Supply Chain Security for the PHP Ecosystem
Generally speaking, Transparency Logs for securing software distribution has been a research topic since around 2015, I also wrote my master thesis on the subject.
Sigstore is a Transparency Log intended for provenance and software artifacts which has support for a few different build artifacts. The container ecosystems also appears to be embracing it.
Cool practical example is pacman-bintrans from kpcyrd that throws Arch Linux packages on sigstore and (optionally) checks each package for being reproducible before installation.
https://github.com/kpcyrd/pacman-bintrans
https://www.sigstore.dev/
I think this is generally useful for a lot of ecosystems indeed, and it's cool to also see similar scoped projects pop up to address the these issues.
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I Love Arch, but GNU Guix Is My New Distro
Reproducible builds are an important part of efforts to secure the software supply chain. Ideally you want multiple independent parties vouching that a given package (whether a compiled binary, or a source tarball) corresponds to a globally immutably published revision in a source code repository.
That gives you Binary Transparency, which is already being attempted in the Arch Linux package ecosystem[0], and it protects the user from compromised build environments and software updates that are targeted at a specific user or that occur without upstream's knowledge.
Once updates can be tied securely to version control tags, it is possible to add something like Crev[1] to allow distributed auditing of source code changes. That still leaves open the questions of who to trust for audits, and how to fund that auditing work, but it greatly mitigates other classes of attack.
[0] https://github.com/kpcyrd/pacman-bintrans
[1] https://github.com/crev-dev/cargo-crev
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CII' FOSS best practices criteria
It's good that having a reproducible build process is a requirement for the Gold rating, as is signed releases.
Perhaps there needs to be a Platinum level which involves storing the hash of each release in a distributed append-only log, with multiple third parties vouching that they can build the binary from the published source.
Obviously I'm thinking of something like sigstore[0] which the Arch Linux package ecosystem is being experimentally integrated with.[1] Then there's Crev for distributed code review.[2]
[0] https://docs.sigstore.dev/
[1] https://github.com/kpcyrd/pacman-bintrans
[2] https://github.com/crev-dev/crev
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Thousands of Debian packages updated from their upstream Git repository
> Of course, since these packages are built automatically without human supervision it’s likely that some of them will have bugs in them that would otherwise have been caught by the maintainer.
Human supervision isn't enough to protect the supply chain, and I can't think of a time that it's actually stopped an attack at the packaging stage, but having some extra "friction" in the process seems like it should be a benefit. Ideally an attacker would have to get past both the upstream author and the Debian maintainer, rather than these being two separate single points of failure.
Fortunately the Debian project is improving the situation with regards to supply chain attacks by continuing to work on Reproducible Builds. I think the next step from there needs to be Binary Transparency, with the adoption of the sort of approach being trialled by Arch Linux:
https://github.com/kpcyrd/pacman-bintrans
- Binary transparency logs for pacman, the Arch Linux package manager
What are some alternatives?
nonguix - Nonguix mirror – pull requests ignored, please use upstream for that
paru - Feature packed AUR helper
iota - A terminal-based text editor written in Rust
arch-audit - A utility like pkg-audit for Arch Linux. Based on Arch Security Team data.
score - ossia score, an interactive sequencer for the intermedia arts
dysnomia - Dysnomia: A tool for deploying mutable components
Intel-Linux-Processor-Microcode-Dat
webext-signed-pages - A browser extension to verify the authenticity (PGP signature) of web pages
gitian-builder - Build packages in a secure deterministic fashion inside a VM
userscan - Scans files for Nix store references and registers them with the Nix garbage collector.
rebuilderd - Independent verification of binary packages - reproducible builds