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I've written and given a lot of references to attacks, countermeasures, fighting the compilers and even non-cryptographic side-channel attacks to uncover someone's Twitter identity:
- https://github.com/mratsim/constantine/wiki/Constant-time-ar...
I noticed in July of 2022 that Go did exactly the vulnerable example and reported it to the security team.
https://github.com/golang/go/issues/53849
It was fixed as of Go 1.21 https://go.dev/doc/go1.21
---
The article cites JavaScript, which is not constant time. There's no sure way to do constant time operations in JavaScript and thus no secure way to do crypto directly in Javascript. Browsers like Firefox depend on low level calls which should be implemented in languages that are constant time capable.
JavaScript needs something like constant time WASM in order to do crypto securely, but seeing the only constant time WASM project on GitHub has only 16 stars and the last commit was 2 years ago, it doesn't appear to have much interest. https://github.com/WebAssembly/constant-time
However, for JavaScript, I recommend Paul's library Noble which is "hardened to be algorithmically constant time". It is by far the best library available for JavaScript. https://github.com/paulmillr/noble-secp256k1
I noticed in July of 2022 that Go did exactly the vulnerable example and reported it to the security team.
https://github.com/golang/go/issues/53849
It was fixed as of Go 1.21 https://go.dev/doc/go1.21
---
The article cites JavaScript, which is not constant time. There's no sure way to do constant time operations in JavaScript and thus no secure way to do crypto directly in Javascript. Browsers like Firefox depend on low level calls which should be implemented in languages that are constant time capable.
JavaScript needs something like constant time WASM in order to do crypto securely, but seeing the only constant time WASM project on GitHub has only 16 stars and the last commit was 2 years ago, it doesn't appear to have much interest. https://github.com/WebAssembly/constant-time
However, for JavaScript, I recommend Paul's library Noble which is "hardened to be algorithmically constant time". It is by far the best library available for JavaScript. https://github.com/paulmillr/noble-secp256k1
I noticed in July of 2022 that Go did exactly the vulnerable example and reported it to the security team.
https://github.com/golang/go/issues/53849
It was fixed as of Go 1.21 https://go.dev/doc/go1.21
---
The article cites JavaScript, which is not constant time. There's no sure way to do constant time operations in JavaScript and thus no secure way to do crypto directly in Javascript. Browsers like Firefox depend on low level calls which should be implemented in languages that are constant time capable.
JavaScript needs something like constant time WASM in order to do crypto securely, but seeing the only constant time WASM project on GitHub has only 16 stars and the last commit was 2 years ago, it doesn't appear to have much interest. https://github.com/WebAssembly/constant-time
However, for JavaScript, I recommend Paul's library Noble which is "hardened to be algorithmically constant time". It is by far the best library available for JavaScript. https://github.com/paulmillr/noble-secp256k1
Thanks, that’s a helpful summary. I knew about the ed25519 issue (but not the others) from writing this: https://github.com/jawj/subtls