spire VS cosign

Compare spire vs cosign and see what are their differences.


The SPIFFE Runtime Environment (by spiffe)


Container Signing (by sigstore)
Our great sponsors
  • Mergify - Updating dependencies is time-consuming.
  • InfluxDB - Collect and Analyze Billions of Data Points in Real Time
  • SonarLint - Clean code begins in your IDE with SonarLint
spire cosign
4 29
1,500 3,637
2.1% 4.0%
7.4 0.0
7 days ago 4 days ago
Go Go
Apache License 2.0 Apache License 2.0
The number of mentions indicates the total number of mentions that we've tracked plus the number of user suggested alternatives.
Stars - the number of stars that a project has on GitHub. Growth - month over month growth in stars.
Activity is a relative number indicating how actively a project is being developed. Recent commits have higher weight than older ones.
For example, an activity of 9.0 indicates that a project is amongst the top 10% of the most actively developed projects that we are tracking.


Posts with mentions or reviews of spire. We have used some of these posts to build our list of alternatives and similar projects. The last one was on 2022-11-21.
  • How to automate certificate renewal with Azure Key vault?
    2 projects | /r/kubernetes | 21 Nov 2022
    If this seems a bit complicated, you could use SPIRE server to issue certificates and Otterize SPIRE integration operator to renew them in Kubernetes and update Secrets.
  • What are the most important metrics for measuring cloud and endpoint security?
    5 projects | /r/cybersecurity | 5 Dec 2021
    BlindSPOT: https://blindspotsec.com/ Specific graphic from BlindSPOT: https://blindspotsec.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Failure_Before.jpg How to Measure Anything in Cybersecurity Risk: https://www.amazon.com/dp/B01J4XYM16/ Monte Carlo simulation approach: https://embracethered.com/blog/posts/2020/red-teaming-and-monte-carlo-simulations/ D3FEND: https://d3fend.mitre.org/ ATT&CK mappings: https://github.com/center-for-threat-informed-defense/attack-control-framework-mappings ATT&CK evals: https://attackevals.mitre-engenuity.org/index.html CALDERA: https://github.com/mitre/caldera Offensive Countermeasures: https://www.amazon.com/dp/1974671690/ SPIFFE: https://spiffe.io/ SPIRE: https://github.com/spiffe/spire Zerotier: https://www.zerotier.com/ Zerotier libzt: https://github.com/zerotier/libzt


Posts with mentions or reviews of cosign. We have used some of these posts to build our list of alternatives and similar projects. The last one was on 2023-05-22.
  • An Overview of Kubernetes Security Projects at KubeCon Europe 2023
    17 projects | dev.to | 22 May 2023
    sigstore is another suite of tools that focuses on attestation and provenance. Within the suite are two tools I heard mentioned a few times at KubeCon: Cosign and Rekor.
  • Spin 1.0 — The Developer Tool for Serverless WebAssembly
    17 projects | dev.to | 28 Mar 2023
    Since we can distribute Spin applications using popular registry services, we can also take advantage of ecosystem tools such as Sigstore and Cosign, which address the software supply chain issue by signing and verifying applications using Sigstore's new keyless signatures (using OIDC identity tokens from providers such as GitHub).
  • Iron Bank: Secure Registries, Secure Containers
    3 projects | dev.to | 8 Feb 2023
    Use distroless images (which contain only application and its runtime dependencies, and don't include package managers/shells or any other programs you would expect to find in a standard Linux distribution). All distroless images are signed by cosign.
  • Getting hands on with Sigstore Cosign on AWS
    3 projects | dev.to | 31 Jan 2023
    $ COSIGN_EXPERIMENTAL=1 cosign verify-blob --cert https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/releases/download/v1.13.1/cosign-linux-amd64-keyless.pem --signature https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/releases/download/v1.13.1/cosign-linux-amd64-keyless.sig https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/releases/download/v1.13.1/cosign-linux-amd64
  • How much are you 'trusting' a docker image from hub.docker.com?
    3 projects | /r/docker | 27 Dec 2022
    Another thing to look for is, whether the image is signed using something like cosign (https://github.com/sigstore/cosign). This lets the publisher digitally sign the image, so you at least know that what's on the registry is what they intended to put there. Handy to avoid the risks of attackers squatting similar names and catching typos.
  • Docker build fails on GitHub Action after net7 update
    9 projects | /r/dotnet | 14 Dec 2022
    name: Docker # This workflow uses actions that are not certified by GitHub. # They are provided by a third-party and are governed by # separate terms of service, privacy policy, and support # documentation. on: push: branches: [ "main" ] # Publish semver tags as releases. tags: [ 'v*.*.*' ] pull_request: branches: [ "main" ] paths: - src/MamisSolidarias.WebAPI.Campaigns/Dockerfile - .github/workflows/docker-publish.yml workflow_dispatch: env: # Use docker.io for Docker Hub if empty REGISTRY: ghcr.io IMAGE_NAME: mamis-solidarias/campaigns jobs: build: runs-on: ubuntu-latest permissions: contents: read packages: write # This is used to complete the identity challenge # with sigstore/fulcio when running outside of PRs. id-token: write steps: - name: Checkout repository uses: actions/checkout@v3 # Install the cosign tool except on PR # https://github.com/sigstore/cosign-installer - name: Install cosign if: github.event_name != 'pull_request' uses: sigstore/cosign-installer@main with: cosign-release: 'v1.13.1' - name: Set up QEMU uses: docker/setup-qemu-action@v2 with: platforms: 'arm64' # Workaround: https://github.com/docker/build-push-action/issues/461 - name: Setup Docker buildx uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@v2 # Login against a Docker registry except on PR # https://github.com/docker/login-action - name: Log into registry ${{ env.REGISTRY }} if: github.event_name != 'pull_request' uses: docker/login-action@v2 with: registry: ${{ env.REGISTRY }} username: ${{ github.actor }} password: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }} # Extract metadata (tags, labels) for Docker # https://github.com/docker/metadata-action - name: Extract Docker metadata id: meta uses: docker/metadata-action@v4 with: images: ${{ env.REGISTRY }}/${{ env.IMAGE_NAME }} tags: | type=schedule type=ref,event=branch type=ref,event=pr type=semver,pattern={{version}} type=semver,pattern={{major}}.{{minor}} type=semver,pattern={{major}} type=sha # Build and push Docker image with Buildx (don't push on PR) # https://github.com/docker/build-push-action - name: Build and push Docker image id: build-and-push uses: docker/build-push-action@v3 with: context: . platforms: linux/amd64, linux/arm64 file: src/MamisSolidarias.WebAPI.Campaigns/Dockerfile push: ${{ github.event_name != 'pull_request' }} tags: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.tags }} labels: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.labels }} # Sign the resulting Docker image digest except on PRs. # This will only write to the public Rekor transparency log when the Docker # repository is public to avoid leaking data. If you would like to publish # transparency data even for private images, pass --force to cosign below. # https://github.com/sigstore/cosign - name: Sign the published Docker image if: ${{ github.event_name != 'pull_request' }} env: COSIGN_EXPERIMENTAL: "true" # This step uses the identity token to provision an ephemeral certificate # against the sigstore community Fulcio instance. run: echo "${{ steps.meta.outputs.tags }}" | xargs -I {} cosign sign {}@${{ steps.build-and-push.outputs.digest }}
  • How to tag base image so images built from it can be tracked
    2 projects | /r/devops | 6 Dec 2022
    After inspecting the layers i think you should start thinking about signing your images: https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/
  • Understanding Kubernetes Limits and Requests
    9 projects | dev.to | 1 Dec 2022
  • Kubernetes Hardening Guidance [pdf]
    2 projects | news.ycombinator.com | 5 Oct 2022
  • Implement DevSecOps to Secure your CI/CD pipeline
    54 projects | dev.to | 27 Sep 2022
    Using distroless images not only reduces the size of the container image it also reduces the surface attack. The need for container image signing is because even with the distroless images there is a chance of facing some security threats such as receiving a malicious image. We can use cosign or skopeo for container signing and verifying. You can read more about securing containers with Cosign and Distroless Images in this blog.

What are some alternatives?

When comparing spire and cosign you can also consider the following projects:

spiffe-vault - Integrates Spiffe and Vault to have secretless authentication

connaisseur - An admission controller that integrates Container Image Signature Verification into a Kubernetes cluster

in-toto-golang - A Go implementation of in-toto. in-toto is a framework to protect software supply chain integrity.

notation - A CLI tool to sign and verify artifacts

rekor - Software Supply Chain Transparency Log

fulcio - Sigstore OIDC PKI

notation - Collection of quotes on notation design & how it affects thought.

libzt - Encrypted P2P sockets over ZeroTier

cosign-installer - Cosign Github Action

sigstore-the-hard-way - sigstore the hard way!