tang | systemd | |
---|---|---|
11 | 517 | |
453 | 12,516 | |
2.0% | 1.6% | |
7.1 | 10.0 | |
3 months ago | about 21 hours ago | |
C | C | |
GNU General Public License v3.0 only | GNU General Public License v3.0 only |
Stars - the number of stars that a project has on GitHub. Growth - month over month growth in stars.
Activity is a relative number indicating how actively a project is being developed. Recent commits have higher weight than older ones.
For example, an activity of 9.0 indicates that a project is amongst the top 10% of the most actively developed projects that we are tracking.
tang
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Can I boot an encrypted system by pulling the key from another PC?
Have a look at clevis and tang. These allow you do have one server - which could be your remote you want to pull from - to be source of the LUKS decryption on the system using tang.
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PSA: Upgrade your LUKS key derivation function
I found that running tang[1] at home and needing to decrypt that box (can be a Pi or whatever) requiring a complex passphrase is very sufficient. You can even just unplug it at night if it makes you sleep better.
https://github.com/latchset/tang
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How to mount LUKS encrypted USB storages (and HDDs inserted to hot swappable drive bay) automatically when connected? The machine is running headlessly, does not have desktop environments installed.
There are 3 ways to unlock a volume in a headless environment: - use a keyfile, located on an already available volume - use your device's TPM and utilize systemd-cryptenroll - use Clevis/Tang to unlock volumes remotely
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is possible to encrypt disk without asking for password on boot?
This is why on headless servers you use tang (ideally, multiple tang servers)
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Tang on OPNSense
Sharing my notes on running a Tang server on OPNSense, in case it is useful for somebody else.
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PSA: If you have a LUKS encrypted system and a TPM2 chip, you can put it to good use
We use clevis against multiple tang servers to provide Network Bound Disk Encryption (NBDE). It's possible to also use TPM2 but it's easier to use multiple tang servers (requiring more than one server to decrypt) in the datacenter.
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A lot of questions about Self hosting :)
For automating unlocking of encrypted drives, look into tang . Here is a red hat guide on setting it up. You will want to be running this on another device on your network, i run it on my router with openwrt since its a local device thats on 24/7. Basically it will unlock your disks as long as your server is on your network, so if your machine or drives are stolen or removed from your network they will just be encrypted as usual. Obviously use a strong encryption password.
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Systemd 250 released
There are other ways to bind data, e.g. "network binding" with Tang server.
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Best Evil Maid prototcol for Linux?
I wonder if https://github.com/latchset/clevis and https://github.com/latchset/tang (complementary projects) will help here.
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Luks Root Encryption
Yes you can, using either Mandos or Clevis and Tang. https://www.recompile.se/mandos https://github.com/latchset/clevis https://github.com/latchset/tang. Basically on boot the server gets the key from another(s) servers. You could use a hidden raspberry pi for example.
systemd
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Run0 – systemd based alternative to sudo announced
> 3. even `adduser` will not allow it by default
5. useradd does allow it (as noted in a comment). 6. Local users are not the only source, there things like LDAP and AD.
7. POSIX allows it:
* https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/6237#issuecomment-...
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Systemd Rolling Out "run0" As sudo Alternative
> I for one love to type out 13 extra characters
FWIW, systemd is normally pretty good at providing autocomplete suggestions, so even if you don't want to set up an alias you'll probably just have to type `--b ` to set it.
> I wonder what random ASCII escape sequences we can send.
According to the man page source[0]:
> The color specified should be an ANSI X3.64 SGR background color, i.e. strings such as `40`, `41`, …, `47`, `48;2;…`, `48;5;…`
and a link to the relevant Wikipedia page[1]. Given systemd's generally decent track record wrt defects and security issues, and the simplicity of valid colour values, I expect there's a fairly robust parameter verifier in there.
In fact, given the focus on starting the elevated command in a highly controlled environment, I'd expect the colour codes to be output to the originating terminal, not forwarded to the secure pty. That way, the only thing malformed escapes can affect is your own process, which you already have full control over anyway.
(Happy to be shown if that's a mistaken expectation though.)
[0] https://github.com/systemd/systemd/blob/main/man/run0.xml
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ANSI_escape_code#SGR_(Select_G...
- Crash-only software: More than meets the eye
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Systemd Wants to Expand to Include a Sudo Replacement
bash & zsh are supported by upstream: https://github.com/systemd/systemd/tree/main/shell-completio...
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"Run0" as a Sudo Replacement
the right person to replace sudo, not: https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/6237
PS: https://pwnies.com/systemd-bugs/
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Linux fu: getting started with systemd
https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/32028#issuecomment...
There are some very compelling arguments made there if you care to read them
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Ubuntu 24.04 (and Debian) removed libsystemd from SSH server dependencies
Maybe it was because you weren't pointing out anything new?
There was a pull request to stop linking libzma to systemd before the attack even took place
https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/31550
This was likely one of many things that pushed the attackers to work faster, and forced them into making mistakes.
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Systemd minimizing required dependencies for libsystemd
The PR for changing compression libraries to use dlopen() was opened several weeks before the xz-utils backdoor was revealed.
https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/31550
- Going in circles without a real-time clock
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The xz sshd backdoor rabbithole goes quite a bit deeper
I find this the most plausible explanation by far:
* The highly professional outfit simply did not see teknoraver's commit to remove liblzma as standard dependency of systemd build scripts coming.
* The race was on between their compromised code and that commit. They had to win it, with as large a window as possible.
* This caused serious errors.
* The performance regression is __not__ big. It's lucky Andres caught it at all. It's also not necessarily all that simple to remove it. It's not simply a bug in a loop or some such.
* The payload of the 'hack' contains fairly easy ways for the xz hackers to update the payload. They actually used it to remove a real issue where their hackery causes issues with valgrind that might lead to discovering it, and they also used it to release 5.6.1 which rewrites significant chunks; I've as yet not read, nor know of any analysis, as to why they changed so much.
Extra info for those who don't know:
https://github.com/systemd/systemd/commit/3fc72d54132151c131...
That's a commit that changes how liblzma is a dependency of systemd. Not because the author of this commit knew anything was wrong with it. But, pretty much entirely by accident (although removing deps was part of the point of that commit), almost entirely eliminates the value of all those 2 years of hard work.
And that was with the finish line in sight for the xz hackers: On 24 feb 2024, the xz hackers release liblzma 5.6.0 which is the first fully operational compromised version. __12 days later systemd merges a commit that means it won't work__.
So now the race is on. Can they get 5.6.0 integrated into stable releases of major OSes _before_ teknoraver's commit that removes liblzma's status as direct dep of systemd?
I find it plausible that they knew about teknoraver's commit _just before_ Feb 24th 2024 (when liblzma v5.6.0 was released, the first backdoored release), and rushed to release ASAP, before doing the testing you describe. Buoyed by their efforts to add ways to update the payload which they indeed used - March 8th (after teknoraver's commit was accepted) it was used to fix the valgrind issue.
So, no, I don't find this weird, and I don't think the amateurish aspects should be taken as some sort of indication that parts of the outfit were amateuristic. As long as it's plausible that the amateuristic aspects were simply due to time pressure, it sounds like a really bad idea to make assumptions in this regard.
What are some alternatives?
clevis - Automated Encryption Framework
openrc - The OpenRC init system
sedutil - Use sedutil for setting up and using self encrypting drives (SEDs) that comply with the TCG OPAL 2.00 standard. This includes the requisite pre-boot authentication image.
tini - A tiny but valid `init` for containers
docker-traefik - Docker media and home server stack with Docker Compose, Traefik, Swarm Mode, Google OAuth2/Authelia, and LetsEncrypt
inotify-tools - inotify-tools is a C library and a set of command-line programs providing a simple interface to inotify.
booster - Fast and secure initramfs generator
s6 - The s6 supervision suite.
systemd - systemd upstream
earlyoom - earlyoom - Early OOM Daemon for Linux
linux-luks-tpm-boot - A guide for setting up LUKS boot with a key from TPM in Linux
supervisor - Supervisor process control system for Unix (supervisord)